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Preface 
 
While traditional valuation methods such as discounted cash flow (DCF) are widely 
being used in real life, more sophisticated techniques such as adjusted present value (APV) 
and real options (RO) attract ever-increasing attention from theory and practice. A wide range 
of papers covering very diverse areas of application for these advanced tools have been 
published over the recent years. However, in contrast to their extensive knowledge about 
techniques that can be applied for valuing acquisitions, academics have an incomplete 
understanding of how the value created in acquisitions is split up between the target’s and 
acquirer’s shareholders. Strategic literature points to the importance of possessing unique 
capabilities and both the strategic and financial literature emphasize the role of information 
asymmetry in determining the acquirer value appropriation. 
This PhD thesis discusses both simple and more complex valuation models of 
acquisitions. Our valuation and value appropriation models consider the specific capabilities 
of the evaluator. We propose an innovative application of an option-game model that takes 
rival bidders’ resources into account. The analysis provided in the thesis aims to further 
bridge the gap between finance and strategic management. 
This dissertation consists of the following chapters: ‘The Valuation of IPOs by 
Underwriting Investment Banks and the Stock Market’, ‘The Role of Investor Capabilities in 
Public-to-Private Transactions’, and ‘Acquisitions as a Real Options Bidding Game’. Each 
chapter is based on a paper. The first chapter is empirical work, the second is of a more 
conceptual nature and the third one is based on theoretical modeling.  
All three papers from which the chapters draw are under submission at high-quality 
journals, and have been presented at several international conferences (e.g., the EIASM 
International Workshop on Capital Market Research, Valencia, 2001; the Financial 
Management Association European Meeting, Copenhague, 2002; the European Financial 
Management Association Conference, Londen, 2002; the Strategic Management Society 
Conference, San Juan, 2004). This research has also been presented at several Belgian and 
Dutch universities. 
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Introduction to the dissertation 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Though valuation methods such as discounted cash flow (DCF) are broadly applied in 
practice, more sophisticated techniques such as adjusted present value (APV) are receiving 
increasing attention. However, the new valuation paradigm that is really on the forefront, both 
at an academic and practitioner level, is real options. In a survey of US firms, Graham & 
Harvey (2001) found that about 27% of the CFOs already use real options for project 
evaluation. Valuation experts like Tom Copeland also expect a rapid growth in the acceptance 
and application of the real option technique, and even predict real options to replace the DCF 
methodology, as the latter method is only a specific case of a real options valuation. 
Myers (1977) introduced ‘real options’ by extending the idea of financial options to 
real assets. Since then, several types of real options have been developed in the financial 
strand of literature. In the early real options literature, competitive effects were ignored or 
assumed to be exogenous. However, if there is a competitive threat, whereby a firm’s payoff 
is affected by its rivals’ actions, competitive interactions have an impact on the value of real 
options and their optimal exercise strategies. Only recently have strategic considerations, 
particularly with regard to imperfect competition, been treated in a formal way in the finance 
and more general economic literature. Kester (1984) discusses concepts of the strategic and 
competitive aspects of growth opportunities. Baldwin (1987) and Trigeorgis (1991) show that 
a firm anticipating future competitive entry at a specified time will invest earlier for pre-
emptive reasons. Kogut (1991), Williams (1993), Dixit & Pindyck (1994), McGahan (1993), 
Nichols (1994), Kulatilaka & Perotti (1998), Smit & Trigeorgis (1998, 2004), Huisman & 
Kort (1999), Grenadier (2000 a,b), Lambrecht (2000), Huisman (2001), Perotti & Rossetto 
(2002), Weeds (2002), Kranenburg, Perotti, & Rossetto (2004) and others provide various 
treatments of the intersection between real options and game theory with applications in 
R&D, joint research ventures, real estate, consumer electronics and pharmaceuticals. Real 
options have also penetrated the strategic literature (Bowman & Hurry, 1993; McGrath, 1997; 
Chi, 2000). Research on the combined field of real options and game theory is rapidly 
growing; for an overview, we refer to Smit & Trigeorgis (2004).  
In contrast to their extensive knowledge about traditional and real option techniques 
that can be applied for valuing acquisitions, academics still need to further develop theories 
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(and empirical evidence supporting them) about the distribution of the value creation between 
the target and acquirer. In other words, what part of the value creation can the acquirer 
appropriate? Strategic management literature points to the importance of possessing unique 
capabilities, and both the strategic and financial literature emphasize the role of information 
asymmetry. In this dissertation both simple and more complex valuation models are 
discussed, and in the last chapter we apply an integrated real option-game model to analyze 
the value appropriated by acquiring firms. In our valuation and value appropriation models, 
the specific resources and capabilities of the evaluator are considered. By taking the acquirer 
resources into account and by proposing an innovative application of a combined option-game 
model, this dissertation aims to further bridge the gap between finance and strategic 
management theory. 
This dissertation consists of the collection of the following three papers: ‘The 
Valuation of IPOs by Underwriting Investment Banks and the Stock Market’ (joint work with 
Marc Deloof and Koen Inghelbrecht), ‘The Role of Investor Capabilities in Public-to-Private 
Transactions’, and ‘Acquisitions as a Real Options Bidding Game’ (joint work with Han Smit 
and Ward van den Berg). The first paper is empirical work, the second is a conceptual 
synthesis and the third one is based on a theoretical model. The common topic covered is 
valuation (all three papers) and value appropriation (second and third paper). The dissertation 
discusses the real option perspective next to the traditional valuation methodologies. 
The first chapter examines the valuation methods used by underwriting investment 
banks for initial public offerings (IPOs). It investigates how the offer price is set and analyzes 
to what extent the investment banks’ valuation results deviate from the stock market price 
shortly after the first listing. Traditional valuation models such as discounted cash flow are 
widely used whereas novel developments like real option methods, in contrast to the US, have 
currently not yet been applied or even discussed for any of the IPOs in our sample. This is 
probably due to its more complex character and the fact that real-life real option applications 
are still in their infancy. The second chapter describes a valuation model for the various 
sources of value creation in a public-to-private transaction and links the investor’s value 
appropriation to its idiosyncratic capabilities. One of the unique resources and value 
components within our framework is the opportunity (real option) provided by the initial 
acquisition of a public-to-private target to lever the investor’s core competences by pursuing 
follow-on investments, for instance within a buy-and-build strategy. The third chapter 
examines how the value creation in acquisitions is distributed between the target’s and the 
acquirer’s shareholders within a setting of asymmetric and costly information. A real option 
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model that explicitly incorporates a rival bidder’s reactions is used to analyze bidding 
contests, the level of the bidding premium and the expected acquirer value appropriation. 
      
2. Overview of the dissertation 
 
The first chapter examines the accuracy of the various valuation models as used by the 
underwriting investment banks, for a sample of 49 IPOs that were listed on Euronext Brussels 
in the 1993-2001 period. A number of papers in both the accounting and finance literature 
look into the accuracy of valuation methods and a mass of research has been published about 
IPOs. However, there is almost no literature about the valuation of IPOs and the accuracy of 
that valuation. In Belgium, pre-IPO valuation estimates by the underwriting investment bank 
are published in the IPO prospectus. This enables us to examine the accuracy of the ex-ante 
valuation models as used by the underwriter, whereas other papers in the field analyze the ex-
post value estimates of academics. We furthermore investigate how the offer price is set and 
whether investment banks use additional information next to their value estimates when 
setting the issue price. Our analysis provides insights in both valuation and the broader IPO 
context. 
The second chapter investigates the value of a public-to-private leveraged 
management buyout (PTP), considered from the perspective of a private equity investor. Its 
main contribution is the fact that it provides an integration of finance and strategic 
management to explain the actual developments and overall evolution taking place within the 
buyout market. Next to the traditional factors (reducing agency problems and information-
asymmetry, tax shields, value added services provided by the private equity investor) we 
discuss the levering of the private investor’s capabilities. These may result in synergetic 
benefits that might exist between the target and the current portfolio companies, and in 
intertemporal synergies, i.e., the real option or opportunity to realize synergetic effects by 
making follow-on investments which build on the initial PTP. All the sources of value are 
integrated within an expanded adjusted present value criterion, which incorporates both the 
operational and financial value, as well as the real option value of a public-to-private. We link 
the private investor’s value appropriation to its unique capabilities and propose that buyout 
firms will further specialize and pursue more innovative investment strategies such as buy-
and-build. 
20
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The third chapter analyses the value appropriation of the acquiring firm in a takeover. 
It presents an integrated real options-game model that examines the bidding process, the 
likelihood of a bidding contest and the expected value appropriation for the acquirer from a 
resource-based perspective. We consider the opportunity to bid on a potential target as a real 
option on the target’s resources in a competitive setting with imperfect and costly 
information. Performing due diligence can be considered as the purchase of a real option on 
the target. Potential buyers need to incur due diligence costs (option premium) in order to 
become informed about their specific target value (underlying value) before making a bid 
(exercise price). In a bidding contest the exercise price is affected by the competitor’s target 
valuation, requiring an option-game model with imperfect information. A higher value of this 
real option and a lower option premium induce rivals to enter a bidding contest and reduce the 
acquirer’s expected value appropriation. The contribution of our model is that when 
considering acquisitions as options games, new -and less obvious- parameters related to 
uncertainty, such as volatility and correlation between bidders, affect value appropriation.  
The final chapter summarizes this dissertation, its main findings and implications. It 
outlines how the dissertation aims to contribute to our knowledge on valuation and value 
appropriation, and how it has taken a step further in bridging the gap between strategic 
management and finance. Furthermore, it provides a number of directions for future research. 
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Chapter 1: The Valuation of IPOs by Underwriting Investment Banks 
and the Stock Market1 
 
Abstract 
 
We analyze the underwriting investment banks’ valuation of 49 IPOs on Euronext 
Brussels in the 1993-2001 period. We find that for each IPO several valuation 
methods are used, of which Discounted Free Cash Flow (DFCF) is the most popular, 
but the offer price seems to be mainly driven by the Dividend Discount Model (DDM) 
if applied. Our results suggest that DDM tends to underestimate value, while DFCF 
produces unbiased value estimates. When multiples valuation is used, investment 
banks rely mostly on future earnings and cash flows. Moreover, multiples valuation 
based on post-IPO forecasted earnings and cash flows leads to more accurate 
valuations than multiples valuation based on earnings and cash flows in the IPO-
year. Consistent with the hypothesis that lead underwriters use other valuable 
information besides value estimates to set the final offer price, our results indicate 
that the final offer price is closer to the post-IPO stock market price than individual 
value estimates.  
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
A firm conducting an initial public offering (IPO) needs to have its stock valued 
before the IPO, in order to determine a price range within which the stock will be offered to 
the public. There are several methods available for stock valuation. The most widely used 
valuation approaches are the dividend discount model (DDM), the discounted free cash flow 
(DFCF) method, and valuation approaches that rely on multiples of firms in similar industries 
and firms involved in similar transactions. 
                                                 
1 This chapter is based on the paper ‘The Valuation of IPOs by Underwriting Investment Banks and the Stock 
Market: Empirical Evidence’, Marc Deloof, Koen Inghelbrecht, & Wouter De Maeseneire, Working Paper Ghent 
University 02/136, 2002. I am grateful to An Buysschaert, Marc De Ceuster, Nancy Huyghebaert, Marc Jegers, 
Rez Kabir, Sophie Manigart, Ilse Verschueren and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and 
suggestions. This paper has also benefited from presentations at the 2001 EIASM International Workshop on 
Capital Market Research (Valencia), the 2001 meeting of the Flemish Economic Association (Diepenbeek), the 
2002 FMA European meeting (Copenhagen), the 2002 EFMA meeting (London), and a research seminar at the 
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. 
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While there are many papers on the accuracy of valuation methods, and there is a very 
extensive literature on IPOs, few papers focus on the valuation of IPOs. Two studies 
investigate the accuracy of IPO valuation.2 Kim & Ritter (1999) value a sample of IPOs in the 
US using P/E and price-to-book comparables, and find that these methods lead to very 
imprecise valuations when historical accounting numbers are used. However, when forecasted 
earnings are used, the accuracy of the valuation improves substantially. Berkman, Bradbury, 
& Ferguson (2000), who value 45 newly listed firms in New Zealand, conclude that the best 
discounted cash flow and P/E valuations have similar accuracy.  
An important feature of these and other studies on the accuracy of valuation methods 
is that they use ex post value estimations by the researcher(s). In Belgium, pre-IPO value 
estimates by the lead underwriting investment bank are often published in the IPO-prospectus, 
which is made available at the start of the public offering. This allows us to examine the 
accuracy of the valuation models as used by investment banks. It can be expected that the 
accuracy of ex ante valuation by investment banks will differ from the valuation accuracy 
measured by academics, for several reasons. Value estimates by investment banks may be less 
accurate because academics are more objective than investment banks, who may be tempted 
to report valuations that justify a high price, for instance by choosing comparables with high 
multiples, or a low price, in order to reduce marketing efforts. On the other hand, value 
estimates by investment banks may be more accurate than value estimates by academics 
because investment banks have more information for valuation available. Moreover, as the 
stock market is pricing perceptions of the future and not the future itself, the value estimates 
by lead underwriters and the offer price, which to some extent will be based on these value 
estimates, may influence these perceptions and therefore the stock price. However, in an 
efficient market mispricing by underwriters should not affect market valuation. 
In this chapter, we investigate the valuation by the underwriters of 49 IPOs on 
Euronext Brussels (formerly the Brussels Stock Exchange) in the 1993-2001 period. We 
address two research questions. First, we want to know how IPOs are valued. What valuation 
models do underwriters use, and how do they set the offer price, given the value estimates? 
Second, we investigate which of the valuation models, as used by underwriters, provides the 
best estimation of the stock market price. Do these valuation methods produce unbiased 
results, and what is the accuracy of the valuations?    
                                                 
2 A number of papers investigate determinants of IPO valuation, but do not consider valuation accuracy (e.g., 
Krinsky & Rotenberg, 1989; Clarkson, Dontoh, Richardson, & Sefcik, 1992; McGuinness, 1993; Klein, 1996; 
Roosenboom & Van der Goot, 2003).  
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We find that for each IPO several valuation methods are used, of which DFCF is the 
most popular method: the DFCF model is used to value all IPOs in the sample. However, the 
offer price is set closer to DDM estimates if DDM is applied. This is remarkable, as a 
comparison of pre-IPO valuations to the average stock price in the first month of listing and to 
the stock price on post-IPO days +1, +10, +20 and +30 suggests that the dividend discount 
model tends to underestimate value, while discounted free cash flow produces unbiased 
results. Interviews with investment bankers indicate that underwriters consciously underprice 
IPOs, by applying a deliberate discount to DFCF value estimates. DFCF is considered to be 
the most reliable method. DDM estimates are on average closer to the preliminary offer price 
than other value estimates, because DDM tends to underestimate value.  
We also find that P/E and price/cash flow (P/CF) multiples using earnings and cash 
flows in the IPO-year lead to less accurate valuations than multiples using forecasted earnings 
and cash flows in the year after the IPO, which is consistent with results of Kim & Ritter 
(1999). Finally, our results indicate that the final offer price is closer to the stock market price 
than pre-IPO value estimates. This is consistent with the expectation that the final offer price 
incorporates valuable information about investor demand, obtained by the underwriter during 
the public offering. 
This study uses ‘real world’ estimations to investigate the different valuation 
approaches. DeAngelo (1990) describes the use of different valuation techniques by a limited 
number of investment bankers to evaluate the fairness of management buyouts, but does not 
investigate the accuracy of these valuations. Other studies examine the accuracy of earnings 
forecasts in IPO prospectuses, but do not focus on valuation accuracy (e.g., Firth & Smith, 
1992; Jaggi, 1997; Jelic, Saaudouni, & Briston, 1998, Gonoupolis, 2003). This chapter adds to 
the IPO valuation literature as it uses the actual value estimates of the underwriters. It 
provides insights in both valuation and the broader IPO context. Our results indicate that 
investment banks can fairly accurately estimate the intrinsic value; high initial returns (often 
referred to as underpricing) are partly due to the underwriters deliberately applying a discount 
when setting the offer price. DFCF, the method most commonly used by valuation experts 
and widely taught in business schools, produces the best estimate of the future IPO stock 
price. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows.  In the next section we briefly 
discuss the accuracy of valuation models and the IPO process. Section 1.3. describes the 
sample along with some statistics and discusses the methodology. In Section 1.4. valuations 
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are analyzed and compared to the IPO offer price and the average stock market price in the 
first month of listing. Section 1.5. presents some conclusions. 
 
1.2. The accuracy of valuation models and the IPO process 
 
1.2.1. The accuracy of valuation models 
 
Several studies examine the accuracy of valuation models. A number of these focus on 
multiples valuation, and provide mixed results on which multiples have the highest valuation 
accuracy (e.g., Beatty, Riffe, & Thompson, 1999; Kim & Ritter, 1999; Cheng & McNamara, 
2000; Liu, Nissim, & Thomas, 2002; Lie & Lie, 2002). Other papers investigate how the 
choice of comparable firms affects accuracy of multiples. Profitability, growth and risk are 
important variables in peer group selection, and the use of harmonic means generates the best 
results (e.g., Boatsman & Baskin, 1981; Alford, 1992; Cheng & McNamara, 2000; Bhojraj & 
Lee, 2002). A consistent result from studies on multiples is that multiples based on forecasted 
earnings leads to higher valuation accuracy than multiples using trailing earnings (see Kim & 
Ritter, 1999; Liu, Nissim, & Thomas, 2002; Lie & Lie, 2002). This is not unexpected, as a 
number of studies suggest that earnings forecasts capture information on value that is not 
reflected by historical earnings (e.g., Tse & Yaansah, 1999; Liu & Thomas, 2000). Yee 
(2004) shows that in a setting of unobserved information, forward earnings are better 
valuation attributes than trailing earnings. 
Some studies compare the accuracy of multiples valuation and discounted cash flow 
valuation. Kaplan & Ruback (1995) examine the discounted cash flow and comparable firm 
approaches in the context of highly leveraged transactions, and conclude that both approaches 
are useful and reliable. According to Kaplan & Ruback, discounted cash flow valuation 
methods perform at least as well as valuation approaches using companies in similar 
industries and companies involved in similar transactions. Gilson, Hotchkiss, & Ruback 
(2000) find that, for firms that reorganize in bankruptcy, the discounted cash flow and 
comparable firm approaches have about the same degree of accuracy and lead to estimates 
that are generally unbiased but not very precise. Berkman, Bradbury, & Ferguson (2000), 
value 45 newly listed firms in New Zealand, and also conclude that the best discounted cash 
flow and multiples valuations have similar accuracy. 
Penman & Sougiannis (1998) and Francis, Olsson, & Oswald (2000) compare accrual 
earnings valuation to discounted cash flow valuation. Interestingly, both studies find that 
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accrual earnings techniques produce lower valuation errors than discounted cash flows and 
dividends. However, Lundholm & O’Keefe (2001) claim that the superiority of accrual 
earnings valuation found by these papers is misguided, and is only due to the researchers‘ 
actual implementation containing inconsistencies, as accrual earnings valuation and 
discounted cash flow valuation are theoretically equivalent. 
Another part of the literature concentrates on the valuation of high-tech and internet 
stocks, examining whether traditional value fundamentals are relevant for these stocks as well 
(e.g., Hand, 1999; Hand, 2000; Schwartz & Moon, 2000; Trueman, Wong, & Zhan, 2000; 
Demers & Lev, 2001; Bartov, Mohanram, & Seethamraju, 2002). The results of these studies 
are mixed: some find that the valuation departs from traditional wisdom, while others find that 
traditional value drivers play a key role. 
 
1.2.2. The IPO process 
 
As our analysis focuses on the valuation of IPOs, it is useful to briefly describe the 
IPO process in Belgium. This process is very similar to IPO procedures in other countries, 
such as the US and the UK. Once the board of directors of a company has decided to go 
public, the company will hire an investment bank to underwrite the offering. Usually, a group 
of co-underwriters is formed to help sell the issue to the public. A prospectus is drafted which 
contains, amongst other things, financial information about the company and the terms of the 
offer. It is the only document the company can use to communicate with potential investors 
during the IPO. In Belgium, it will very often contain estimates of the company value by the 
lead underwriter. Before the shares can be offered to the public, the prospectus has to be 
approved by the Belgian Banking and Finance Commission. 
During the offering period, which lasts one or two weeks, investors can place bids for 
shares, usually within a range of potential offer prices, and sometimes at a unique offer price. 
Most IPOs in Belgium make use of the bookbuilding method, in which the underwriter builds 
a book of likely orders and uses this information to set the final offer price. The underwriter 
organizes road shows during which the new issue is marketed to investors. A few days after 
the public offering period, the final offer price is set within the offer price range (if 
applicable), shares are allocated to investors, and the share starts trading on the stock market. 
The final offer price is therefore set after the underwriter has obtained information about 
investor demand, which is not available at the time when the underwriter sets the preliminary 
offer price range on the basis of the value estimates. 
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1.3. Sample and methodology 
 
1.3.1. Sample 
 
Our sample includes 49 IPOs on Euronext Brussels from 1993 to 2001, excluding 
IPOs of mutual funds and holding companies. For IPOs before 1993, there is insufficient 
information available on value estimates. 15 of the 49 firms included in our sample were 
listed on the New Market (also called the Euro.NM Belgium), which was set up in 1997 for 
young, high growth firms. Table 1.1. shows that the IPOs in the sample are active in a wide 
range of industries, including both ‘high tech’ industries and industries that do not rely on 
sophisticated technologies.  
 
Table 1.1. 
Distribution across Industries  
49 IPOs on Euronext Brussels between 1993 and 2001 
by industry (Source: Datastream) 
Industry Number 
of IPOs 
Software 6 
Food processors 4 
Computer services 3 
Clothing and footwear 2 
Commercial vehicles 2 
Diversified industry 2 
Environmental control 2 
Leisure facilities 2 
Media agencies 2 
Medical equipment and supplies 2 
Pharmaceuticals 2 
Restaurants and pubs 2 
Textiles and leather goods 2 
Brewers 1 
Chemicals – advanced materials 1 
Computer hardware 1 
Construction materials 1 
Consumer electronics 1 
Electrical equipment 1 
Electronic equipment 1 
Gas distribution 1 
Insurance non-life 1 
Non-ferrous materials 1 
Paper 1 
Personal products 1 
Publishing and printing 1 
Retailers 1 
Soft goods 1 
Telecom equipment 1 
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Table 1.2. presents some descriptive statistics. The median firm introduced at 
Euronext Brussels offered 858,678 shares at a preliminary offer price of 28.8 EURO. The 
preliminary offer price is the midpoint of the minimum and maximum offer prices, or, if the 
shares are not offered within a price range, the unique offer price (see Kim & Ritter, 1999).3 
The initial returns, which are calculated as [average price in the first month of listing / offer 
price] – 1, were generally substantial on Euronext Brussels: the median initial return is + 
10.6%, and the mean initial return is + 20.2%.4 
 
Table 1.2. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics on (1) the number of shares offered to the public, (2) the preliminary offer price (in EURO), 
which is the midpoint of the minimum and maximum offer prices, or, if the shares are not offered within a price 
range, the pre-specified offer price, (3) the average price in the first month of listing (in EURO), (4) the initial return 
(in %), which is defined as [average price in the first month of listing / preliminary offer price] – 1, and (5) the 
number of firms offering existing shares and/or new shares, for 49 IPOs on Euronext between 1993 and 2001. For 
three observations there is no information available on the average price in the first month of listing, and therefore 
the initial return could not be calculated. For one observation there is no information available on the type of shares 
offered. 
 Mean St. dev. Minimum Median Maximum 
Number of shares offered to the public 1,132,361 1,066,284 116,809 858,678 6,250,000
Preliminary offer price (EURO) 40.4 96.4 1.7 28.8 694.1 
Average price in the first month of listing (EURO) 49.6 100.8 2.09 33.6 695.8 
Initial return (%) 20.2 38.0 -22.3 10.6 190.5 
 Number of firms offering   
Only existing shares 8   
Existing and new shares 25   
Only new shares 15   
 
 
For most IPOs, at least a part of the shares are sold by existing shareholders: 8 firms 
offer only existing shares; 25 firms offer both existing and new shares; only 15 firms offer 
only new shares (not surprisingly, all firms introduced on the New Market, which aims at 
young high growth firms, offer new shares)5. These findings are consistent with evidence 
from other European countries that a major motivation for European firms to go public is to 
allow the controlling shareholder to divest from the firm (see Rydqvist & Högholm, 1995; 
Pagano, Panetta, & Zingales, 1998; Giudici & Roosenboom, 2002; Ritter, 2003).  
                                                 
3 33 out of 49 IPOs in our sample made use of bookbuilding, the remaining IPOs involved fixed price 
mechanisms. 
4 Stock prices were taken from Datastream. 
5 For 1 observation we did not have sufficient information on the type of shares offered. 
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All lead underwriters are Belgian banks, with the exception of ABN Amro Rothschild, 
which is co-lead underwriter of 2 IPOs, and Indosuez, which is co-lead underwriter of 1 IPO.6 
How do these lead underwriters value the firm? Table 1.3. contains the valuation methods 
used to value the 49 IPOs, and the number of cases in which they are applied.7 All lead 
underwriters mention only the use of generally accepted valuation methods and seem to avoid 
eccentric multiple valuation methods as the ones described by Fernandez (2001).8 DFCF is the 
most popular method: it is used to value all IPOs. DDM is used for 24 IPOs, and a multiples 
approach is used to value 40 IPOs. All underwriters use at least two different valuation 
methods. Although multiple valuation is flawed from a theoretical perspective, it is often used 
in practice as in contrast to DCF, it does not require the though work of adequately estimating 
cash flows and appropriate discount rates (cf. Lie & Lie, 2002). P/E and P/CF are the most 
popular multiples approaches: P/E is applied for 37 IPOs and P/CF is applied for 17 IPOs. 
Other multiple approaches used are EnterpriseValue/EBITDA (8x), EnterpriseValue/Sales 
(3x), Price/Book (1x), Dividend yield (2x) and P/E-to-Growth (1x).  
A number of empirical studies (e.g., Carter & Manaster, 1990, and Carter, Dark, & 
Singh, 1998) have found that IPOs managed by high prestige investment bankers have a 
smaller initial return than do IPOs handled by low reputation underwriters. According to 
Carter & Manaster (1990), low risk firms signal their low risk by selecting prestigious 
underwriters, and prestigious underwriters, to maintain their reputation, only market IPOs of 
low risk firms. In line with this argument, it could be argued that underwriter reputation will 
also affect the accuracy of valuation. Underwriters that are more prestigious, can be expected 
to have more incentives to certify that the offer price incorporates all available information. 
More prestigious underwriters may therefore be associated with higher valuation accuracy. 
However, we do not investigate this relation here, for several reasons. First, we do not have a 
reliable measure of investment bank reputation in Belgium. The Belgian market for 
underwriting services is very small, the number of banks offering these services is limited, 
and there do not appear to be big differences in reputation across Belgian investment banks. 
                                                 
6 Other (co-)lead underwriters are Generale Bank/Fortis Bank (14 IPOs), Smeets Securities/Delta Lloyd 
Securities (12 IPOs), Bank Brussel Lambert (9 IPOs), KBC Securities (7 IPOs), Petercam (7 IPOs), 
Paribas/Artesia Bank/Dexia (5 IPOs), Bank De Groof (4 IPOs), Lessius (1 IPO),  Delen & Co (1 IPO), Van Moer 
Santerre (1 IPO) and Nedee (1 IPO). 
7 Some IPO prospectuses mention the use of a valuation method for which no estimation result is given. These 
are not included in Table 1.3. 
8 Fernandez discusses the valuation of internet provider Terra-Lycos in 2000 by a number of banks, which use 
weighted averages of a curious mix of multiples, based on e.g., GNP per capital, number of habitants, 
capitalization per subscriber, enterprise value per page view, and capitalization per page view. 
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Moreover, Engelen (2000) finds an insignificant relation between proxies for underwriter 
reputation and underpricing of Belgian IPOs. 
 
Table 1.3. 
Valuation Methods Used by  
Lead Underwriters  
The number of IPOs for which the IPO-prospectus, 
which is made available at the start of the public 
offering, provides a value estimation based on a 
particular valuation method, for 49 IPOs on Euronext 
Brussels between 1993 and 2001. 
Valuation method Number 
of IPOs 
Discounted free cash flow 49  
Dividend discount model 24 
Multiples 40 
 Price/earnings 37 
Peer group 34 
Stock market 14 
Growth shares 2 
 Price/cash flow 17 
Peer group 15 
Stock market 8 
Growth shares 3 
 EnterpriseValue/EBITDA (peer 
group) 
8 
 EnterpriseValue/sales  3 
Peer group 3 
Stock market 1 
 Price/book (peer group) 1 
 Dividend yield (peer group) 2 
 P/E-to-growth (peer group) 1 
 
 
A problem with using multiples to value Belgian IPOs is that the number of firms 
listed on Euronext Brussels is limited. At the end of 1999 only 144 firms were listed, many of 
which are financial institutions and holding companies. It is therefore often difficult to find a 
sufficient number of comparable firms. In several cases, the underwriter compares the IPO to 
the Euronext Brussels stock market, as well as to a peer group of firms, in order to estimate 
value. In some cases, value is also estimated using the average P/E or P/CF of growth shares 
on Euronext Brussels. Table 1.3. shows that the stock market P/E is used to value 14 IPOs, 
while the stock market P/CF is used for 8 IPOs. In one case, valuation is based on the stock 
market Enterprise Value/Sales ratio. The P/E (2x) and the P/CF (3x) of Euronext Brussels 
growth shares is used in only a very limited number of cases. 
Multiples can be based on historical earnings or cash flows, but also on forecasted 
earnings and cash flows. Most multiples used in our sample are based on current year’s 
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forecasted earnings and cash flow (year 0) or next year’s forecasted earnings or cash flow 
(year +1). In a limited number of cases the underwriter also uses historical earnings and cash 
flow in the year before the IPO (year –1) and/or the forecasted earnings and cash flow for the 
second post-IPO year (year +2). This leads to a wide range of multiples used by investment 
banks, along three dimensions: [1] type of multiple (P/E, P/CF, Price/book ..), [2] the firms to 
which the IPO is compared (peer group, stock market, growth shares), and [3] the timing of 
the multiple (years –1, 0, +1, +2). In the remainder of the chapter, we will investigate the 
estimations of the most frequently used multiples: P/E and P/CF, for a peer group and for the 
stock market, in years 0 and +1.  
 
1.3.2. Methodology 
 
For each valuation method, the proximity of the estimated value to the offer price is 
measured by the natural log of the ratio of the estimated value to the offer price. Likewise, the 
proximity of estimated value to the market value is computed as the natural log of the 
estimated value over market value. We will refer to these measures as ‘valuation errors’. 
However, the natural log of the ratio of the estimated value to the offer price should not be 
interpreted as an error in the strict sense, but only as a measure of the proximity of value 
estimate and offer price. As in other studies of valuation methods, we use mean and median 
valuation errors to indicate the extent to which value estimates are biased: do the value 
estimates tend to be on average higher or lower than the offer price or the market value? We 
focus on median errors, which are less affected by outliers than mean errors (although the 
difference in our sample is limited). The accuracy of valuation is measured by the percentage 
of valuation errors within 15% and the mean absolute error, both indicating the dispersion of 
the valuation errors.9    
Our measure of valuation accuracy, which is commonly used in the literature, is based 
on a comparison of value estimates with stock market prices. This measure assumes that (1) 
values estimates reported in the prospectus are the actual value estimates of the underwriter, 
and (2) stock market prices reflect fair value. Regarding the first assumption, it cannot be 
ruled out that the reported values estimates are lower than the actual estimations of the 
                                                 
9 See for instance Kaplan & Ruback (1995), Kim & Ritter (1998) and Gilson et al. (2000). Kaplan & Ruback 
also use the mean quadratic error as a measure of valuation accuracy. The mean squared error assumes that the 
‘cost’ of valuation errors for the user of the valuation method, such as costs arising from mispricing, increase 
quadraticly, while the mean absolute error assumes that the cost increases are linear. We measured the mean 
squared error for all the analyses presented in this paper. The results (not reported) fully confirm those of the 
mean absolute error.  
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underwriter. It is widely acknowledged that IPOs are underpriced. If underwriters consciously 
underprice IPOs, they may have an incentive to report value estimates that are lower than 
their “true” value estimates. If this is the case for the IPOs in our sample, we expect to find 
that the reported value estimates for different methods tend to underestimate stock market 
prices. However, it can be argued that even if the reported value estimates are lower than the 
actual value estimates of the underwriter, a comparison of valuation errors will yield 
consistent results, as long as reported value estimates are underpriced to the same degree.  
The assumption that stock market prices reflect fair value, implies that the stock 
market is efficient and that any underpricing is corrected for very fast when trading starts. 
Most studies on underpricing indeed find abnormal initial returns on the first day of trading, 
but not afterwards, which suggests that underpricing is corrected at the first trading day (e.g., 
Ritter, 1998). Investors may also overreact when trading starts, thereby driving stock prices 
above fair values. Some studies on the long-run underperformance of IPOs find support for 
this theory (e.g., Aggarwal & Rivoli, 1990; Ritter, 1991; Loughran & Ritter, 1995; Ritter & 
Welch, 2002; Purnanandam & Swaminathan, 2004). Stocks can also become overvalued 
because underwriters tend to support prices in the after-market (e.g., Aggarwal & Rivoli, 
1990; Schultz & Rivoli, 1994). Stock market prices might therefore not reflect fair value. 
However, it can be argued that if the underwriter bases his valuations upon the same 
expectations as the stock market, a comparison of valuation errors will yield consistent 
results, regardless of overvaluation in the stock market.  
 Another potential problem when examining the valuation accuracy is that the 
information set changes when trading of the IPO begins, and investors are not restricted to the 
investment bank’s information set (Berger, 2002). This would mean that even though the 
value estimates of underwriters may be right at the time they were made (ex ante), they may 
be wrong afterwards (ex post), potentially distorting our results. However, given the very 
short period of time between the publication of the IPO prospectus and the first day of trading, 
we estimate this effect to be limited.  
 
1.4. Results 
 
1.4.1. On which method(s) do lead underwriters rely most to set the preliminary offer price? 
 
We first investigate the relation between the preliminary offer price and the results of 
the different value estimates by the lead underwriter. We want to find out on which valuation 
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method(s) lead underwriters rely most to set the preliminary offer price. Table 1.4. presents 
results for DFCF, DDM and the most commonly used multiple approaches: P/E and P/CF 
based on a peer group or stock market, calculated for year 0 and year +1.10 
The median valuation error for DFCF is +14.1%: lead underwriters set the preliminary 
offer price significantly lower than the value estimates based on DFCF (p-value of the 
Wilcoxon signed rank test is less than 0.001). The median error for DDM is +3.4% and only 
significant at the 10% level (p-value = 0.094). The median errors for estimates based on 
multiples vary widely: they range from -9.8% to +21.7%. These results suggest that the lead 
underwriters rely primarily on DDM to determine the preliminary offer price. 
We measure the degree of central tendency of value estimates towards the preliminary 
offer price by the percentage of differences within 15% and the mean absolute error. For only 
27 out of 49 IPOs (55.1% of the sample), the estimates based on DFCF are within 15% of the 
preliminary offer price. On the other hand, the DDM estimate is within 15% of the 
preliminary offer price for 22 out of 24 IPOs (91.7%) for which a DDM value is estimated. 
For the multiples estimates, the percentages within 15% are also much lower than for 
DDM. A comparison of the mean absolute error for the different valuation methods leads to 
the same conclusions as the comparison based on the percentage within 15%. A t-test of 
differences in the mean absolute error reveals that the mean absolute error for DDM estimates 
is significantly smaller than the mean absolute error of DFCF estimates (p-value = 0.002), and 
smaller than the mean absolute error for P/E peer group estimates in year +1 (p-value = 
0.003), the most frequently used multiple estimation method. The mean absolute error for 
DFCF and P/E peer group (year +1) estimates are not significantly different (p-value = 0.40). 
Again these results seem to suggest that the preliminary offer price is driven by DDM if 
applied (we will further elaborate upon these results in Section 1.4.3.).  
Another interesting finding in Table 1.4. is that the multiples valuations for year +1 are 
consistently closer to the preliminary offer price than the multiples valuations for the IPO year 
0: underwriters seem to rely more on forecasted future multiples than on current multiples. 
The p-value of a t-test of differences in the mean absolute error between P/E peer group (year 
0) and P/E peer group (year +1) is 0.002. 
Some valuation methods will be more appropriate to use than others. The underwriter 
has to choose which methods are appropriate and which are not. The results in Table 1.4. may 
be influenced by this choice. For example, the difference between DFCF and DDM might be 
                                                 
10 These multiples are consistently closer to the preliminary offer price than the multiples for which no results are 
presented. 
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caused by the 15 IPOs for which DFCF was used but DDM was not. For the 24 IPOs for 
which both methods were used, the DFCF estimates might then be much closer to the 
preliminary offer price than the results in Table 1.4. suggest. We therefore also investigate the 
relation between the IPO preliminary offer price and different value estimates by a pairwise 
comparison of valuation methods, for those IPOs that are valued with both methods. The 
results are presented in Table 1.5. DFCF, DDM and P/E based on a peer group for year +1 are 
compared pairwise. We concentrate on the P/E based on a peer group for year +1 because our 
performance measures indicate that this multiple is the one closest to the preliminary offer 
price. Moreover, P/E based on a peer group is the most commonly used multiple. We also 
compare P/E based on a peer group in year 0 and year +1. All results in Table 1.5. confirm 
those in Table 1.4.. 
So far, we have relied on univariate analysis to investigate the relation between pre-
IPO value estimates and preliminary offer price. For the IPOs in our sample, underwriters 
always use at least two valuation approaches. It therefore seems likely that the preliminary 
offer price is based on more than one value estimate. Table 1.6. reports the results of OLS-
regressions of the natural logarithm of the preliminary offer price, on the natural logarithm of 
value estimates by the lead underwriter. All variables are expressed as a natural logarithm 
because of large size differences. The coefficients of the explanatory variables should provide 
an estimate of the weight underwriters attach to a particular valuation method. However, the 
results in Table 1.6. have to be interpreted with caution: the number of observations for each 
combination of valuation methods is limited, and the value estimates are strongly correlated. 
The first column of Table 1.6. reports results for 13 IPOs which were valued with 
DFCF, DDM and P/E Peer Group Year +1 (the most commonly used multiple). The DDM 
coefficient is 0.68 and significant at the 1% level; the P/E Peer Group Year +1 is 0.31 and 
significant at the 5% level; the DFCF-coefficient is not significant. This again suggests that 
the preliminary offer price of IPOs which are valued with DFCF, DDM and P/E Peer Group 
Year +1, is primarily determined by DDM, and to a lesser extent by P/E Peer Group Year +1.
38
T
ab
le
 1
.4
.  
P r
e-
I P
O
 V
al
u e
 E
s t
i m
a t
e s
 a
nd
 P
re
lim
i n
ar
y 
O
f f
e r
 P
r i
ce
: a
 C
om
p a
ri
so
n 
o f
 D
i ff
er
e n
t  V
al
ua
t io
n 
M
e t
ho
ds
 
A
 c
om
pa
ri s
on
 o
f t
he
 m
os
t c
om
m
on
ly
 u
s e
d 
m
et
h o
d s
 t o
 v
al
ue
 4
9  
I P
O
s o
n 
E u
ro
ne
xt
 B
ru
ss
e l
s  
be
tw
ee
n 
19
9 3
 a
nd
 2
00
1 .
 V
a l
u a
ti o
n  
er
ro
rs
 a
r e
 c
om
pu
te
d 
a s
 th
e  
n a
tu
ra
l l
og
 
o f
 th
e  
r a
ti o
 o
f 
th
e 
e s
t im
at
ed
 v
a l
ue
 t o
 t h
e  
pr
el
im
in
ar
y  
o f
fe
r 
pr
i c
e .
 T
h e
 p
re
lim
in
ar
y  
o f
fe
r 
pr
i c
e  
is
 t h
e 
m
id
p o
i n
t o
f  
th
e 
m
i n
i m
u m
 a
nd
 m
ax
im
um
 o
ff
er
 p
r ic
e s
,  o
r , 
if 
th
e 
s h
a r
es
 a
re
 n
ot
 o
ff
e r
e d
 w
ith
in
 a
 p
ric
e  
ra
n g
e,
 th
e  
p r
e -
sp
e c
ifi
e d
 o
ff
e r
 p
ric
e.
 T
h e
 p
re
-I
P O
 v
al
u e
 e
s t
im
a t
e s
 a
re
 p
u b
lis
he
d  
in
 th
e 
IP
O
-p
ro
sp
e c
tu
s, 
w
h i
c h
 is
 m
a d
e  
av
a i
la
b l
e 
a t
 
th
e  
st
a r
t o
f t
h e
 p
u b
lic
 o
ff
er
in
g .
 T
h e
 fi
rs
t f
o u
r r
o w
s  
re
p o
rt 
m
e d
ia
n ,
 m
e a
n ,
 s
ta
n d
a r
d 
d e
vi
a t
io
n  
a n
d  
in
te
rq
ua
rti
le
 ra
n g
e  
o f
 e
rr
o r
s. 
T w
o  
m
e a
s u
re
s  o
f v
a l
ua
tio
n  
a c
c u
ra
c y
 a
re
 
re
p o
rte
d :
 th
e  
pe
rc
e n
ta
g e
 o
f e
rr
or
s  
w
ith
in
 1
5  
%
, a
nd
 th
e  
m
ea
n  
a b
so
lu
te
 e
rr
or
. F
o r
 e
ac
h  
v a
lu
a t
io
n  
m
et
h o
d ,
 th
e 
n u
m
b e
r o
f o
b s
er
v a
tio
n s
 d
e p
e n
d s
 o
n  
th
e  
n u
m
b e
r o
f I
PO
s  
fo
r w
hi
c h
 th
e  
m
e t
ho
d 
is
 a
pp
lie
d.
 
V
a l
ua
tio
n 
m
e t
ho
d:
 
D
is
c o
un
te
d 
Fr
ee
 C
a s
h 
Fl
ow
 
D
iv
id
e n
d 
D
is
c o
un
t 
M
od
el
 
P/
E 
Pe
e r
 
G
ro
up
   
   
(y
e a
r 0
) 
P/
E 
Pe
e r
 
G
ro
up
   
   
(y
ea
r +
1)
 
P/
E 
St
oc
k 
M
a r
ke
t  
   
 
(y
e a
r 0
) 
P/
E 
St
oc
k 
M
ar
ke
t  
   
 
(y
e a
r +
1)
 
P/
C
F 
Pe
e r
 
G
ro
up
  
(y
e a
r 0
) 
P/
C
F 
Pe
e r
 
G
ro
up
   
   
 
(y
e a
r +
1)
 
P/
C
F 
St
oc
k 
M
a r
ke
t  
   
 
(y
e a
r 0
) 
P/
C
F 
St
oc
k 
M
a r
ke
t  
   
(y
e a
r +
1)
 
M
e d
ia
n 
14
.1
%
 
3.
4%
 
-1
.0
%
 
11
.2
%
 
-7
.2
%
 
7.
6%
 
21
.7
%
 
20
.1
%
 
-9
.8
%
 
7.
7%
 
M
ea
n 
14
.4
%
 
3.
2%
 
-2
5.
8%
 
7.
4%
 
-1
6.
8%
 
9.
5%
 
24
.9
%
 
24
.2
%
 
-3
.8
%
 
5.
8%
 
St
an
da
rd
 d
ev
ia
tio
n 
13
.2
%
 
8.
7%
 
12
1.
5%
 
14
. 1
%
 
30
.8
%
 
23
.5
%
 
34
.1
%
 
32
.5
%
 
21
.6
%
 
14
.4
%
 
In
te
rq
ua
rti
le
 ra
ng
e 
15
.0
%
 
12
.0
%
 
34
.0
%
 
16
.8
%
 
26
.8
%
 
6.
6%
 
32
.4
%
 
31
.8
%
 
18
.5
%
 
13
.4
%
 
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 w
ith
in
 1
5%
 
55
.1
%
 
91
.7
%
 
42
.9
%
 
63
.0
%
 
50
.0
%
 
66
.7
%
 
33
.3
%
 
27
.3
%
 
62
.5
%
 
50
.0
%
 
M
ea
n 
ab
so
lu
te
 e
rr
or
 
15
.8
%
 
7.
9%
 
47
.0
%
 
13
.9
%
 
23
.2
%
 
16
.6
%
 
30
.4
%
 
30
.1
%
 
17
.6
%
 
13
.5
%
 
N
um
be
r o
f o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
 
49
 
24
 
21
 
27
 
12
 
12
 
12
 
11
 
8 
6 
      
39
Chapter 1 
 
 23
Column (2) of Table 1.6. reports regression results for 24 IPOs which were valued with DFCF 
and DDM. The preliminary offer price of these IPOs seems to be primarily determined by 
DDM, and to a lesser extent by DFCF. For 27 IPOs which were valued with DFCF and P/E 
Peer Group Year +1 (see column (3)), the underwriter seems to rely primarily on DFCF, but 
also on P/E Peer Group Year +1. The results in column (4), based on 17 IPOs, suggest that 
when P/E Peer Group year 0 and year +1 are used, underwriters rely only on P/E Peer Group 
in year +1.11 Taken together, the regression results confirm those of the univariate analysis: 
the preliminary offer price seems to be primarily determined by DDM, and underwriters rely 
more on forecasted multiples than on current multiples. 
 
1.4.2. What is the bias and accuracy of the valuation methods used? 
 
Next, we investigate the bias and accuracy of the valuation methods by comparing the 
estimated values to the average stock price in the first month of listing. Results are presented 
in Table 1.7.. Results based on the stock price on post-IPO days +1, +10, +20 and +30 are 
very similar and are therefore not reported here. 
DFCF seems to be an unbiased value estimator: the median valuation error is only 
4.1% and not significant (Wilcoxon signed rank test p = 0.681). DDM on the other hand 
produces biased estimates of value: the median valuation error is – 10.6% and is significant (p 
= 0.006). If the stock market prices IPOs correctly, then DDM tends to underestimate value. 
For most multiple valuation methods, we also find a negative median valuation error, but this 
error is significant at the 10% level or higher for only three methods: P/E Peer Group (year 0) 
(p-value = 0.082), P/E Stock Market (year 0) (p-value = 0.009) and P/CF Stock Market (year 
+1) (p-value = 0.031). Of course, for most multiples the sample is very small, which affects 
the quality of statistical testing.  
Again, we use the percentage within 15% and the mean absolute error to measure the 
accuracy of the valuation methods. The results suggest that DFCF, DDM and the most 
commonly used multiples (P/E Peer Group year 0 and year +1) have similar accuracy. For 
each of these methods, about half of the valuations is within 15% of the average stock price in 
the first month of listing. The mean absolute errors are also very similar: they are not 
significantly different from each other, except the mean absolute error of P/E Peer Group year 
0, which is significantly larger than DFCF mean absolute error (p-value = 0.043).
                                                 
11 We did not estimate a separate regression for DDM and P/E Peer Group year +1, because the 13 IPOs which 
were valued with DDM and P/E Peer Group year +1, were also valued with DFCF: see column (1). 
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Table 1.6. 
Relation of the Preliminary Offer Price to Pre-IPO Value Estimates 
OLS-regressions of the natural logarithm of the preliminary offer price on the natural logarithm of 
value estimates by the lead underwriter, for 49 IPOs on Euronext Brussels between 1993 and 
2001. The preliminary offer price is the midpoint of the minimum and maximum offer prices, or, 
if the shares are not offered within a price range, the pre-specified offer price. The pre-IPO value 
estimates are published in the IPO-prospectus, which is made available at the start of the public 
offering. For each regression, the number of observations depends on the number of IPOs for 
which the value estimates included in the regression are used. *, ** and *** denote significant 
difference from zero at the 10% level, the 5% level and the 1% level, respectively. 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
C -0.37 -0.20 -0.12 0.50 
 (-1.27) (-2.02)* (-1.58) (1.46) 
Ln (DFCF estimate) 0.09 0.38 0.62 - 
 (0.46) (2.36)** (4.94)***  
Ln (DDM estimate) 0.68 0.66 - - 
 (3.15)*** (3.82)***   
Ln (P/E Peer Group Year +1 estimate) 0.31 - 0.38 0.82 
 (2.93)**  (3.21)*** (6.24)*** 
Ln (P/E Peer Group Year 0 estimate) - - - 0.03 
    (0.59) 
Adjusted R2 0.95 0.99 0.99 0.96 
Number of observations: 13 24 27 17 
 
 
It is interesting to compare our results on value accuracy with the valuation accuracies 
obtained by Kim & Ritter (1999), who investigate the value accuracy of multiples using a 
sample of 190 US IPOs from 1992 to 1993. They use recent IPOs as comparables, which are 
chosen with a mechanical algorithm, and comparables chosen by a firm specializing in IPO 
research. Comparing IPO multiples to the median comparables multiple and a predicted 
multiple using regressions, they find much lower valuation accuracy than we do. It may seem 
surprising that objective valuations by academics are less accurate than valuations by lead 
underwriters. As we have noted in the introduction, value estimates by lead underwriters may 
be more accurate because they often have better access to information that is useful for 
valuation. Moreover, the valuation does not take place in a vacuum: the lead underwriter may 
be affected by the market mood at the time of valuation (see Section 1.4.3.). On the other 
hand, the post-IPO stock price may be affected by the valuation of the lead underwriter, if the 
market is willing to be guided by the valuations made at the pre-IPO stage. In this case, the 
valuation influences the market, rather than the other way around. The Belgian IPOs in our 
sample are also often mature firms that are comparatively easy to value. Finally, it can be 
expected that lead underwriters choose to report only valuation results that are appropriate for 
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the type of firm that needs to be valued, while academics report all estimates of the valuation 
method(s) they investigate.  
When we compare the valuation accuracy of the different multiples approaches in 
Table 1.7., it is striking that the valuations based on the forecasted earnings and cash flows in 
year +1 are consistently less biased and more accurate than the valuations based on the 
forecasted current year’s earnings and cash flows: this result holds for both the P/E and the 
P/CF peer group multiples, and for the P/E and the P/CF stock market multiples, for all 
measures of valuation accuracy.12 Again, we also make a pairwise comparison of valuation 
methods: DFCF, DDM and P/E based on a peer group for year +1 are mutually compared, as 
well as P/E based on a peer group in year 0 and year +1. The results, which are presented in 
Table 1.8., confirm those of Table 1.7.. 
 
1.4.3. Valuation and underpricing 
 
Probably the most often researched anomaly in the IPO market concerns underpricing 
and high average initial returns. These are found over a wide range of time periods and 
countries. For an overview of evidence and underpricing theories, we refer to Ibbotson & 
Ritter (1995), Ritter & Welch (2002) and Ritter (2003). Ritter & Welch (2002) find an 
average initial return on the first trading day of 18.8% in their sample of US firms going 
public from 1980 to 2001. In our sample, the initial return averaged 20.2%, which is a strong 
indication of underpricing. Given this result, the results in Section 1.4.1. (preliminary offer 
price is on average closest to DDM estimates) and the results in Section 1.4.2. (DDM tends to 
underestimate value while DFCF is an unbiased value estimator) are consistent with three 
different explanations.  First, underwriters may rely on DDM because they believe that DDM 
produces the most accurate value estimates, not realizing that DDM tends to underestimate 
value. Alternatively, underwriters may consciously underprice the IPO, by relying on DDM. 
Third, underwriters may also underprice the IPO by applying a discount to other value 
estimates (such as DFCF), or to a weighted average of valuations. 
The hypothesis that underwriters consciously underprice IPOs is confirmed by the fact 
that for 21 out of 24 IPOs for which both DDM and DFCF were used, the DDM valuation, 
which is on average closest to the preliminary offer price, was lower than the DFCF valuation. 
                                                 
12 This result is further confirmed if we take into account valuations based on the earnings and cash flows in 
years –1 and +2. We did not include these valuations in Table 1.7. because they are based on a very limited 
number of observations (1 to 5 observations). 
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For only one IPO, DDM and DFCF lead to the same value estimate. This is remarkable, as 
both valuation methods should yield the same value if consistent assumptions are made. 
Nevertheless, it is well recognized that dividend discounting techniques are subject to some 
practical issues. In Penman & Sougiannis (1998), DDM produces considerably lower 
valuation results than DFCF. Francis, Olsson, & Oswald (2000) find that all their models 
underestimate value, but DDM to the largest extent. They state that models which should give 
the same results in theory, differ in practice due to inconsistencies in forecasted attributes, 
growth rates and discount rates (e.g., clean surplus relationship violation, non-constant growth 
rates, discount rates inconsistent with no arbitrage principle). Lundholm & O’Keefe (2001) 
relate differences in the models to inconsistent forecast, inconsistent discount rate and missing 
cash flow errors. Damodaran (1994) explains the undervaluation of DDM because most 
practical valuation models do not allow (in an appropriate way) for the build-up in cash when 
firms pay out less than they are able to, which is often the case, and the use of inconsistent 
assumptions. He claims that in reality, DCF values often exceed DDM values. 
Another indication that underwriters consciously underprice the IPO is that for 14 of 
the 49 IPOs, the preliminary offer price was set lower than all value estimates published in the 
prospectus. An example is the IPO of Real Software, a Belgian software company: DFCF, 
minimum multiple and maximum multiple estimates were respectively 21.8%, 48.1% and 
50.0% higher than the preliminary offer price. The average stock price of Real Software in the 
first month of listing was 64.6% higher than the preliminary offer price. 
Our data do not allow us to distinguish between the hypothesis that underwriters 
underprice by relying on biased DDM estimates, and the hypothesis that underwriters 
underprice by applying a discount to other value estimates, or to a weighted average of value 
estimates. In order to gain insight into the way underwriters value and price IPOs, four 
investment bankers were interviewed, who were the lead underwriter of 30 of the 49 IPOs in 
our sample. They provided a consistent story on how Belgian IPOs are valued and priced. All 
four investment bankers consider DFCF the most important valuation method. DDM is 
considered to be too ‘conservative’ and is less relied on. One banker described DDM-
valuation as merely a control check on DFCF-valuation. Multiples on the other hand, are 
driven by market sentiment and may provide valuations that are ‘too high’ in a hot market. An 
offer price that is too high may damage the reputation of the underwriter. Interestingly, the 
investment bankers admit that in a hot issue market, they often have to make ‘aggressive’ 
assumptions about the parameters of the DFCF model, in order to obtain DFCF estimates that 
are in line with multiple estimates. 
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According to the investment bankers, the preliminary offer price and the offer price 
range are primarily determined by DFCF estimates, with DDM providing lower value 
estimates and multiples providing higher value estimates. The preliminary offer price is not 
actually based on a weighted sum of value estimates, but is set more loosely, taking into 
account the available value estimates (especially DFCF),  and then applying a price discount.  
This implies that our finding that the preliminary offer price is closest to DDM is not a 
consequence of underwriters primarily relying on DDM, but rather coincidentally as it tends 
to produce low valuations. The preliminary offer price is closest to DDM because 
underwriters rely on valuation methods that produce higher value estimates, and apply a 
discount to these valuations.  
 
1.4.4. Is the offer price a better predictor of the stock price than pre-IPO value estimates? 
 
During the public offering period, the underwriter obtains information about investor 
demand and updates the price. In addition, the bank may incorporate any changes in general 
market conditions, industry or firm-specific outlooks. The final offer price should therefore be 
a more accurate predictor of the stock price than the estimates of individual valuation 
methods. To test whether this is indeed the case, we compare the relation between the final 
offer price and the stock price on the one hand, to the relation between the estimated value 
and the average stock price in the first month of listing on the other hand. For each valuation 
approach, the offer price should be closer to the stock price than the value estimate if the lead 
underwriter also uses other valuable information to determine the price at which the shares 
will be offered. Results for the most commonly used valuation methods are presented in Table 
1.9.. The number of observations for each valuation method depends on the number of IPOs 
which were initially offered within a price range (not at a unique offer price), and which were 
valued with this estimation method. 
For the 33 firms that are valued using DFCF, 15 firms (45.4%) have a DFCF estimated 
value within 15% of the stock price, while 19 firms (57.6%) have an offer price within 15% of 
the stock price. For the 21 firms that are valued using DDM, 10 firms (47.6%) have a DDM 
estimated value within 15% of the stock price, while 14 firms (66.7%) have an offer price 
within 15% of the stock price. A comparison of mean absolute errors also suggests that the 
offer price is closer to the stock price than the DFCF and/or DDM value estimates. However, 
the differences in the mean absolute errors are never statistically significant. Finally, the 
results for the most commonly used multiple estimates indicate that the offer price is closer to  
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Table 1.9. 
 Pre-IPO Value Estimates, Stock Price, and Final Offer Price: a 
Comparison of Different Valuation Methods 
A comparison of the most commonly used methods to value 46 IPOs on Euronext Brussels 
between 1993 and 2001 (information on stock prices was not available for 3 IPOs). Valuation 
errors are computed as the natural log of the ratio of the estimated value to the average stock 
price in the first month of listing, and as the natural log of the ratio of the final offer price to the 
average stock price in the first month of listing. The pre-IPO value estimates are published in 
the IPO-prospectus, which is made available at the start of the public offering. The first four 
rows report median, mean, standard deviation and interquartile range of errors. Two measures of 
valuation accuracy are reported: the percentage of errors within 15 %, and the mean absolute 
error. For each valuation method, the number of observations depends on (a) the number of 
IPOs which were initially offered within a price range (not at a unique offer price), and (b) the 
number of IPOs which were valued with this estimation method. 
Valuation method: Discounted 
Free Cash 
Flow  
Dividend 
Discount 
Model 
P/E Peer Group  
(year 0) 
P/E Peer Group   
(year +1) 
Ln (estimated value / average stock price in the first month of listing) 
Percentage within 15% 45.4% 47.6% 38.9% 50.0% 
Mean absolute error 22.1% 23.4% 34.4% 25.4% 
Ln (offer price / average stock price in the first month of listing) 
Percentage within 15% 57.6% 66.7% 61.1% 55.0% 
Mean absolute error 21.3% 20.4% 20.9% 22.1% 
Number of observations 33 21 18 20 
 
to the stock price than the multiple estimates, but again, the differences in the mean absolute 
errors are not statistically significant.13  
 
1.5. Conclusions  
 
There have been several studies that investigate the accuracy of valuation approaches 
using ex post value estimates, but this study investigates the accuracy of valuation by 
practitioners. We investigate the valuation by the lead underwriters of 49 IPOs on Euronext 
Brussels in the 1993-2001 period. We find that the lead underwriter always uses several 
valuation approaches, of which DFCF is the most popular. Our results show that DDM tends 
to underestimate value, while DFCF produces unbiased value estimates. Interviews with 
investment bankers suggest that underwriters consciously underprice IPOs, by applying a 
deliberate discount to DFCF value estimates. DFCF is considered to be the most reliable 
                                                 
13 p-values are 0.89 for DFCF, 0.69 for DDM, 0.18 for P/E Peer Group (year 0), and 0.70 for P/CF Peer Group 
(year +1). 
48
Chapter 1 
 
32 
method. DDM estimates are on average closer to the preliminary offer price than other value 
estimates, because DDM tends to underestimate value.  
When multiples valuation is used, investment banks rely mostly on forecasted future 
earnings and cash flows. We find that multiples valuation based on post-IPO forecasted 
earnings and cash flows indeed leads to more accurate valuations than multiples valuation 
based on earnings and cash flows in the IPO-year. Our results also indicate that the IPO final 
offer price is closer to the post-IPO stock price than pre-IPO value estimates, which is 
consistent with the lead underwriter using not only value estimates but also other valuable 
information to set the offer price. 
Our work identifies some directions for future research. It would be interesting to 
examine what valuation methods investment banks use in a large sample study. For IPOs, 
how are offer prices set as compared to these value estimates, and how is the discount 
determined? How accurate are investment banks in predicting the stock market prices for the 
IPOs they manage? And what IPO-specific variables affect valuation accuracy? Answers to 
these questions would provide further insights in investment banks’ incentives and in the IPO 
stock market characteristics. Another relevant question, is why investment banks do not use 
harmonic means in multiple valuation while academics find this methodology to produce the 
most accurate valuation results. It would also be interesting to know what the actual 
inconsistencies are applied by practitioners in DDM, which are responsible for its suggested 
undervaluation. 
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Chapter 2: The Role of Investor Capabilities in  
Public-to-Private Transactions14 
 
Abstract 
 
In a public-to-private (PTP) acquisition, the gained control and the capabilities of the 
private equity investor affect strategic management of the firm and its value. We 
examine the role of idiosyncratic investor capabilities in the value appropriation from 
PTPs and provide implications for the changing market for private equity. Next to the 
traditional sources of value, we incorporate and value entrepreneurial aspects, 
investor specialisation, path-dependency and levering the private investor’s core 
competencies. Due to competition and replicability an increasing part of value 
creation in PTPs is reflected in the acquisition premium. As a result, we expect more 
specialization in private equity to lever idiosyncratic capabilities, as can be observed 
in buy-and-build strategies. 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Public-to-private transactions are an important means for restructuring 
underperforming businesses and may allow removing a capability gap that exists within 
inefficient public firms. In a public-to-private transaction (PTP)15, a private equity investor, 
often in cooperation with the incumbent management, buys out the shareholders of a listed 
company. To a large extent, going-private transactions are financed by issuing new debt. 
Clearly, strategic management of and creating value in private investments are quite different 
from that of ordinary investments in public firms. A small shareholder of a public firm is not a 
true owner of the company in the sense of having an impact upon the operational cash flows 
or on the uncertainty surrounding them. By contrast, private equity is an alternative 
investment: the shareholder often gains control because its investment is substantial and 
involves a long-term commitment to the firm. This gives the private investor the opportunity 
                                                 
14 This chapter is based on the paper ‘The Role of Investor Capabilities in Public-to-Private Transactions’, 
Wouter De Maeseneire, Working Paper Ghent University, 2004. 
15 The terms going private, public-to-private (PTP), leveraged buyout (LBO), management buyout (MBO) and 
leveraged management buyout (LMBO) are often used interchangeably in the literature to indicate a public-to-
private transaction, although strictly speaking these are not synonyms. Public-to-privates belong to a special 
category of management buyouts, and their sources of value thus include those of a management buyout, but in 
addition there are the advantages (and disadvantages) of a delisting.    
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to influence management decisions, introduce better incentive mechanisms, renew firm 
governance, and enhance information flows. 
PTPs occur when they generate economic value. Kaplan (1989a) reports that cash 
flows rise on average by 96% from the year before the buyout to three years after the 
transaction, and firm value increases by 235% (96% on a market-adjusted base) from two 
months before the buyout offer, to the exit. However, a large part of the value creation is 
reflected in the takeover price due to competition and flows to the target’s shareholders.16 The 
competitive landscape for private equity investors has changed over the last years as they 
encounter heavier competition, further driving their returns downwards. In addition, a large 
part of their once unique resources, such as their creative financial engineering skills and their 
privileged access to deals, have become commodities. Over time, the traditional idiosyncratic 
capabilities17 and sources of value creation have lost their uniqueness. It has become 
increasingly difficult to appropriate value with a traditional buyout. 
Only when rival private investors are unable to duplicate the value creation that 
derives from non-imitable assets or skills controlled by the buyout firm, bidding away the full 
value creation can be avoided. Examples of such idiosyncratic assets or capabilities include 
the private investor’s organisation, culture, image and reputation, the firm’s unique history, its 
experience in deal making and managing portfolio companies, and its network. If any of these 
organisational attributes are unique and when combined with the target generate more value 
than rivals can obtain, the investor will be able to appropriate part of the economic value 
created and generate abnormal returns. As a result of heavy competition, a private investor 
can only capture value creation by levering its own or its portfolio companies’ unique core 
competences onto the target firm. In this chapter, we examine the process of replication and 
the role of renewing idiosyncratic investor capabilities in the value appropriation from PTPs. 
We value isolating mechanisms such as path dependencies and develop implications for the 
changing market for private equity.     
This study adds to both the finance and the strategic management literature. In finance 
literature, restructuring and increasing efficiency by resolving agency and information 
problems and optimizing tax shields are the common grounds for PTPs. We also pay attention 
to entrepreneurial aspects, investor specialisation and levering the private investor’s core 
competencies. To the finance literature we add the idiosyncratic and path-dependent nature of 
                                                 
16 DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Rice (1984a), Lowenstein (1985), Kaplan (1989a), Smith (1990) and others show 
that premiums paid to selling shareholders in public-to-privates in the 1970s and 1980s are 30 to 50% of the pre-
buyout market value. 
17 We use the terms capabilities, (core) competencies and resources interchangeably.  
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the investor’s resources. We emphasize that the strategic value of levering capabilities 
provides path-dependent follow-up investment opportunities that can be valued using real 
option theory. We contribute to the strategic management theory by providing an explicit 
application of the resource-based view, by linking the value appropriation to idiosyncratic 
resources and adding uncertainty to the knowledge-based view using a real options 
framework. This value-based framework is able to quantify the levering of core competencies 
and path dependencies.  
Our holistic framework relies on techniques from finance and uses an expanded 
adjusted present value criterion that not only considers portfolio synergies but also 
intertemporal synergies of levering capabilities and creating growth opportunities (by organic 
growth or through acquisitions). A unique resource position can be built through the 
accumulation of resources by the sequential exercise of investment opportunities in a real 
options chain. As a result, private equity investors try to build and accumulate unique and 
difficult-to-replicate resource positions, and concentrate on deals in which their distinctive 
resources are most valuable. Building on our model, we propose the following implications 
for the buyout market.  
In order to obtain a unique portfolio of accumulated resources, private investors will 
further specialize, in specific industries or technologies, and extend their networking and deal 
syndication. They differentiate themselves as they require unique core competencies that can 
be levered onto the target. The traditional sources of value like the financial and some of the 
operational effects have become non-idiosyncratic and are reflected in the takeover price; 
value appropriation stems from levering the investor’s core capabilities onto the target and 
exploiting the follow-up investment opportunities the target provides. The private equity 
market will further move away from the traditional type of transactions based on financial 
considerations into more sector specialization, innovative approaches and hybrid deals, such 
as buy-and-build strategies, that really enable the private investor to take advantage of its 
unique competencies. To an increasing degree, a private investor’s resources and previous 
portfolio investments determine the value of its current transactions (path dependency), 
resulting in specialisation. Moreover, this specialisation further reinforces the path-dependent 
character of its portfolio of investments. The path dependency of investments (under 
uncertainty) leads to unique investment opportunities that have a higher value to one specific 
investor than to the other, due to its idiosyncratic buyer value, its unique information and/or 
its idiosyncratic real option parameters.      
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Our framework allows explaining the dynamic evolution in the market for private 
equity. As the capabilities and sources of value creation in the ’80s (restructuring inefficient 
firms that suffered from agency problems) became commodities due to increasing levels of 
competition, buyout investors developed innovative investment strategies in the ‘90s enabling 
them to benefit from the idiosyncratic sources of value these strategies provide. However, 
rival private investors get more sophisticated as well, eroding the value from some of the 
current sources of value and inducing private investors to again develop new investment 
strategies, thereby producing a new set of idiosyncratic capabilities. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2.2., we present a 
resource-based framework for levering resources onto the PTP candidate of a specific private 
investor. In Section 2.3., we provide a comprehensive overview of the various shared and 
idiosyncratic sources of value creation associated with public-to-privates. Section 2.4. 
discusses the replication and renewal of the private equity investor’s idiosyncratic resources 
and the evolution of value creation and appropriation in PTPs. Section 2.5. summarizes the 
main implications of our framework. 
 
2.2. A resource-based framework for levering capabilities in PTP transactions 
 
In this section we develop a value-based theory for PTPs that incorporates strategic 
management theory in financial economics. We consider PTPs as the acquisition of a bundle 
of resources and incorporate the various potential value creating and destroying components 
of a going-private transaction. 
 
2.2.1. Strategic management: replication and renewal of idiosyncratic capabilities 
 
Unlike the public financial markets, the market for private acquisitions is characterized 
by illiquidity and imperfections. It is a market with few buyers and targets and with a low 
degree of transparency and high information asymmetry due to the heterogeneity of targets, 
sellers and potential buyers. We consider each PTP as a purchase of a bundle of resources by 
an investor that is also regarded as a combination of resources and capabilities. Thus, a PTP 
leads to capability bundling of the target and the private investor (Wernerfelt, 1984, 1995; 
Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). 
The extent to which potential sources of value in PTPs are available and give rise to 
real value creation depends on the buyer’s resources and capabilities that can be levered onto 
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the acquisition, or the resources of the target that can be levered onto other portfolio 
companies or even future investment opportunities. Heterogeneity in buyer values can stem 
from both types of resources, but usually derives from those that the private investor can lever 
on the target. A firm’s value is equal to the value of its current assets-in-place and the value of 
its growth opportunities (Myers, 1977). Obviously, dependent on the resources and skills of 
who owns and manages the company, the value of both components changes. 
The total idiosyncratic value of the PTP firm is the upper price the private equity 
investor is prepared to pay. However, the actual price it will pay depends upon the 
competitive environment and the replicability of its resources. The non-idiosyncratic benefits 
of a PTP, such as the financial and most of the operational effects, are reflected in the 
transaction price; appropriating part of the value creation and obtaining abnormal returns 
stems from exploiting idiosyncratic capabilities which are levered onto the target (see Figure 
2.1.). In order to appropriate part of the value creation, a private equity investor requires 
distinct valuable resources, and has to focus on deals in which its resources offer the most 
value creating opportunities. 
 
Figure 2.1. 
Buyer Value Creation in Public-to-Private Transaction 
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Following the resource-based perspective, the previous investments (other portfolio 
companies), the experience and the information advantage of a private equity investor will 
determine its current processes, accumulated resources and position. The key implication is 
that a given target will have different values for different buyers, with particularly a lot of 
variance among those buyers that can obtain a fit (synergy or complementarity) between their 
resources and the target’s. For instance, an investor that can undertake the PTP at lower cost, 
or that is capable of financing the deal by raising a greater amount of debt at better terms, will 
value the target more highly. Similarly, the PTP target will be more valuable to investors that 
are best at optimizing management incentives and organizational efficiencies or that are better 
monitors as a result of their expertise, previous experience or inexpensive and efficient 
information processing. An information advantage or the ability to achieve one through 
quicker learning about the target may be a valuable resource. If a private investor possesses a 
portfolio company that offers potential synergies with the target, or a platform company in the 
target’s industry, PTP targets may tie into a buy-and-build strategy and thus have a higher 
value to this investor. Another valuable resource might be the fact that an investor already has 
a substantial stake in the company. This will provide an important information advantage and 
a better starting position in a bidding contest, as the investor will not have to pay a bidding 
premium for the shares it has already acquired. 
However, the rise in the number of private investors and the resulting increase in 
competition has resulted in a similar value creating potential for several investors that is bid 
away in a takeover contest. Competition from the typical rivals (strategic buyers) and new 
types of investors (PE funds that rely on innovative fund raising or investment strategies), or 
‘substitution’ by new types of transactions (such as accelerated IPOs, in which the 
intermediate step of buyout fund ownership is skipped over) are ever increasing. Next to this, 
buyout firms used to have unique networks and relationships that provided them with access 
to buyout deals that their rivals did not have, thereby avoiding a competitive bidding process. 
Today however, most significant deals are subject to a visible and public auction process as 
sellers seek the best price (Harper & Schneider, 2004). Another unique resource for which 
buyout investors used to be (in)famous are their financial-engineering skills. Though still 
remaining important, this capability is now widely available and is a necessary competence in 
order to be in business, but does not provide a barrier that shields from competition as 
acquisition prices reflect the value inherent in leveraging up the target. 
The majority of the sources of value creation in PTPs is replicable by and shared 
among various private investors; as a consequence, inimitable value creation can only be 
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obtained by levering unique core competencies onto the target. That is why private equity 
investors are pursuing innovative investment strategies such as buy-and-build, and are 
increasing their efforts to specialize and build networks, leading to a renewal of idiosyncratic 
capabilities. This knowledge-based perspective and the link with value appropriation can be 
observed in the actual behavior of venture capital and private equity firms. Bygrave (1987) 
and Barry, Peavy, Muscarella, & Vetsuypens (1990) point to the importance and the 
increasing level of specialization of venture capital firms in order to build valuable resources 
and capabilities (e.g., specialized knowledge about innovations, technology), and to 
distinguish themselves from competitors. Amongst others, Sahlman (1990) also finds that 
venture capital firms tend to specialize by industry, stage of investment, and geographic area.  
Proposition 1: The private equity market will see a further move away from financial 
transactions into more innovative approaches, that require asset accumulation and  
specialization, and hybrid deals, which allow the private investor to lever its core 
competences and to fully exploit its unique capabilities. 
Unique capabilities may lead to resource position barriers, meaning that a private 
investor’s specific resources affect costs and/or revenues of rival acquirers, and allow the 
investor to obtain strong returns. Kaplan & Schoar (2003) show that there are large 
differences in private equity fund returns due to fund idiosyncratic resources and skills. New 
entrants cannot compete effectively due to the well performing funds’ proprietary deal flow 
and unique ability to provide value added services, resulting in a strong persistency of fund 
returns. Furthermore, returns improve with partnership experience. Unique resources clearly 
allow generating abnormal returns. 
Some barriers are self-reproducing: a private investor that is ahead of others may use 
these barriers to maintain and further extend this lead (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1998; 
Kaplan & Schoar, 2003). Examples of these resources are an information advantage, 
experience, reputation or the possession of a platform portfolio company in the industry. 
Strategic growth options open to a private investor depend therefore on its accumulation of 
specific resources and its portfolio of companies. Having a toehold in the target company, or 
having a platform in the target’s industry, generates valuable real options. In this way, initial 
investments may create growth opportunities along the future path. Another way of obtaining 
an information advantage is through private investments in public equity (PIPE) which may 
allow to get ahead of rivals and may offer privileged access to potential disinvestments or 
buyout opportunities (Harper & Schneider, 2004). Thus, the private equity investor’s 
resources give rise to a certain degree of path dependency (Teece et al., 1997). Competition 
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forces private investors to pursue acquisitions in which they can create most value, and will 
therefore be driven in the direction of specialisation. Once an investor has specialized, say in 
biotech, its accumulated resources in areas like information processing or monitoring will 
make new investments in biotech more attractive than to other investors. 
Proposition 2: A private investor’s resources and previous portfolio investments 
determine the value of its current transactions (path dependency) and lead to specialisation, 
and this specialisation further reinforces the path-dependent character of its investments. 
Such investments in resources can be considered as a link in a chain of investment 
decisions under uncertainty or real options. Where the private investor is going in the future 
depends on the historical path it has traveled and its strategic plans. As soon as the buyout 
firm starts down a path it is faced with uncertainty about developments in the private equity 
market and the target’s industry, and with competitive moves. The private investor needs to 
respond flexibly to those changes and it should not consider the current trajectory along the 
strategic path chosen as a static scenario but instead dynamically adjust it depending on 
uncertain developments in the business environment. Obviously, a resource-accumulating and 
capability-building strategy is history-dependent. The chosen path not only defines which 
buyout opportunities are available to the firm today but also constrains the future ones. The 
private equity investor is often able to appropriate part of the value from the path-dependent 
option to lever its core competences as its unique accumulated resource base results in a 
unique path towards the investment opportunity. Its idiosyncratic option parameters lead to 
inimitable value creation. Examples of unique option parameters may be a lower exercise 
price because of a foothold in the target company or a higher target value due to a unique fit 
between the target and acquirer’s resource base. Alternatively, the private investor may have 
an exclusive option due to an information advantage that allows avoiding competition for the 
target. 
Proposition 3: The path dependency of investment opportunities (under uncertainty) 
leads to a unique resource position in which the accumulated resources and the option to 
lever competences have a higher value to one specific investor than to the other, due to its 
idiosyncratic buyer value, its unique information and/or its idiosyncratic real option 
parameters. 
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2.2.2. The financial economics perspective: an expanded value-based model for the leverage 
of path-dependent resources 
 
Private equity firms’ willingness to commit funds determines the supply side of this 
market, whereas the companies who are seeking private equity rather than public equity 
financing define the demand side.18 The markets for public and private equity investments are 
in balance when all the private investment opportunities are financed until the expected net 
benefit of the marginal private investment opportunity equals the return on a similar public 
investment in equilibrium. Private equity may provide a number of advantages and thus net 
benefits over public financing, thereby allowing buyout firms to make money by taking a 
public firm private while generating high returns for the target shareholders as well. However, 
the net benefits of PTPs are dynamic as a process of replication of value creation by 
competitors followed by a renewal of competencies takes place. The traditional net benefits 
derive from removing inefficiencies at the public target by reducing agency and information 
problems and levering up the firm. 
We expand the traditional perspective on the net benefits by taking into account the 
potential real option value inherent in PTPs. Thus, our framework incorporates the value of 
operations, financial side effects and real option value of levering competences and resources. 
The value of operations is determined by the future free operating cash flows, discounted at 
the unlevered cost of capital, which purely reflects operational risk. The value of all the 
financing side effects of the transaction is captured by the (positive) value of interest tax 
shields and the (negative) value of financial distress costs. The value of learning and the real 
option value stem from levering capabilities and draws from strategic management theory. 
The net benefits of a going private are equal to the value of the target to this specific private 
investor minus the stand alone value on the financial markets:  
 
Net benefitsi = PTPi – Stand alone value         (2.1.) 
 
The value of the public-to-private target to a private investor i is given by PTPi = value 
of operations + financial side effects + strategic value of levering capabilities (Equation 2.2.):   
 
                                                 
18 A good description and overview of the private equity market can be found in Fenn, Liang, & Prowse (1997), 
Wright & Robbie (1998) and Denis (2004). 
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where PTPi  = value of the public-to-private target to a specific private equity  
                                   investor i, given its resources and capabilities 
= SAV (standalone value of PTP target) + sources of value 
creation of private investor i – sources of value destruction of 
private investor i 
FOCFi,n = expected free operating cash flow of target firm in year n, after 
                                               PTP by private investor i     
CAi = cost of equity of target firm, after PTP by private investor i  
 CFTSi,n = expected cash flow of interest tax shields of target firm in year 
                                               n, after PTP by private investor i   
RTSi = appropriate discount rate of interest tax shields cash flows of 
            target firm, after PTP by private investor i 
ECFDi  = expected costs of financial distress of target firm, after PTP by 
                                               private investor i 
COSTi  = costs of the PTP operation for private investor i 
ROVi = real option value of the portfolio of growth opportunities and 
           learning that the target offers to private investor i   
  
All of these elements are equal to their value before the PTP, adjusted for the change brought 
about by the PTP by investor i. For example, FOCFi,n = FOCFsan + ∆FOCFi,n = expected free 
operating cash flow of standalone firm in year n + change in expected free operating cash 
flow of target firm in year n after PTP by private investor i.  
The first component of the value and thus of the net benefits, “value of operations”, is 
determined by the free operational cash flow and the cost of equity (=cost of assets). The 
overview of the various value components (discussed in detail in Section 2.3.), along with the 
supporting empirical evidence, shows that operational cash flow generally increases after PTP 
transactions, while investments in fixed assets and net working capital are reduced. At times, 
this has lead to a considerable rise in free operational cash flow and value. However, the 
impact of a PTP on the cost of equity (CA) is twofold. On the one hand, the cost of equity for 
new investors will be lower because business risk is often reduced; on the other hand, there is 
a lack of liquidity and diversification for these shareholders, resulting in a considerable rise in 
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the cost of equity. Empirical evidence makes no general statements about the overall change 
in the cost of equity.  
The second component, “financial side effects”, considers interest tax shields and 
potential costs of financial distress. As noted, public-to-private transactions are financed to a 
large extent with debt. Evidence shows that improved operational performance results in a 
further increase in interest tax shield cash flows (CFTS), as well as a lower risk associated 
with these cash flows (RTS). The other financial side effect, expected financial distress cash 
flows (ECFD), has a negative impact on the target’s value. While the concentrated ownership 
presumably leads to improved firm performance after the PTP and a lower chance of financial 
distress, higher leverage increases the probability of distress. A final aspect is the transaction 
cost (COST) that is incurred in the PTP operation. 
In this study, we add a third component, “strategic side effects”. This new factor 
reflects cross-time growth options and synergies, which result from levering competencies 
and capabilities onto the buyout target. When the value of operations and financial side 
effects is fully incorporated in the acquisition price due to competitive forces, private 
investors need to search for unique capabilities that allow them to capture value creation. 
Recently, private equity investors have been more and more involved in hybrid transactions, 
and financial investors try to capture strategic benefits as well. The third component thus 
involves organizational change and the real option value (ROV) of the growth opportunities a 
buyout target provides in conjunction with other portfolio companies of the private investor, 
as well as the value of information learned by undertaking the buyout.19   
For instance, the potential buyout candidate may be part of a buy-and-build strategy in 
which a private equity investor initially undertakes a platform acquisition and then leverages 
core competencies onto follow-on acquisitions in a broadened geographical base. The investor 
acts as an industry consolidator and aims to transform several smaller companies into an 
efficient large-scale network. The initial platform acquisition generates the real option for 
further acquisitions. The investor’s leverage of its core capabilities onto the target may have 
two effects in Equation 2.2.. First, value adding services, reputation effects and synergies 
result in increased value of operations and financial side effects (interactive effect). Part of 
this value may be reflected in the acquisition premium. Second, if the PTP target offers 
                                                 
19 We choose to present the various sources of value creation in an additive form which allows for a clear 
presentation of the various factors; however, we acknowledge that the leverage of core competencies and the 
capability bundling may result as well in interactive effects between our various value components. 
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growth opportunities or valuable information to the private equity investor, it contains real 
option value (ROV).  
Asset accumulation strategies under uncertainty such as buy-and-builds should not be 
considered as static investment strategies but rather as (a path-dependent) series of options as 
presented in Figure 2.2.. Investors may always choose to forego planned follow-on 
investment opportunities if such a build strategy turns out worse than expected. To assess the 
flexibility value provided in a buy-and-build strategy, we have to look forward to how the 
industry might evolve and then reason back to when follow-on acquisitions are undertaken. 
This is equivalent to the backward induction principle of option valuation. The dynamics of 
the synergistic effect can be modeled with a binomial event tree over the estimated horizon of 
the buy-and-build strategy, according to favorable or unfavorable developments in the sector. 
The valuation is rather complex as the strategy may involve a collection of interacting and 
sequential real options. Further follow-on acquisitions in several geographic locations could 
increase cash flows as a result of cost and marketing efficiencies. Figure 2.2. presents a 
simplified structure of the value of synergistic opportunities (In Section 2.3.4.3. we provide a 
numerical valuation example of a path-dependent option). Future follow-on acquisitions can 
be undertaken, i.e., options can be exercised, after indications are received as to the likely 
potential speed of consolidation and as uncertainty about the success of the build-up is 
resolved over time. The opportunities that are available to a private investor in the later stages 
depend on the acquisitions taken earlier on (=accumulated resources), and thus one can 
observe a clear path dependency in the (value of) the further build-on acquisitions. 
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Figure 2.2. 
Staged Decisions within a Buy-and-Build Strategy as a Set of Options 
The PTP of the platform target can be regarded as providing a compound call option on the average 
synergestic effect with a time to maturity equal to the horizon of the build-up. The build-up will only 
be carried out if developments in the build-up process are more favourable than expected, and 
therefore the option on the synergetic effects has a higher value than the current expected synergies. 
The exact value can be computed by looking forward to how the industry might evolve and then 
performing a backward induction reasoning to see when follow-on acquisitions are undertaken. 
Acknowledging that the platform target generates the opportunity to make further build-up 
investments in the future captures the full value of the target, both the value provided by current 
actions and the value provided by future growth opportunities. An expanded adjusted present value 
is hence needed to refect all sources of value in a PTP transaction.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3. A categorization of capabilities and sources of value in going private 
 
The high PTP takeover premiums averaging 30% to 50% on top of the share price, 
which is presumably close to the fair value of the standalone company in efficient markets, 
indicates that, at times, PTPs favourably affect firm value. This section reviews the various 
value-creating components in a public-to-private transaction, which all have to be evaluated in 
light of the distinct capabilities of the private investor. We distinguish between the sources of 
value that draw on common resources and that are available to many private investors, and 
those that are unique since they require idiosyncratic capabilities. However, we acknowledge 
that there is a dynamic evolution in the idiosyncratic nature of the capabilities. For instance, 
removing inefficiencies linked to agency problems and financial engineering used to be rather 
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unique skills in the ‘80s. Thus, our categorization is to some extent time-dependent and 
reflects the current state of the buyout market. 
The starting point in our framework is the stand alone company (as is), whose value 
might be improved substantially by a going-private transaction. The standalone value20 of the 
PTP target is the firm value when traded, given the current potentially suboptimal 
organisational, governance and incentive structures. The first category of value sources stems 
from resources and capabilities that are shared and have a rather similar value to several 
private investors. They often include the costs of the PTP transaction, reduced agency 
problems and reduced information asymmetry. The second category of sources of value 
consists of resources and capabilities that are rather unique to each private investor. The PTP 
firm may benefit from value added services by the private investor and from reputational 
effects. Furthermore, there might be potential synergies and growth opportunities generated in 
tandem with the private investor’s current or future portfolio companies. In addition, 
undertaking the PTP might contain considerable learning value.21 
Figure 2.3. presents an overview of the value creating and destroying factors, which 
together determine the total idiosyncratic buyer value of the buyout firm and the net benefits 
of the transaction. To value a specific PTP target, given the private equity investor’s 
resources, all value creating and destroying components of the PTP should be estimated 
within the new organisational, governance and incentive structure, which will affect how 
these items are reflected in our framework. As a starting point, one can depart from the value 
components for the standalone firm, and take into account all changes due to the going private 
transaction. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 Usually firm value on the financial markets is equal to the standalone value of the firm; however, there might 
be reasons for deviations. For example, takeover speculation may lead to a higher stock market price. 
21 Next to the above sources of value, one can find two other frequently mentioned reasons in the literature for 
why public-to-privates exist: opportunistic behavior/private information of the firm’s management, and wealth 
transfers to the shareholders. However, in contrast to the above sources, these do not represent real sources of 
value creation. In the best case, there is only a transfer of value from other parties to the new shareholders. 
Moreover, these transfers are non-existent or only minimal (a.o. DeAngelo et al., 1984a; Marais, Schipper, & 
Smith, 1989; Muscarella & Vetsuypens, 1990; Smith, 1990). 
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2.3.1. Non-idiosyncratic sources of value destruction in a PTP 
 
For some firms, a public-to-private may be worth considering, but it comes with a 
range of costs. A private firm suffers from an illiquidity discount. Amihud & Mendelson 
(1986a,b) show that the lower the liquidity of a financial asset, the higher is its required 
return, controlling for risk. By comparing the price of illiquid restricted and publicly traded 
stock, Amihud & Mendelson (1988) estimate this illiquidity discount to be 25% to 30%. The 
PTP transaction itself is expensive due to transaction costs and due diligence fees. Kaplan 
(1989a) reports median fees of 4.65% of the market value of equity two months before the 
buyout proposal. In Rappaport’s (1990) view, a PTP transaction is a transitory stage by nature 
and cannot be a fully fledged alternative for public companies. Concentrated ownership and 
high leverage do not allow PTP firms to be flexible or to optimally adjust to changing 
economic and competitive environments. DeAngelo & DeAngelo (1987) suggest that private 
firms may face a higher cost of capital and that their investment is limited by the availability 
of senior claim financing at acceptable terms, the level of operational cash flow, and the 
ability and willingness of current shareholders to raise equity capital. A risk-averse manager 
whose wealth is entirely invested in his own PTP firm will generally bear a welfare loss due 
to a lack of diversification (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  Besides, this lack of diversification 
may induce managers to take suboptimal actions. The need for capital, a desire for higher 
liquidity and better diversification to spread risks may eventually lead to a public sale of the 
PTP firm. Another disadvantage is that the PTP abolishes the single best source of 
information about corporate value: the daily stock price. Furthermore, a delisted company 
cannot enjoy the advantages of being a public firm: the ability to raise new capital on public 
markets and to pay for takeovers with shares; the availability of cheaper financing sources; 
publicity and credibility; a better image and quality label; the opportunity for shareholders to 
diversify their holdings; reduced transaction costs and a lower cost of capital; employee and 
management motivation through share ownership and stock option schemes; and enhanced 
corporate professionalism because of organisational, control, and governance requirements for 
public companies (Roëll, 1996; Pagano, Panetta, & Zingales, 1996, 1998).  
Although there are only a limited number of sources of value destruction, especially in 
comparison to the numerous sources of potential value creation, the importance of these 
disadvantages and costs are significant and are not offset by the benefits for most public 
firms. 
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2.3.2. Non-Idiosyncratic sources of value creation in a PTP: reduced agency problems 
 
Reduced agency problems include the control function of debt, the associated tax 
shields, direct monitoring, management ownership and increased entrepreneurial spirit.   
 
2.3.2.1. Control function of debt. When there are excess resources, management is particularly 
prone to making suboptimal decisions: this is the ‘free cash flow’ theory (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Jensen, 1986). Higher leverage lowers free cash flow and the opportunities for waste 
and abuse of corporate resources. Furthermore, there is the pressure to perform well since 
failure of meeting debt services or interest payments can lead to financial distress. This is the 
control function of debt (Jensen, 1986). On the other hand, a leveraged buyout increases 
bankruptcy risk due to the higher debt load, but this is (partly) compensated by a reduction in 
business risk, due to increased management incentives, as well as organisational and strategic 
changes (Palepu, 1990). This business risk reduction allows for higher leverage. The private 
investor usually has long-term relationships with institutional lenders, and therefore has 
reduced incentives to transfer wealth from lenders. This again allows for greater borrowing 
(DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Rice, 1984a). A significant positive relation exists between 
undistributed cash flow, the decision to go private, and the takeover premiums paid (Maupin, 
1987; Singh, 1990). Moreover, this relation is very strong for companies in which 
management holds little stock. Competitive forces in the financial sector and the 
commoditizing of financial-engineering skills result in debt terms that are rather similar for 
different private investors. 
 
2.3.2.2. Tax shields. The substantial reliance on debt financing results in an increase in tax-
deductible interest payments. In some cases, there is also a tax advantage through a scale-up 
in the asset (and depreciation) base of the buyout firm for the acquirer. The tax advantage 
stems from the enlarged debt capacity resulting from the new incentives and better firm 
performance (Kaplan, 1988;1989b).22 Increased monitoring of management by the buyout 
specialist also permits higher use of debt and increases the accompanying potential tax shields 
(Hite & Vetsuypens, 1989). Numerous researchers notice that the tax advantage in PTPs is an 
important source of value (a.o. Hayn, 1989; Kaplan, 1989b; Maupin, 1989; Smith, 1990; 
Newbould, Chatfield, & Anderson, 1992; Opler, 1992). PTP firms with higher operating 
                                                 
22 Kim & Sorensen (1986) find that companies with greater insider stock ownership have more debt than firms 
with diffuse ownership, which is made possible by stronger management incentives to perform.  
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returns make use of higher leverage in order to optimize tax shields (Roden & Lewellen, 
1995). Tax shields typically provide a non-idiosyncratic source of value.  
 
2.3.2.3. Direct monitoring. In contrast to the fragmented ownership in financial markets 
concentrated firm ownership provides increased monitoring and disciplining incentives. Barry 
et al. (1990) find that venture capitalists specialize their investments to provide better and 
more intensive monitoring. The larger the participation, the more monitoring is performed by 
the private equity investor, and the larger the chance of having a seat on the board of directors 
(Lerner, 1995). Singh (1990) finds that the board of directors after a PTP is more focused, the 
board consists to a larger extent of institutional investors rather than reputed individuals or 
CEOs from other firms, and that directors now are larger shareholders with better monitoring 
incentives. In studying private equity financings, Wruck (1989) finds that an increase in 
ownership concentration has a positive impact on firm value. The private investor’s 
monitoring incentives are further improved because its investment is illiquid and cannot be 
sold off when management fails to take value maximizing actions (Wright & Robbie, 1998).23 
Lichtenberg & Siegel (1990) find that after a PTP, total factor productivity increases and the 
number of supervisors is reduced, due to better monitoring incentives. 
 
2.3.2.4. Management ownership. In public companies, the separation of ownership and 
control (stockholders and management) may have disadvantages if insufficient disciplining is 
imposed upon management. Management may strive for excessive corporate perquisites, 
power, status, prestige or visibility, and may try to grow or diversify the company so as to 
reduce risk and guarantee their own jobs, thereby destroying value (Berle & Means, 1932; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Amihud & Lev, 1981; Jensen, 1989; Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 
1990). In management buyouts, management becomes a (substantial) shareholder24, agency 
costs are strongly reduced and management compensation is linked to firm performance, 
thereby providing managers with the right incentives (Berle & Means, 1932; Jensen & 
                                                 
23 Furthermore, the high amount of debt financing, the high sensitivity of share value to firm performance 
induced by this substantial leverage, and the higher chance of facing liquidity problems all create additional 
monitoring incentives (Hite & Vetsuypens, 1989). Besides, management now is a major shareholder and will 
better monitor itself. In addition, there is generally a positive relationship between Tobin’s q and the fraction of 
shares owned by institutional investors, who have better incentives, greater expertise and can perform lower-cost 
monitoring. This institutional ownership further increases the positive effect of insider ownership on corporate 
value (McConnell & Servaes, 1990). 
24 Jensen & Murphy (1990) find that the median CEO in a PTP firm has a 6.4% equity stake, as compared to 
0.25% for the median CEO in a Forbes1000 company. Kaplan (1989b) and Smith (1990) estimate that top 
management in a PTP respectively holds 22.6 % and 16.7 % of the shares, which is much higher than in public 
companies.  
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Meckling, 1976). Moreover, the private equity investor makes use of sophisticated financial 
contracts, such as convertible preferred stock and redemption rights, that tie the distribution of 
cash flow, voting, control and liquidation rights to the firm’s performance so as to optimize 
management incentives (Admati & Pfleiderer, 1994; Trester, 1998; Kaplan & Strömberg, 
2000, 2001). 
Suboptimal management behavior can arise due to information asymmetry between 
stockholders and management and the lack of adequate disciplining mechanisms. In principle, 
sanctions should be imposed on this inefficient performance by the product and factor markets 
(Hart, 1984), the managerial labor market (Fama, 1980), the capital markets (Easterbrook, 
1984), internal control systems and the market for corporate control (Manne, 1965; Jensen & 
Ruback, 1983). However, these mechanisms are not always very effective, which is partly due 
to information problems.25 Successful private investors are able to mitigate uncertainty by 
reducing information asymmetry and impose disciplining mechanisms.  
Takeover premiums in the ‘80s are larger when management holdings are lower, 
indicating higher potential agency costs (Easterwood, Hsieh, & Singer, 1988). The observed 
positive effects of PTPs are higher for management buyouts than for non-management 
buyouts (Grammatikos & Swary, 1986; Travlos & Millon, 1987), and management ownership 
in PTPs has a positive influence on managerial motivation and leads to enhanced working 
conditions, better attitudes and improved relationships with other managers.26 It is 
management stock ownership, rather than increased leverage, that is responsible for the 
change in objectives, strategy, organisational structure and performance (Thompson, Wright, 
& Robbie, 1992; Phan & Hill, 1995; Holthausen & Larcker, 1996). 
 
2.3.2.5. Organisational efficiencies/Corporate entrepreneurship. Many PTPs restructured 
businesses that had overdiversified in earlier merger waves (Wright, Thompson, & Robbie, 
1991). These firms were typically characterized by certain organisational inefficiencies, such 
as an excessive head office staff or a central, bureaucratic internal control system (Fox & 
Marcus, 1992). Downsizing, decentralisation and reorganisation by divesting unrelated assets 
and business units generated various benefits (Jensen, 1989). Decision power was transferred 
to those closely involved in the business process, leading to accelerated and better informed 
decision-making (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Lowenstein, 1985; Hite & Vetsuypens, 1989; Palepu, 
                                                 
25 This was pointed out by Liebenstein (1966), Williamson (1975), Jensen (1986, 1989, 1993), Shleifer & Vishny 
(1988) and Rappaport (1990), among others. 
26 Long (1978) points out that employee ownership in general gives rise to improved employee attitudes, more 
integration, involvement, commitment and satisfaction, and improved organisational performance. 
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1990). Increased visibility of performance and responsibility lead to better management 
incentives and monitoring (Child, 1984), and middle management positions were eliminated, 
thereby further encouraging decentralisation and increased accountability (Baker & Wruck, 
1989; Easterwood, Seth, & Singer, 1989). Management also developed a more entrepreneurial 
attitude with respect to innovations (Hill & Snell, 1989; Busenitz & Barney, 1997). 
Most of the above organisational improvements are even more important in 
management buyouts of business units of large diversified groups, where the internal labor 
and capital markets, as well as central monitoring, do not always perform adequately 
(Thompson & Wright, 1987). Investment funds may not be allocated on the basis of rates of 
return, but rather as a result of relative internal power relations or strategic planning based on 
non-profit maximizing objectives. Moreover, problems may occur because of limited central 
resources, bad monitoring and lack of adequate incentives.27 To meet their short-term 
objectives, management of public firms may sometimes sacrifice valuable long-term projects. 
After a PTP, strategic controls generally replace financial controls as owners are now closely 
involved in managing the company and making key decisions. This control change facilitates 
investing in profitable long-term projects, and encourages spending on innovation and 
corporate entrepreneurship activities (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Hitt, Hoskisson, & 
Ireland, 1990). 
The enabling and facilitating roles of collective ownership and the freedom from 
inappropriate corporate control are important justifications for PTPs (Green, 1992). PTPs 
result in better resource allocation and improved organisational and strategic decision-making. 
Several studies show that PTP firms are more innovative, introduce more new products, 
pursue more new markets and enlarge their customer base (Kaplan, 1989c; Malone, 1989; 
Bull, 1989; Wright, Thompson, & Robbie, 1992). There is a higher commitment to 
developing new products and commercialising new technology; the quality and size of the 
R&D function is enhanced; and new business creation activities are intensified. New R&D 
projects and new product introductions usually lead to an increase in firm value (Zahra, 
1993). PTP firms focus more on their core activities and show lower growth in terms of 
personnel and sales. Firm size and the degree of diversification are reduced, and firms stress 
efficiency rather than growth (Seth & Easterwood, 1993; Phan & Hill, 1995; Wiersema & 
Liebeskind, 1995). 
 
                                                 
27 For instance, Jones (1992) finds that PTP firms use planning, management accounting and control systems that 
are better tuned down to the organisation, as these systems no longer need to conform to the parent. 
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2.3.3. Non-idiosyncratic sources of value creation in a PTP: reduced information asymmetry  
 
Reduced information asymmetry includes the underinvestment problem and the costs 
of being listed.  
 
2.3.3.1. Reduced information asymmetry between firm and financier – the underinvestment 
problem. In some cases, information asymmetry and the accompanying adverse selection 
problems make public financing inaccessible or too expensive because the capital markets are 
unable to adequately evaluate projects and companies (Akerlof, 1970; Myers & Majluf, 1984; 
Amit, Glosten, & Muller, 1990; Lerner, 1995).28 If so, firms may decide to forgo investing, 
even in an intrinsically valuable investment project. Private equity investors are experts in 
information gathering and processing, in screening potential investment targets and in long-
term follow-up of their portfolio companies (Chan, 1983). Syndication, networking and 
specialisation make their information collection and processing much more efficient 
(Bygrave, 1987; Lerner, 1994; Gifford, 1995). Fried & Hisrich (1994) base private equity 
investors’ information processing benefits on economies of scale, economies of scope and 
learning-curve effects. Moreover, their concentrated ownership often goes hand in hand with 
a more direct and complete transfer of information. Private investors are thus more efficient in 
evaluating projects than the financial market and are better able to finance them at fair terms, 
thereby allowing the private firm to take on all valuable investment opportunities.  
 
2.3.3.2. No costs and obligations of stock listing. A stock listing involves a number of costs 
and obligations, mainly meant to reduce information asymmetry between the firm and its 
public investors. These include costs for the actual listing, regulatory costs of being a public 
concern, the costs of disclosing all required information and investor relations costs (see 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Rice, 1984b). Moreover, listing may bring additional costs and 
obligations: the potential loss of control due to hostile takeover; restrictions on management’s 
decision power; higher taxes due to increased financial accounts’ transparency; investor 
relations expenses; and disclosing sensitive and strategic information (Roëll, 1996; Pagano et 
al., 1996, 1998). 
                                                 
28 This information asymmetry is one explanation for the underpricing of some quoted companies: small caps are 
not or are to a lesser extent analysed by investment banks, receive limited attention (‘neglected firms’) and little 
information is available, leading to depressed stock market valuations as compared to their intrinsic value.  
74
Chapter 2 
 
58 
Maupin (1987) finds as major reasons for going private: internal cash flows minimize 
the need for primary equity markets; current share price does not represent fair value; and 
trading activity is low. Furthermore, there are stock market pressures to maintain short-term 
earnings (partly due to information asymmetry) and stock prices; these pressures may have a 
harmful influence not only on how events are reported but also on the events themselves. 
There is a tendency in public companies to emphasize reported earnings at the expense of 
potential tax savings (Lowenstein, 1985). In contrast, PTP firms focus more on cash flow 
maximization rather than maximizing earnings and minimizing earnings variability 
(Lowenstein, 1985; Bull, 1989). Stein (1985) points out that a PTP relieves a firm of the 
burden of regulation and of market pressures for quarterly results, pressures that inhibit 
careful attention to long-range planning and shareholder value improvement. 
 
2.3.4. Idiosyncratic sources of value creation in a PTP: leverage of core competencies  
 
A private investor’s bundle of resources combined with the resources of the PTP target 
determine the total idiosyncratic target value. The acquisition price is determined by the 
uniqueness of its resources and value creation that derives from shared resources is bid away. 
This can be observed from the empirical evidence on PTPs presented above: there is a clear 
relation between the takeover premium and acquisition price and shared capabilities/sources 
of value, such as benefiting from tax shields, increasing management holdings and reducing 
excess cash flow. In order to appropriate part of the value creation, a private equity investor 
requires distinct valuable resources, and has to focus on deals in which its resources offer the 
most value creating opportunities. The idiosyncratic sources of value include providing value 
added services and exploiting portfolio and intertemporal synergies.   
 
2.3.4.1. Value added services and reputational effects. Companies financed by a private 
equity group can make use of the group’s extensive network and relationships: customers, 
suppliers, other investors, and access to more sophisticated resources in banking, legal and 
other areas, etc. (Bradford & Smith, 1997). The PTP firm can also benefit from the private 
investor’s expertise and competencies with regard to strategy, operational and financial 
management, human resources and marketing policy, and mergers and acquisitions (Wright, 
Hoskisson, & Busenitz, 2001). The private equity investor not only finances the company, but 
also provides a number of value added services, including valuable direction and oversight, as 
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well as involvement in the company’s day-to-day management as an active consultant29 
(Diamond, 1985; Bradford & Smith, 1987; Gorman & Sahlman, 1989; Sahlman, 1990; 
Sapienza, Manigart, & Vermeir, 1996). Furthermore, the target company benefits from an 
increased reputation and higher credibility as it has gone through the private investor’s 
thorough selection process. This might for example lead to enhanced bank financing terms or 
even access to bank financing in the first place. Though management buyouts have generally 
been seen as requiring less investor involvement than the more early-stage venture capital 
investments, some of them may have significant entrepreneurial opportunities which 
necessitate greater involvement by the private equity provider, who may play an important 
role in developing the entrepreneurial opportunities dimensions.30 For such companies, the 
private investor contributes to top management decision-making by keeping strategy on track, 
establishing new ventures/acquisitions, broadening market focus, and reviewing R&D, 
budgets and marketing plans (Bruining & Wright, 2002). 
 
2.3.4.2. Portfolio synergies.31 The target buyout firm might provide synergies with the private 
investor’s other portfolio companies. Joint operating efficiencies may result from combining 
research and development, procurement, distribution, sales and marketing, other business 
supporting services and headquarters operations. Integration of (parts) of these firms leads to 
a larger company with increased market power and gives rise to economies of scale. The 
wider application range of production facilities, process or product know-how and distribution 
channels provide potential economies of scope. 
  
2.3.4.3. Intertemporal synergies. The investor resources may have intertemporal synergies 
with future follow-up investment opportunities. For instance, the potential buyout candidate 
may be part of a buy-and-build strategy in which a private equity investor initially undertakes 
a platform acquisition and then leverages core competencies onto follow-on acquisitions in a 
broadened geographical base. Additional value is created through the consolidation of 
synergistic acquisitions as operations become more integrated, cost efficiencies are realized, 
and market share increases. Within such a buy-and-build strategy, acquisitions are no longer 
                                                 
29 Wright, Thompson, & Robbie (1992) report that 30% of the buyout managers consider the involvement of a 
venture capital provider very useful. Manigart et al. (2001) show that venture capital firms with specialist skills 
both add value and are better placed to control risks. 
30 These are: innovativeness, proactiveness, competitive agressiveness, risk taking and autonomy (see e.g. 
Lumpkin & Dess, 1996). 
31 Usually, synergies and intertemporal synergies are more widely available for strategic buyers than for financial 
investors; as a result, private investors face heavy competition from these corporate acquirers when trying to take 
a firm private. 
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viewed as stand-alone investments but rather as links in a chain of interrelated investments in 
which the early investments are prerequisites and set the path to follow. Besides, by making 
investments, firms learn about their capabilities, skills and assets. The PTP target will be 
valued differently by various investors according to their resource base. Moreover, when 
initial resources differ, what investors learn by doing the PTP will differ, and the value of this 
information will also differ as private investors have different real options (Bernardo & 
Chowdry, 2002). 
The flexibility of a sequential or staged acquisition in a buy-and-build can provide 
great benefits to the investor when there is major uncertainty about the consolidation. Once 
uncertainty about the success of the first stage is resolved, the investor can expand operations 
or simply decide not to proceed with the next stage (i.e., not exercise the real option) or even 
sell the company to another player. Pricing the first of an expected series of acquisitions 
requires a real options framework, allowing a dynamic analysis of the target’s synergistic 
growth potential. When several private investors may acquire the initial platform company, 
this represents a shared opportunity, and a high takeover price is typically paid for this type of 
investment (only after the acquisition does the platform provide idiosyncratic resources that 
can be levered onto follow-up investments). Within this framework, it is clear that not only 
the initial platform has a much higher value than on a stand-alone basis, but this also holds for 
follow-on acquisitions, which provide potential synergies and further growth options 
themselves.32 
One of many buy-and-build examples is the acquisition of DuPont’s connector 
systems unit (later renamed Berg Electronics) by Hicks, Muse, Tate & Furst in 1993. The 
buy-and-build included seven follow-on acquisitions, whereby Berg improved its efficiency in 
marketing and distribution. Berg went public in 1996 and was eventually acquired by 
Framatone in 1998, providing a generous return to its shareholders. The valuation of the 
platform company should consider the real option value of future follow-on investments. A 
buy-and-build unlocks value in several ways. First, there is a financial leverage effect. The 
investor typically uses a significant amount of debt to finance the acquisitions. Besides 
creating valuable tax shields, the resulting highly levered financial structure strengthens 
managerial incentives to improve efficiency and cash flow. Second, a buy-and-build strategy 
unlocks synergistic value through economies of scale or scope, and the increased size of the 
consolidated firm is likely to result in enhanced market power. Moreover, as the firm becomes 
                                                 
32 Smit (2001) provides a comprehensive description and discussion of the buy-and-build strategy. 
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larger and more mature, the private equity investor is likely to have more attractive exit 
opportunities. 
The future investment opportunities of a private equity investor and their value depend 
on the resources accumulated and the path chosen by the investor, as the value of levering its 
core competencies is path-dependent. Figure 2.4. illustrates a simplified valuation example of 
an asset accumulation strategy under uncertainty which involves a sequence of decisions. The 
acquisition of the second build-up firm, B2, is more valuable when the investor has purchased 
the first build-up, B1. 
 
Figure 2.4. 
Real Option Valuation of a PTP Platform Company: A Numerical Example of  
Path-Dependent Options 
 
Nature Payoff Investment Nature Payoff Investment 
moves decision B 1 moves decision B 2
Max (3328-700, 1600) = 2628 Acquire B2
[p×2628+(1-p)×1401]-600 Acquire B1
= 1372 Max (2101-700, 1210) = 1401 Acquire B2
Max (1740-700, 500) = 1040 Acquire B2
Max{[p×1040+(1-p)×620]-600, 500} Not acquire B1
= 500 Max (1320-700, 500) = 620 Acquire B2
PTP (P)
[p×1372+(1-p)×540] Max (2101-700, 1210) = 1401 Acquire B2
= 927 [p×1401+(1-p)×913]-600 Acquire B1
 = 540 Max (1339-700, 913) = 913 Not acquire B2
Acquire platform company
927>500 Max (1320-700, 500) = 620 Acquire B2
Max{[p×620+(1-p)×500]-600, 500} Not acquire B1
= 500 Max (996-700, 500) = 500 Not acquire B2
Platform value including                              Max(Build strategy, No build up) Max(Extend build strategy, No build up)
build-up strategy Max{S×[S×(P+B1)+B2)]-B2, S×(P+B1)}
when acquired B1 
Max(Build strategy, No build up)
Max[S×(P+B2)-B2, P)]
when not acquired B1  
 
In the first period, the firm may acquire the platform company in a PTP (P), which 
allows for follow-up acquisitions. In the second period, the investor has to choose between 
making the first build-up acquisition (B1), providing the opportunity to make further build-up 
investments, or temporarily not going ahead with the perceived build-up strategy. In the third 
period, the investor can choose to make an additional build-up investment (B2) or make no 
follow-on acquisitions. In the case that B1 was not acquired, the investor can add follow-up 
opportunity B2 to its platform, or abandon the buy-and-build strategy. Note that the choices 
that are available in the future and the values at the nodes depend not only on the state of 
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nature but also on the decisions taken along each trajectory. The option provided by the 
platform company is solved using backward induction. 
Suppose that the platform company has a stand-alone value (SAV) of $500 mio (P), 
the first build-up has a SAV of $600 mio (B1) and the second expansion has a SAV of $700 
mio (B2). For simplicity, acquisition prices are assumed to equal the SAV. The synergies of 
merging are expected to be 10%, but might be higher (up-factor u:1.15) or lower (down-factor 
d:1/1.15). Thus, we define a synergistic multiplicative factor (S) that indicates how the 
combined firm value evolves. Its expected value is 1.1, in the next period it may be uS (1.27) 
or dS (0.96). In the last period, it is equal to uuS (1.45), udS/duS (1.1) or ddS (0.83). In the 
final period, the firm has to decide whether purchasing the second build-up is more valuable 
than not investing, in case it has acquired B1 in the previous period: the value it obtains equals 
Max(S × [S × (P + B1) + B2)] - B2, S × (P + B1)). For instance, in the upper branch of the tree 
(uuS) the value of the combined firms would be 1.45 × [1.45 × (500 + 600) + 700)] = 3328; 
this value is obtained by purchasing B2 at a price of 700, and thus has a net value of 2628, 
which is higher than the value of making no further investment (1.45 × (500 + 600) = 1600). 
Hence, the build strategy is continued in this situation. In case it has not acquired B1, the firm 
has to determine whether purchasing the second build-up target B2, combined with the initial 
platform, is more valuable than not investing. The value it obtains equals Max(S × (P + B2) - 
B2, P). For example, suppose we are in the lowest branch of the tree (ddS), the value of 
purchasing B2 combined with the PTP platform is 0.83 × (500 + 700) = 996; the net value is 
obtained by subtracting the investment of 700 and equals 296. As this value is below the value 
of the platform when no build-on occurs (500), the private investor does not invest. In a 
similar way the end node values of all possible trajectories are calculated. Note that the value 
of acquiring B2 is affected by the investment decision to acquire B1.  
In the second period, the investor has to consider whether it acquires the first build-up 
or not. For instance, in the upper branch of the tree (uS) acquiring the first build-up provides 
an option on the upper payoffs in the third period: the value of this option depends on those 
future payoffs and is equal to 1372, which is higher than the value of not investing in the 
follow-up investment opportunity (500), so B1 is acquired. In the down branch of the tree (dS) 
the first build-up provides an option on the payoffs in the third period with a value of 540, 
which is higher than the value of not investing in B1 (500); the first add-on acquisition is 
made. 
The value of levering core competences via the add-on investment opportunity 
depends on the earlier path chosen and the private investor’s accumulated resource base. The 
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value of the follow-up investments is path-dependent in the sense that the value of the end 
nodes depends on the decisions taken along the path (e.g., in case that B1 is not acquired, the 
ddS trajectory results in an end node value of 500, while it results in an end node value of 913 
in case B1 is acquired).           
The value of the platform, $927 mio, can be obtained via backward induction of the 
option tree using the risk-neutral valuation approach within a binomial model (with p = [1 - d] 
/ [u - d] = 0.465). Therefore, correctly regarding the opportunity to make follow-on 
investments as an option and not an obligation adds an additional $126 mio (difference 
between value within option framework, $927 mio, and NPV framework, 1.1 × {1.1 × [$500 
mio + $600 mio] + $700 mio} - $600 mio - $700 mio = $801 mio) to the value of the initial 
platform, of which the acquisition provides the opportunity (the compound option) to make 
follow-on investments. Note that this is a simplified example. The valuation of more realistic 
cases is based on the same principles, but is often far more complex due to multiple 
interacting options, competitive interactions and different types of uncertainty.  
 
2.4. The evolution of value creation and the process of replication and renewal of 
idiosyncratic capabilities 
 
Management buyouts have traditionally involved the organisational restructuring of 
firms facing agency problems and operating in mature sectors with limited investment 
opportunities. The early buyout literature focused on value creation through reducing agency 
costs, stemming from overdiversification, overinvestment and insufficient accountability. The 
conglomeration trend of the 1960s reversed itself by the mid-1970s and through the 1980s as 
changing market circumstances and economic turbulence made many of these conglomerates 
inefficient. In restructuring moves designed to go back to the core business, many firms 
divested unrelated and inefficient businesses through sales to private equity groups. In the 
beginning of the 1990s, economic stagnation and a high level of competition resulted in a 
drop in investor returns, as most of the private investor once unique capabilities had lost their 
idiosyncratic nature, and the number of public-to-privates decreased significantly.  
Because of competition and imitability, empirical research shows a strong relation 
between total tax shields and the takeover premium paid in PTPs. The value of tax shields can 
be obtained by many players and is predictable, and is therefore almost fully reflected in the 
takeover price (Lowenstein, 1985; Kaplan, 1988, 1989b; Grundfest, 1989; Hayn, 1989; 
Kieschnick, 1989; Lehn & Poulsen, 1989). This holds as well for the other non-idiosyncratic 
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resources. On the other hand, buyout investors reap the gains from operating improvements, 
and these show no relation with the takeover premiums in the ‘80s (Kaplan, 1989b). 
Empirical research supports that the investor’s distinct resources and capabilities provide a 
barrier that shields from competition. 
With imperfect information, when target values are hard to assess, private investors 
should be very careful not to overbid and thereby avoid become a victim of the winner’s 
curse. Weston & Chen (1994) find overbidding for many PTPs at the end of the 1980s, due to 
high competitive pressure from the many buy-out funds that were raised at the time, attracted 
by the high returns in the early 1980s. The premium paid in buyouts with three or more actual 
or potential bidders is higher and acquirers show negative abnormal returns (Lowenstein, 
1985; Bradley, Desai, & Kim, 1988). Singh (1990) argues that many buyouts are preceded by 
takeover attempts, hence the private equity investor has to take these other potential acquirers 
into account. Thus, by the end of the ‘80s competition clearly affects the bidding premiums 
paid by private equity firms and strategic bidders and, as a result, the market for PTPs dried 
up.  
The period after 1992, characterized by economic growth, saw a revival of the private 
equity industry and its profitability. The new investment trend in private equity combined the 
restructuring motives from the ‘80s with a focus on growth. Stock market indices at the end of 
the 1990s reached record levels, resulting in exits at high valuations for private investors. 
These substantial returns gave rise to the creation of numerous new private equity firms and 
high commitment levels of funds, thereby increasing supply and competition (Gompers, 
1998). This resulted in higher deal valuations and a downward pressure on realised returns. 
Gompers & Lerner (2000) find that a rise in funds raised and in the number of private equity 
investors results in higher valuations and lower returns (“too much money chasing too few 
deals”). A doubling of funds raised by private equity firms results in a valuation level increase 
of 7% to 21%. As a consequence, due to the change over time in the idiosyncratic nature of 
the investor’s sources of value and capabilities, venture capitalists had to search for new 
markets. This was stimulated by the declining opportunities in the US and the UK, and their 
accumulated expertise gave them a comparative advantage over domestic competitors in those 
markets in seeking out and taking advantage of emerging opportunities (Wright, Thompson, 
& Robbie, 1992; Wright & Robbie, 1998).  
Private equity investors used to be mainly financial investors; during the ‘90s 
however, they have become active competitors of strategic players, searching for synergies. 
While the value creation of buyouts in the 1980s found its origin in restructuring cumbersome 
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conglomerates, the new trend in private equity focuses much more on the value added of 
growth. Buyout specialists have developed innovative approaches, and the scope of leveraged 
buyouts has broadened from mature, slow-growth industries to high-growth industries. 
Besides the more traditional type of buyouts, in which cost reduction and strategic 
reorientation are the key value drivers, there are also buyouts that derive their value mainly 
from product development, innovation and exploiting entrepreneurial growth opportunities.33 
This evolution is due to a considerable change in the idiosyncratic nature of the 
various sources of value. Those that relate to reducing agency problems and information 
asymmetry are not very specific anymore as many private equity investors possess the 
necessary capabilities to perform these activities. Among these, direct monitoring, obtaining 
organisational efficiencies and avoiding the underinvestment problem are idiosyncratic to 
some degree as they require specific information and skills. The sources of value destruction 
are somewhat idiosyncratic, as one investor is better able to cope with the costs of going 
private than the other, though these difference are rather limited. However, all of the sources 
of value described in the section ‘leverage of core competencies’ are likely to be more 
idiosyncratic. This holds for the value added services and reputational effects, but even far 
more for the portfolio and intertemporal synergies. Because every investor has a different 
resource base and portfolio of companies, there will be substantial difference in the extent to 
which synergies, both current and intertemporal, can be realised. Therefore, when we look 
back to our framework, the real option value component in particular will differ among rival 
private investors.  
As the previous investments and the experience of a private equity investor determine 
its current resources and capabilities, path dependency will become more important for 
explaining a private investor’s acquisition strategy. The private equity market will see a 
further move away from financial transactions into more innovative approaches and hybrid 
deals, such as buy-and-build strategies, which allow the private investor to lever its core 
competences and to fully exploit its unique capabilities. One way to acquire unique 
capabilities is through specialisation, networking and syndication. Private investors need to 
develop managerial and operating skills such as marketing and supply chain management that 
are useful in their whole investment portfolio. In order to make use of these skills in an 
optimal way, further specialisation in specific industry segments, technologies, geographic 
                                                 
33 According to its characteristics (managerial/entrepreneurial mindset - aimed at efficiency/strategic innovation), 
a buyout can be categorized as an efficiency-oriented buyout, a revitalisation buyout, an entrepreneurial buyout, 
or a buyout failure (Wright et al., 2000; 2001). 
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areas or investment stages is desirable. Private equity firms might consider partnering up with 
corporate acquirers, thereby benefiting from the partner’s industry-specific knowledge and 
management capabilities.      
 
2.5. Conclusions 
 
In this chapter, we use a combination of strategic management theory and financial 
economics to develop implications for the value appropriation in public-to-private 
transactions and to explain the observed evolution in this market. Investor-specific 
competencies and resources allow buyout investors to appropriate the value creation in a PTP. 
Due to competition in the market for private equity, any value creation arising from shared 
competencies is fully reflected in the price paid to the old shareholders. An important 
implication of the knowledge-based view is that private investors should build distinctive 
resources so as to be in a unique position to create value, and should focus on those going-
private deals in which their distinctive resources offer the most value-creating opportunities. 
The traditional sources of value creation in PTPs like the financial and some of the 
operational effects have become non-idiosyncratic. Private equity investors can only 
appropriate the value created by levering their core capabilities onto the target and exploiting 
the follow-up investment opportunities the target offers. As a result, the private equity market 
moves away from the traditional type of transactions based on financial restructuring into 
more specialization, innovative approaches and hybrid deals. A buy-and-build strategy, for 
instance, allows the private investor to benefit from levering its unique competencies. Private 
investors further specialize in specific industries and technologies, and extend their 
networking and deal syndication to obtain an idiosyncratic resource base. This resource 
accumulation further reinforces the path-dependent character of a private investor’s 
investment strategy. The path dependency of accumulating resources and making investments 
under uncertainty result in unique investment opportunities for a specific investor and allow to 
appropriate part of the value created, due to the idiosyncratic buyer value, its unique 
information and/or its idiosyncratic real option parameters.      
Studies in finance may benefit from incorporating strategy and further linking the two 
fields (e.g., by considering firms as bundles of resources, acknowledging the occurrence of 
path dependency, etc.). Valuable future research may be provided by empirical studies of 
PTPs that explicitly examine value creation given the target’s and private investor’s unique 
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resources, and that concentrate more on the ‘leveraging core competencies’ value sources 
rather than on the widely documented traditional sources. 
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Chapter 3: Acquisitions as a Real Options 
Bidding Game34 
 
Abstract 
 
This chapter uses a unified treatment of real options and game theory to examine the 
occurrence of bidding contests within a competitive environment of imperfect 
information and asymmetric bidders. Competing potential buyers may sequentially 
perform due diligence and incur costs (option premium) to become informed about 
their firm-specific target value (underlying value) before making a bid (exercise 
price). The first player’s bid reveals a signal on its own and the rival’s target value, 
thereby affecting the value of the rival’s option to bid on the target and the 
probability of a bidding contest. We find that bidding contests are more likely to take 
place between moderately correlated buyers, whereas rather diverse or just very 
similar buyers are less likely to compete. 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Acquisitions are known to have sometimes a beneficial and occasionally a very 
detrimental impact on a corporation’s performance. Empirical research on this topic indicates 
that, on average, acquisitions create value but most of this added value is reflected in the 
acquisition price. However, the resulting low acquirer returns exhibit substantial variation. In 
bidding contests in particular, heterogeneity between rival bidders and information asymmetry 
between them determine the acquisition premium (Bradley, Desai, & Kim, 1988; Fishman, 
1988). The real options-game model presented here examines the bidding process, the 
likelihood of a bidding contest and the expected value appropriation for the acquirer. The 
implications of the model are built on signaling by heterogeneous35 players. The information 
about target value that is revealed to a rival by a bid depends on the (dis)similarity of 
resources of the rival bidders. The bidding strategy, the likelihood of a bidding contest and the 
                                                 
34 This chapter is based on the paper ‘Acquisitions as a Real Options Bidding Game’, Han Smit, Ward van den 
Berg & Wouter De Maeseneire, Working Paper Tinbergen Institute, TI 084/2, 2004. I would like to thank 
Michael Fishman, Erwan Morellec and Enrico Perotti for comments on this chapter. This chapter has also 
benefited from presentations at the Corporate Finance Day, Ghent University (2004) and at the Strategic 
Management Society Conference, San Juan, Puerto Rico (2004). 
35 Bernardo & Chowdry (2002) also link a firm’s resources to its real options. A firm will make specialized or 
general investments, depending on what it expects to learn about its resources. 
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expected acquisition price are determined by new and less obvious parameters such as 
volatility and correlation between bidders’ resources. 
Firms often invest aggressively in due diligence before making acquisitions. Early, 
detailed, and rigorous transaction screening yield a significant advantage in placing a 
successful bid to many deals or avoid that the other deals are being taken too far through the 
process. The due diligence investment of an interested bidder can in this sense be considered 
as the purchase of a real option on the target’s value. The due diligence costs (option 
premium) a potential buyer needs to incur reveals the target value (underlying value) and are 
thus a prerequisite before making a bid (exercise price). A potentially interested bidder will 
only perform due diligence and incur the associated cost if this is justified by the real option 
value. The opportunity to bid on a target, however, is not an exclusive but rather a shared 
option, where the acquisition price is determined by competition between potential buyers.  
The specific acquirer’s assets, resources and capabilities and their fit with those of the 
potential target determine the actual value for each potential buyer (Barney, 1986). A public 
opening bid might reveal an attractive takeover target for rivals and provokes closer scrutiny 
of the target by other bidders. The extent to which an opening bid affects an uninformed 
rival’s beliefs concerning its target value and its expected gains from the acquisition depends 
on the bidders’ resources. For instance, a high bid indicates a high value for the initial bidder 
and a similar rival is likely to assign a high value to the target as well, whereas this bid would 
give no indication on the value for an unrelated rival. 
Fishman (1988) and Hirshleifer & Png (1989) also relate the expected gains in a 
bidding contest to the costs associated with acquiring information. Fishman (1988) offers the 
interesting insight that the price of a target in a bidding contest may exhibit a jump when 
some contestants have imperfect and costly information. We contribute insights from option 
theory to Fishman’s model and show that uncertainty and correlation between bidders 
determine the information revealed by the opening bid. Our model builds on Fishman (1988) 
and presents a two player setting, where the initial bidder may decide to make a pre-emptive 
or an accommodating bid after performing due diligence. When the bid provides an 
accommodating signal, the second bidder invests in due diligence and an English auction36 
unfolds. However, when the initial bidder has offered a pre-emptive bid, the costs of due 
diligence are higher than the second bidder’s option value on the target. The rival will abstain 
from entering a bidding contest and the first bidder acquires the target at the pre-emptive bid.  
                                                 
36 The target is then acquired at the second highest player's value. For an excellent overview of auction theory 
see Krishna (2002). 
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Our model provides several novel implications that can in principle be tested. In 
contrast to common beliefs, value appropriation is not strictly decreasing with the level of 
relatedness between bidders (correlation) but follows a U-shaped form. The opening bid 
provides a double signal to the rival. When correlation is high (bidders are similar), the 
opening bid signals high target value for the rival, inducing him to invest in due diligence and 
potentially join in a bidding contest. However, at the same time, due to the great similarity, 
acquisition prices will be high and value creation will be bid away in the contest, making the 
second player less inclined to invest in due diligence. When rival bidders are different 
(correlation is low) the second player is less likely to invest as well, since the bid signals low 
target value. As a consequence, both very low and very high levels of correlation enhance the 
ability to make a pre-emptive bid and increase the initial bidder’s value appropriation. 
Intermediate levels of correlation may result in a bidding contest and low value appropriation. 
Furthermore, value appropriation increases in case of higher uncertainty and higher expected 
value for the initial bidder. Greater uncertainty to the second bidder increases the likeliness of 
a bidding contest and reduces the value appropriation.  
The remainder of the chapter is as follows. In Section 3.2., we provide a brief review 
of background literature on bidder heterogeneity and information asymmetry to support the 
economic fundamentals of our model. In Section 3.3., we present our real option-game model. 
The model’s results are discussed in Section 3.4., and Section 3.5. elaborates upon the 
model’s implications. Section 3.6. summarizes this chapter and its main findings. 
 
3.2. Literature on value appropriation in acquisitions: heterogeneity and imperfect 
information 
 
From empirical research it is clear that acquisitions may create value, but there is 
substantial variation in how this value is split up between target and acquirer.37 A successful 
tender offer increases the combined value of the target and acquiring firm by about 7 to 10% 
on average (Bradley, Desai, & Kim, 1988; Seth, 1990; Stulz, Walkling, & Song, 1990). 
Further evidence suggests that acquiring firms on average earn a return close to zero, though 
                                                 
37 There are several alternative explanations with respect to how value creation is distributed between target and 
acquirer. Market power, hubris, overpayment, and other factors play a role (Chatterjee, 1992; Seth, Song, & 
Pettit, 2000; Capron, Mitchell, & Swaminathan, 2001). Moreover, agency-related and free-rider problems are 
important variables as well (e.g., Grossman & Hart, 1980; Bagnoli & Lipman, 1988; Stulz, 1988; Lang, Stulz, 
& Walkling, 1991; Slusky & Caves, 1991; Jennings & Mazzeo, 1993; Song & Walkling, 1993; Burkart, 1995; 
Hartzell, Ofek, & Yermack, 2004) but our model does not consider these problems. For a more comprehensive 
discussion on value appropriation in acquisitions, we refer to Bruner (2002), Capron & Pistre (2002) and King, 
Dalton, Daily, & Covin (2004). 
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there is tremendous variation in these returns (e.g., Berkovitch & Narayanan, 1993). The 
underlying causes of this variation in acquisition returns have enjoyed continuous attention in 
the empirical literature. However, further theoretical development explaining the variation in 
value appropriation is desirable (Fuller, Netter, & Stegemoller, 2002).  
Recently, several articles have used real options and games to explain the occurrence 
and returns of mergers (Smith & Triantis, 1994, and Smit, 2001). Lambrecht (2004) shows 
that firms have an incentive to merge in periods of economic expansion when mergers are 
motivated by economies of scale, which provides a rationale for the procyclicality of merger 
waves. Morellec & Zhdanov (2004) have developed a model that is consistent with the 
general empirical observation that target shareholders’ returns are larger than returns to 
bidding shareholders and that returns to bidding shareholders can be negative if there is 
competition for the target acquisition.  
The existence of information asymmetry between rival bidders has a significant 
influence on competition for deals and the size of the acquisition premium (Barney, 1988). 
For instance, a buyer’s initial stake (toehold) results in a financial and strategic advantage and 
to higher bidder returns (e.g., Grossman & Hart, 1981; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986; Franks & 
Harris, 1989; Stulz, Walkling, & Song, 1990). In addition, those returns could be attributed to 
the information advantage provided by the initial shareholding (Burkart, 1995). Bradley, 
Desai, & Kim (1988) have shown that bidder returns were higher before the acceptance of the 
1968 Williams Act, which requires a bidder to disclose private information about the target. A 
larger part of the value creation goes to the acquirer when buying a private firm or a 
subsidiary rather than a public firm. In addition to the lack of liquidity, this can be explained 
in part by limited information that is available, higher information costs for rivals, and 
consequently lower competition for the target. This is consistent with the findings of Fuller, 
Netter, & Stegemoller (2002), who show that acquirer returns are more positive for larger 
non-public targets and more negative for larger public firms. In our model, information on the 
idiosyncratic target value is acquired at a cost, such as consultancy and banker fees related to 
due diligence, but essentially creates an option to acquire the target. We show that a bid may 
reveal part of this information to potential rival bidders, and that the information revealed 
depends critically on the heterogeneity between bidders (correlation). 
Heterogeneity as a result of the specific match between the target’s and the acquirer’s 
resources creates the ability of a buyer to avoid bidding away all the value creation through 
high takeover prices (Chatterjee, 1986, 1992; Barney, 1988). The target will have different 
values for heterogeneous buyers. Capron & Pistre (2002), for example, show that acquirers 
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earn abnormal returns only when they can transfer their own unique resources to the target, 
which prevents the competitive bidding process from fully unfolding.38 Parenting advantage 
(Campbell, Goold, & Alexander, 1995), complementary resources (Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, 
& Ireland, 2001) and absorptive capacity (Zahra & George, 2002) might be considered as 
partly inimitable valuable resources and are therefore important factors in explaining the 
appropriation of value creation in acquisitions.  
In our model, we analyze the effect of heterogeneity on the information signaled to 
rivals by the opening bid, and we develop implications for the likelihood of bidding contests 
to occur.  
 
3.3. Option and game model 
 
In this section we develop our real option-game model in which players sequentially 
retrieve information on the target value and we determine the optimal Bayesian Nash 
equilibrium under an accommodating or deterrent bidding strategy. 
 
3.3.1. Assumptions of the option-game model 
 
We assume a two-player setting of the bidding game. Contests with more than two 
bidders seldom occur.39 In our model, Player A is the first to investigate the target value at 
time t = 0; at t = 1, Player A is informed about its target value and offers its initial takeover 
bid. Player B observes this public bid and can infer some information on the target value for 
both itself and the rival, enabling him to better assess the expected acquisition price and real 
option value obtained by performing due diligence. Player B will only invest in due diligence 
if the option value to bid on the target exceeds the costs of due diligence, I.40 If Player B 
decides to invest in due diligence, the target becomes the subject of a bidding contest between 
informed players at t = 2. The winning bidder’s value appropriation is contingent on its rival’s 
                                                 
38 Distinctive competences provide an isolating mechanism and allow acquirers to capture the value creation 
brought about by these unique resources (e.g., Chatterjee, 1986, Singh & Montgomery, 1987; Barney, 1988; 
Bradley, Desai, & Kim, 1988; Jarrell & Poulsen, 1989; Nathan & O’Keefe, 1989; Slusky & Caves, 1991). 
39 For instance, in the study of Bradley, Desai, & Kim (1988) 65 out of 73 multiple bidder contests involved 
only two bidders. 
40 In a takeover, a potential acquirer has to invest resources in searching for an appropriate target, evaluating 
potential sources of value and preparing the actual bid. These costs include fees to counsel and to investment 
banks, management time and the cost of obtaining the required amount of financing. Initial investigation of and 
identification of valuable targets may be a very costly activity (e.g., Chowdry & Nanda, 1993; Burkart, 1995).  
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value (= acquisition price). If Player B does not invest in due diligence, Player A acquires the 
target at its binding opening bid. 
We assume that common beliefs about expected target values, uncertainty around 
those values, and correlation between rivals’ target values are available to all participants in 
the game. The decisions are based on those common beliefs and observed players’ actions. 
We denote the present or expected value of the uncertain target value by ( ))2()0( 0 AA VEV =  
and ( ))2()0( 0 BB VEV =  for Players A and B respectively.41 The volatility or uncertainty can be 
different for both players and reflects the extent to which the actual value can deviate from the 
expected value; it is given by Aσ  and Bσ . The correlation between bidders’ target values is 
denoted by ρ. 
The information search period has been standardized to one.42 In the due diligence 
process small pieces of information on the acquisition value emerge, gradually reducing 
uncertainty, until at the end of the search the player knows its private actual target value, 
denoted by )2(* AA VV =  and )2(* BB VV =  for Players A and B, respectively. We assume a risk-
neutral world, in which the resolution of uncertainty about the actual target value during the 
process of information search is represented by the geometric Brownian motion in Equation 
3.1.. 43 
 
BAifortdZtVtdV iiii ,    )()()( == σ                   (3.1.) 
 
The Brownian motions of the actual target values, )(tZ A  and )(tZ B 44, are correlated 
by a factor ρ , with 11 ≤≤− ρ . The correlation reflects the degree of uniqueness of the rival 
bidders’ resources and capabilities. When ρ  equals 0, the two prospective buyers do not 
share any resources or capabilities that contribute value in the acquisition. For increasing 
                                                 
41 In a risk neutral world, the present value equals the expected value, if the discount rate is zero. For simplicity, 
we do not apply a risk-free time discount, as the entire acquisition game takes place within a short time horizon. 
Introducing a discount rate would not alter the model’s results. 
42 Takeover contests can last weeks or even months. Bradley, Desai, & Kim (1988) report that for their sample 
of multiple-bidder contests the ultimately successful offer was made on average more than six weeks after the 
initial offer. 
43 Alternatively, we could have assumed that the actual target values are lognormally distributed at t = 2, but the 
Brownian motion describes precisely the due diligence process. 
44 The notion of time in the Brownian motions ZA(t) and ZB(t) relates to the information that is released at a 
certain stage in the due diligence process (between begin t = 0 and end t = 1) and should not be confused with 
the decision at discrete time in the overall model, where Player A first investigates between time 0 and 1 and 
Player B investigates between time 1 and 2. If viewed in this way, the Brownian motions should be defined as 
ZA(t) and ZB(t-1). 
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values of ρ  a larger proportion of value creation in the acquisition results from similar 
capabilities and resources, and competition would become more intense in a bidding contest. 
For instance, tax shields in management buyouts can be obtained by many investors and stem 
from similar resources, whereas improving operations requires idiosyncratic capabilities 
(Kaplan, 1989). For 1=ρ , competitors are identical in their value creation competences and a 
bidding contest would transfer all value creation to the present shareholders. In case of 
negative correlation, a resource of the target or acquirer that has greater value to one player 
than initially expected will likely have a lower value for the competitor. An example would be 
the case of an inefficient business unit of a target that is making huge losses. If one player 
cannot perform the required restructuring, while the rival bidder is an expert in transforming 
inefficient businesses into successful ones, this would result in negative correlation between 
the rival bidders’ value of this resource. 
Finally, we assume -similar to most tender offer literature (e.g., Bradley, Desai, & 
Kim, 1988; Burkart, 1995)- that managers of bidding firms seek to maximize their 
shareholders’ wealth, that there are no transaction costs in bidding, that offers cannot be 
withdrawn (binding bids) and that all takeover bids are public information. Furthermore, we 
assume that a player who does not know its actual target value will never enter a bidding 
contest solely on the basis of common knowledge.45 Any bid must exceed the seller’s 
reservation price, RES, which is the price at which current owners are willing to sell their 
stake in the target. It is assumed to be equal to the target’s stand-alone value, or to the 
financial market value in the case of a listed firm. We do not consider free-rider problems, as 
did Grossman and Hart (1980), and assume that current owners are rather passive in the 
transaction. 
 
3.3.2. Option value for second bidder 
 
At t = 1, Player A has conducted due diligence and has offered a bid, bA, thereby 
signaling its value to Player B who is contemplating investment in due diligence. The real 
option for Player B to bid on the target resembles the exchange option of Margrabe (1978), as 
the uncertain target value to Player A (= price) is exchanged for the uncertain target value to 
Player B, but it also incorporates the information offered by Player A’s initial bid, Ab . Player 
                                                 
45 Barney (1986) and Fishman (1988) make this assumption as well: without being informed, acquirers can 
create value only when they are lucky. 
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A’s bid provides a lower bound to Player A’s target value distribution, AV ′ , which is at least as 
large as the bid.46 Furthermore, correlation between the players’ target values determines the 
bid’s impact on Player B’s update of its target value and uncertainty. When firms are similar, 
a high bid indicates a high value for Player A and therefore a high value for Player B is more 
likely as well. At time 1 the value of Player B’s option to bid on the target is given by 
Equation 3.2., where we take the truncation of the price distribution into account, or 
AA VV ′>* .47 
 
( ))|)0),2()2(max()1( AABQ VVVEC ′−=                  (3.2.) 
 
To obtain a closed form solution for the option value of Equation 3.2., we first 
examine the impact of the opening bid Ab  on Player B’s beliefs on the target’s value 
distribution for both players. At time 1 Player A has complete knowledge on its target value. 
Player B can infer some information on Player A’s value, as the lognormal distribution of the 
value at time 1 is now truncated by the lower bound AV ′ . The paths of the Brownian motion 
)(tZ A  that attain a value at t = 2 below ( ) AAAA VEk σσ /))(ln()Vln( 221+−′=  are not feasible 
anymore. Hence, the expected target value of Player A conditional on its implied bid, 
)|)2((1 AA VVE ′ , is given by the truncated expectation in Equation 3.3.. 
 
( ) ( )kNkNVVVE AAAA −−=′ σ)0()|)2((1                        (3.3.) 
 
Thus, Player A’s bid results in an upwards update of Player B’s beliefs about Player 
A’s expected target value. Moreover, when rivals’ target values are correlated, the bid reveals 
that certain due diligence outcomes on the value of the shared resources are not feasible. This 
affects Player B’s expected target value, as some values of )(tZ B are more likely to occur if 
the lower paths of )(tZ A  have not been attained. In case of positive correlation Player B’s 
expected target value will increase by a bid of Player A, while the update is downwards for 
                                                 
46 As we will discuss later, Player A’s bid signals that its actual target value is strictly higher than the bid and at 
least equal to the implied bid, AV ′ . 
47 In Equation 3.2. the option value is updated for the information on the minimal acquisition price revealed by 
bA. In the Appendix Equation (A.17.) we present the option value for Player B when there is also information in 
the type of bid (pre-emptive or accommodating). 
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negative correlation. Equation 3.4. provides Player B’s updated expected target value after 
observing Player A’s bid. 
 
( ) ( )kNkNVVVE BBAB −−=′ ρσ)0()|)2((1                  (3.4.) 
 
If BA ρσσ >  Player A’s bid has a larger impact on the expected value to Player A than 
to Player B. Player B’s shared resources are not sufficiently valuable to overcome the unique 
value creation that Player A might realize.  
Player B’s option value to bid on the target can now be expressed in terms conditional 
on the lower bound on Player A’s value revealed by its initial bid.48,49 
 
)(/),,()|)1(()(/),,()|)1(()1( 2121121211 eNeeMVVEdNddMVVEC AAAB ρρ ′−′=     (3.5.) 
 
The parameters50 of the standard bivariate and univariate normal distribution functions M and 
N are given by 
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The variance of the ratio )1(/)1( AB VV  is given by BABAAB σρσσσσ 2222 / −+= , while 
the correlation between the ratio )1(/)1( AB VV  and the variable )1(AV  is given by 
( ) ABAB /1 /σσρσρ −= .  
                                                 
48 The derivation of Equation 3.5. and Equation 3.9. can be found in the Appendix. 
49 In Section 3.3.3. and in Equation A.17. of the Appendix we present a solution that updates this option value 
for both the minimal value for Player A and the signal given by whether it follows an accommodating or pre-
emptive strategy. 
50 Note that kd B −= ρσ2 and ke A −= σ2 , which enables us to further simplify Equation 3.5.. 
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Let us consider some properties of this option. For a bid close to zero, or when no bid 
is offered, the option value collapses to the Margrabe simple exchange option given by 
)()0()()0( 11 eNVdNV AB − . For very low bids, the signal provided by Player A’s implied bid is 
weak and does not much alter Player B’s beliefs about its own or Player A’s expected target 
value. For higher bids, the influence on option value depends on uncertainty and correlation, 
which both affect the probability of a successful takeover and the updated value for the 
players. For very high bids ( ∞→′AVlim ) the option can take one of two values. If AB σρσ < , 
the option value converges to zero. A high bid increases the expected target value to Player A 
by far more than to Player B, and Player B will surely lose in a bidding contest. On the other 
hand, if B Aρσ σ> , a high bid indicates an even larger value for Player B than for Player A and 
Player B would certainly win a bidding contest. The option value will then become infinitely 
large. 
 
3.3.3. Pre-emption or accommodating competition 
 
Player A must deliberate at time 1 whether to quote a high pre-emptive bid or a lower 
bid that allows the rival to enter a bidding contest. The gains from quoting a pre-emptive bid 
are known in advance, while the option value of an accommodating bid strategy depends on 
the unknown target value to Player B. For which level a bid acts pre-emptive depends on the 
value of the alternative of offering an accommodating bid, which we will consider first. 
After due diligence, Player A knows its own target value *)2( AA VV =  and can update 
its beliefs about Player B’s target value based on their common resources and capabilities. 
The value of this shared component in the Brownian motions )(tZ A  and )(tZ B  is thus known 
to Player A, who is informed about the realization of 
( ) AAAAA VEVlZ σσ /))(ln()ln()2( 221** +−== . Hence, Player A knows the probability 
distribution of Player B’s target value conditional on *)2( AA VV = , and the updated expected 
value equals 
 
)(/)()0()|)2(( *1 llVVVE BBAB ϕρσϕ −=                  (3.6.) 
 
where )(xϕ is the standard normal probability density function evaluated at x, where -∞ < x < 
+∞. If Player A’s value is smaller than expected, VA(0), it is more likely that Player B’s value 
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is also smaller than initially expected, VB(0), under positive correlation. The variance in the 
geometric Brownian motion that describes Player B’s possible values is therefore reduced as 
well and is given by 
 
)()()1()( |
2 tdZtVtdV ABBBB σρ−=                     (3.7.) 
 
The Brownian motion )(| tZ AB  is independent of )(tZ A . Player A will make a pre-
emptive bid only if the expected payoff from preventing Player B from participating in a 
bidding contest outweighs the higher purchase price. The value of quoting a low bid and 
facing competition from Player B is given by the option 
 
))0),),2(max((max()1( * ABAQ bVVED −=                  (3.8.) 
 
The minimum acquisition price equals the initial bid, Ab . A competitor will enter the 
bidding contest if its target value is higher than this opening bid. When Player A values the 
target higher than Player B, it acquires the target at a price )2(BV ; otherwise, Player B 
acquires the target and Player A’s payoff is zero. The present value of this option at t = 1 is 
given in closed form by 
 
( ) )()()()|)2(()(),1( 121*11** fNbeNeNVVEdNVVD AABAA −−−=               (3.9.) 
 
where the parameters are given by 
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Player A’s option value under an accommodating bid strategy is decreasing in the 
level of the bid Ab . In a bidding contest, the likelihood of a successful acquisition depends 
only on Player B’s target value, which is not affected by a higher or lower bid. A higher bid 
only increases the average acquisition price, as the opportunity to acquire the target at the 
rival’s value, which may be lower than the bid, has been forestalled. In an accommodating bid 
strategy, Player A therefore has an incentive to offer an opening bid as low as possible and 
will hence offer a bid equal to the reservation price. 
Player B can obtain the option to bid by investing in due diligence at costs I . Player A 
can avoid a bidding contest when it has the opportunity to offer a pre-emptive bid that results 
in a Player B’s option value that is smaller than the information costs. Player A will follow a 
pre-emptive bid strategy if the pre-emptive bid is lower than the expected purchase price in a 
bidding contest. If Player A offers the pre-emptive bid, Player B infers that the value of pre-
emption exceeds the value of accommodation for the actual target value of Player A. The 
lower bound on Player A’s target value distribution is therefore not given by the pre-emptive 
bid, Ab
~ , itself, but by the implied pre-emptive bid, impAb , at which the value of accommodation 
equals the value of pre-emption. At this implied pre-emptive bid, Player B’s option value to 
bid on the target equals the due diligence costs.  
 
{ }IbCbb AAimpA <= ),0(:inf                             (3.10.) 
 
The pre-emptive bid itself is the difference between the implied pre-emptive bid and 
the value of the option to accommodate at a target value equal to this implied pre-emptive bid.  
 
),1(~ impA
imp
AA bDbb −=                  (3.11.) 
 
To summarize, Player A may choose a pre-emptive bid and receive the certain payoff, 
AA bV
~* − , or the option value under an accommodating bid strategy, ),1( *AVD , dependent on its 
actual target value, *AV . There are three equilibrium regions. If Player A’s target value is 
below the pre-emptive bid ( AA bV
~* < ), it accommodates. For target values between the pre-
emptive and the implied pre-emptive bid ( impAAA bVb << *~ ) accommodating is preferred as 
well, despite the fact that its value exceeds the pre-emptive bid. From a certain threshold, 
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imp
AA bV >* , offering a pre-emptive bid yields a higher payoff than accommodating 
competition.  
The pre-emptive bid depends on the uncertainty of and correlation between bidders. If 
BA σσρ /1 <<− , a pre-emptive bid exists since Player B’s option value decreases in Player 
A’s bid and will thus become smaller than the information costs. If AB σρσ > , the option 
value increases in the initial bid and pre-emption is impossible, except in the special case 
where the reservation price is already deterrent. The pre-emptive bid decreases in due 
diligence costs, as the implied pre-emptive bid decreases more than the value of the option 
under an accommodating strategy. 
Finally, if Player A accommodates a double signal is provided to Player B: i) Player 
A’s target value is at least as large as the reservation price (= accommodating bid); and ii) an 
accommodating bid implies that player A could not offer a high pre-emptive bid and Player 
A’s actual value is consequently lower than the threshold level impAb . In the Appendix 
Equation A.17., this cap on Player A’s value is accounted for in Player B’s option. Player B’s 
option value increases due to the cap on Player A’s value.  
 
3.4. Results of the model 
 
In this section we discuss the initial bidder’s decision between the alternative 
strategies -offering a high pre-emptive or a low accommodating bid- and examine Player A’s 
expected value appropriation. In our analysis, we focus on the impact of correlation and 
uncertainty about actual target value.   
 
3.4.1. Pre-emptive bidding: option value for Player B 
 
Player B will invest in due diligence after observing Player A’s bid when its option 
value exceeds the information costs. Player A knows the parameter values of this option and 
can offer a pre-emptive bid to deter Player B from entering the bidding contest. 
Figure 3.1. shows the influence of Player A’s implied bid (=lower bound on its value 
distribution) on Player B’s real option value to bid on the target under various parameter 
settings. As noted, in the special case where Player A has offered no bid or a bid equal to zero 
the option collapses to the Margrabe exchange option. In this case, Player B’s option value 
decreases in the level of correlation. In line with conventional wisdom, higher correlation 
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decreases total uncertainty about the difference in values that both bidders assign to the target 
(ratio of value and price). In general, heterogeneity between bidders’ resources -measured in 
our context by correlation- leaves room for appropriation of value in competitive bidding. 
However, when acknowledging the signaling effect of Player A’s implied bid on price 
and value for Player B, the option value of Player B becomes a non-linear function of the 
implied bid, and the impact of correlation on option value becomes more complex. At high 
correlation levels the implied bid has a limited impact on the option value: the likely 
acquisition price increases, but so does the expected target value. However, at low or even 
negative levels of correlation the bid signals a low target value, and the non-linearity becomes 
more apparent. 
The comparative static analysis presented in Figure 3.1. shows three types of 
curvatures, depending on the correlation: strictly increasing, strictly decreasing and initially 
increasing but later decreasing. First, when 0<ρ , the option value is strictly decreasing in 
the level of the implied bid. A higher bid reduces the expected value for Player B, while its 
beliefs about the acquisition price (i.e., the expectation of Player A’s value) increase. Second, 
when BA σσρ /0 <<  the option value is (often marginally) increasing for a low implied bid51 
and is decreasing for higher bids. In this case, the total uncertainty for Player A is higher than 
Player B’s uncertainty on the shared target resources. Consequently, a higher bid increases 
Player B’s conditional expected value (since 0>ρ ), but Player B’s belief of the acquisition 
price increases by an even larger amount (since AB σρσ < ; e.g., the curves in Panels D and F 
for 9.0=ρ  and in Panel C for 6.0=ρ ). Third, when AB σρσ >  the option value is strictly 
increasing in the level of the bid. When the uncertainty surrounding the shared resources 
faced by Player B is higher than the total uncertainty faced by Player A, a higher bid reveals 
information for Player B that increases its expected target value by more than the expected 
price. An example is shown in Panel C for the case 9.0=ρ . 
In the base case of Panel A, the target’s (unconditional) expected value for both 
players equals 100 and uncertainty around this expectation is 0.3 ( 3.0=iσ ). By offering an 
implied pre-emptive bid, PA, Player A can deter Player B from bidding because the 
information costs exceed Player B’s option value. Due to non-linearity the S-shaped option 
value functions for different correlation levels intersect. Whether higher correlation facilitates 
or hinders pre-emptive bidding therefore depends on the option value function vis-à-vis the 
                                                 
51 The maximum is, however, often located close to a bid of zero and the curve seems to be strictly decreasing. 
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level of information costs, I. When a low pre-emptive bid is sufficient (e.g., high costs) the 
effect on price exceeds the signal on value and higher correlation has a negative effect on the 
option value and the pre-emptive bid. When a high pre-emptive bid is required (e.g., low 
costs) the effect on value dominates the effect on price and higher correlation has a positive 
effect on option value, driving the pre-emptive bid upward. 
Panel B shows that higher uncertainty for Player A ( 4.0=Aσ ) amplifies the S-shaped 
form of the option value function relative to the base case. Player B’s acquisition price is 
more uncertain than its target value. Similar to Margrabe’s exchange option, higher 
uncertainty about the acquisition price would increase option value, since it increases the 
volatility in the difference between players’ actual target values. Interestingly, the bid’s 
signaling effect on price is stronger than in the base case, while its effect on Player B’s value 
has not been altered, thereby reducing option value. When a low pre-emptive bid is sufficient, 
the increased price uncertainty dominates the larger acquisition price and the option value 
rises. In cases where Player A has to make a high pre-emptive bid, the increased price 
uncertainty is dominated by the larger acquisition price and option value decreases. For 
instance in the example of Panel B, the implied pre-emptive bid is lower as compared to the 
base case of Panel A (for 3.0=ρ , from PA to PB). 
Panel C shows the effect of higher uncertainty for Player B ( 4.0=Bσ ) on option 
value. In this situation target value is more uncertain than target price. Now, the bid conveys a 
more significant adjustment in Player B’s expected value. In general52, the option value and 
the pre-emptive bid rise (for 3.0=ρ , from PA to PC). Pre-emptive bidding may even become 
impossible when AB σρσ > . 
Panel D shows the case of higher uncertainty for both players (to 4.0=iσ ) and thus 
combines the effects of the two previous panels. More uncertainty about resources and 
capabilities increases the attractiveness of conducting due diligence, as a greater potential is to 
be explored. With some exceptions, the option values in Panel D are shifted upward relative 
to Panel A, increasing the implied pre-emptive bid (for 3.0=ρ , from PA to PD). 
Panels E and F show the influence of expected target value on option value. A higher 
expected value of Player A (Panel E) reduces the bid’s signaling function. In general, the 
                                                 
52 Only in the special case of negative correlation a decline in Player B’s value might offset the increase in 
volatility. 
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option value and required pre-emptive bid will be lower (for 3.0=ρ , from PA to PE).53 Higher 
expected value to Player B (Panel F) increases its option value and the implied pre-emptive 
bid (for 3.0=ρ , from PA to PF). 
 
3.4.2. Accommodation: option value for Player A in a bidding contest 
 
The value of accommodating competition depends on Player A’s actual target value 
and its update on Player B’s expected target value (= expected acquisition price). Player A 
will accommodate when this strategy is more valuable than pre-emption. Accommodating 
competition may result in a lower acquisition price and hence larger value appropriation, but 
Player A faces the risk of paying more or even losing the contest. 
Figure 3.2. shows Player A’s real option value as a function of its actual target value 
when competition is accommodated. In the numerical example we set the reservation price 
equal to 80. If Player A’s actual value, *AV , equals the reservation price, the option value is 
zero, and the option value increases for higher actual target. The shared resources (correlation 
between the players’ target values) are an important factor for the shape of the function. The 
impact of correlation depends on the initially expected value for Player A and the actual target 
value which is private information of Player A. When Player A’s actual value is lower than 
initially expected (100 in our example) and correlation is positive, Player B’s value -and 
hence the acquisition price for Player A- is likely to be smaller. When actual target value is 
higher than initially expected, the effect of correlation on the acquisition price update is 
opposite. Player A’s option value therefore increases in the correlation level at low actual 
values due to lower acquisition prices, while it decreases in correlation for large actual target 
values due to higher acquisition prices (as can be best viewed in Panels C and E of Figure 
3.2.).54 
 Panel B shows the option value when the uncertainty faced by Player A is higher than 
for Player B.55 Player A’s negative or positive update on the expected acquisition price is 
  
                                                 
53 For negative correlation option value might decrease as compared to the base case, since the bid’s adverse 
effect on Player B’s expected value is smaller. 
54 In the case of negative correlation, the option value converges for higher target values to the maximum value 
appropriation, RESVA −*  (or a 45 degree line), as it is becoming less and less likely that Player B’s value would 
exceed the reservation price. For positive correlation the value of the option is always less than this 45 degree 
line, as the acquisition price is likely higher than the reservation price. 
55 In the simple case (not depicted) when no correlation is present, 0=ρ , the higher uncertainty has no influence 
on the price and the same option value would result. 
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Figure 3.1. 
Second Bidder’s (Player B) Option Value to Enter a Bidding Contest after  
Observing the First Bidder’s Offer (Player A) at Time 1 
In each panel the curves represent different correlation levels between Player A’s and Player B’s target value. Panel A shows the 
standard case where both players’ expected value equals 100 and uncertainty is 30%. In Panel B, only uncertainty for Player A has 
risen to 40%, while in Panel C only uncertainty for Player B has increased to 40%. In Panel D both players’ uncertainty has increased 
to 40%. In Panel E Player A’s expected target value rises to 110, while in Panel F Player B’s expected target value is 110. In all 
panels, we assume a due diligence cost of 7. The level of the implied pre-emptive bid is given by that implied bid at which the option 
value equals the costs. A dotted line represents option value if the second bidder does not purchase the option to enter the bidding 
contest. A continuous line represents the option value when the second bidder will purchase the option and enters the bidding contest. 
Panel A. Base Case      Panel B. Larger Uncertainty to Player A: 
        Option value increases and decreases 
 
Panel C. Larger Uncertainty to Player B:   Panel D. Larger Uncertainty to Both Players: 
Option value increases      Option value increases 
 
Panel E. Larger Expected Value for Player A:   Panel F. Larger Expected Value for Player B: 
Option value decreases      Option value increases 
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smaller. As can be observed from Panel A and B differences in option values due to 
correlation are therefore smaller under higher uncertainty to Player A.  
Panel C depicts the case where uncertainty on Player B’s value (or the acquisition 
price) is higher. As usual, higher price uncertainty increases option value, but it has also an 
effect on the updated expected acquisition price. Player A’s update will be larger, which may 
reinforce or offset the option value increase due to the larger uncertainty. When the actual 
target value is lower than expected, the downwards update on the acquisition price will be 
larger under positive correlation, raising option value. When the actual target value is higher 
than expected, the option value will decrease under positive correlation, partially or totally 
offsetting the increase due to larger uncertainty. An extreme example is given by the option 
value curve for 9.0=ρ , where the option value converges to zero for large actual target 
values. The effect of higher uncertainty to Player B on its option value are opposite for 
negative correlation. 
In Panel D uncertainty to both players is increased and the results of previous two 
cases might reinforce or offset each other. In Panel E a larger expected value to Player A 
increases option value for positive correlation and reduces it for negative correlation. A higher 
expected value to Player B (Panel F) reduces the option value in any case. 
 
3.4.3. Deliberation of Player A: pre-emption or accommodation 
 
At t = 1 Player A deliberates between making a pre-emptive bid or a lower bid that 
allows the rival to participate in a bidding contest. The gains from a pre-emptive bid are 
certain, AA bV
~* − . The value of allowing the competitor to enter the contest equals )1(D  from 
Equation 3.9.. For low target values, AA bV
~* < , Player A finds it optimal to place a low bid and 
accommodate competition, which is represented by the smooth line in Figure 3.3.. For values 
imp
AAA bVb << *~  Player A makes a profit when offering the pre-emptive bid, but the value of 
accommodation is higher, as can be observed in Figure 3.3.. The value of offering the pre-
emptive bid, AA bV
~* −  (represented by the thin dotted line), is less than the value of 
accommodating competition. The level of the pre-emptive bid Ab
~  is given by the value where 
the diagonal dotted line crosses the X-axis. The pre-emptive bid is offered for impAA bV >* , 
when pre-emption yields a higher return than accommodation. The implied pre-emptive bid is 
represented by the vertical dotted line. 
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Figure 3.2. 
First Bidder’s (Player A) Option Value to Accommodate Competition at Time 1 
If the second bidder enters a bidding contest, the first bidder’s payoff of the potential acquisition is affected as the rival raises the 
takeover price. Panel A shows the standard case where both players’ expected value equals 100 and uncertainty is 30%. In Panel B 
only uncertainty for Player A has risen to 40%, while in Panel C only uncertainty for Player B has increased to 40%. In Panel D both 
players’ uncertainty has increased to 40%. In Panel E Player A’s expected target value rises to 110, while in Panel F Player B’s 
expected target value is 110. In all panels, the reservation price equals 80. 
 
Panel A. Base Case      Panel B. Larger Uncertainty to Player A: 
Option value increases and decreases 
 
Panel C. Larger Uncertainty to Player B:   Panel D. Larger Uncertainty to Both Players: 
Option values increases and decreases    Option value increases or decreases 
 
 
Panel E. Larger Expected Value to Player A:   Panel F. Larger Expected Value to Player B: 
Option value increases and decreases    Option value decreases 
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Panel A, the base case, shows for each actual target value the expected value 
appropriation for Player A. Due to non-linearities in option value for Player B, a correlation 
level exists above which the pre-emptive bid no longer increases but instead decreases in 
correlation.56 The pre-emptive bid shifts right in correlation, but from a certain threshold level 
it shifts left again, as can be best viewed in Panel B. This can be explained if we revisit Figure 
3.1.. When the option value intersects the cost line, the pre-emptive bid can fall in the low 
cost region (correlation increases the pre-emptive bid) or high cost region (correlation 
decreases the pre-emptive bid). When correlation is very high and the opening bid is equal to 
the reservation price, Player B’s option to bid on the target may be less valuable than the due 
diligence costs. Player A can then appropriate all value creation and no bid premium is 
offered (e.g., the curve 9.0=ρ  in Panels A, B and E).  
When competition is accommodated, the results from Section 3.4.2. on Player A’s 
option value apply. For high actual target values the option value to accommodate 
competition decreases in correlation (see Figure 3.2.). This reinforces the effect of larger 
correlation on offering a pre-emptive bid for high target values: not only the pre-emptive bid 
decreases but also the alternative of accommodation is less valuable.  
In Panel B (higher uncertainty for Player A) we observe lower pre-emptive bids. As 
the pre-emption lines shift to the left, the first bidder appropriates a higher proportion of 
value. The high or low cost regions are a function of information cost vis-à-vis option value. 
Increased uncertainty to Player A shifts the minimum of the U-shaped value appropriation 
function to a lower correlation level.57  
Panel C of Figure 3.1. shows that it is more difficult to deter competition under higher 
uncertainty for Player B. As Player B’s option value increases, the pre-emptive bid shifts to 
the right. As can be confirmed from Section 3.4.2., the value of the accommodation option is 
higher for low target values and it might even exceed the value of pre-emption in the base 
case.  
Panel D again unites the previous both cases. The value of Player B’s option to bid on 
the target increases in uncertainty, raising the pre-emptive bid. A higher uncertainty to both 
players also results in a higher value of the accommodation option. For high actual target 
                                                 
56 The value appropriation for actual target values where a pre-emptive bid is chosen is minimal for this 
correlation level. In Panel A a correlation of 0.63 would minimize value appropriation for large actual target 
values. 
57 The minimal value appropriation under pre-emption is now attained at a correlation of 0.41 instead of 0.63 in 
the base case. Panel B shows that the pre-emptive bid for a correlation level of ρ = 0.6 is lower than for ρ= 0.3 
and value appropriation is accordingly higher.   
 
107
Chapter 3 
 
 91
values, the value appropriation will be less than in the base case where pre-emption occurs. 
However, for smaller actual target values, the value of the option to accommodate 
competition will be more valuable than in the base case where a pre-emptive bid is offered or 
competition is accommodated. The increased uncertainty to both players shifts the minimum 
of the U-shaped value appropriation function to a higher correlation. 
A higher expected value to Player A (Panel E) facilitates offering a pre-emptive bid 
and raises the value of the option to accommodate competition under positive correlation, so 
value appropriation will be larger. A larger expected target value to Player B (Panel F) 
reduces Player A’s expected value appropriation. The pre-emptive bid will be higher, and the 
option to accommodate competition becomes less valuable. 
 
To summarize, the value appropriation by the initial bidder decreases with a higher rival 
option value to bid on the target or lower information costs, resulting in higher pre-emptive 
bids, or with a lower value of accommodating competition. For high target values, value 
appropriation takes a U-shaped function in correlation. It initially decreases until correlation 
reaches a certain level; from that level on, value appropriation rises with correlation.  
 
3.5. Discussion of the model results and model extensions 
 
The value of a target depends on its resources and the related and complementary 
resources of the potential acquirer. Potential acquirers differ in their resource base and part of 
the value created in the acquisition is unique. The uncertainty around the expected value and 
the correlation between potential bidders are determined by the match between the resources 
of the target and potential acquirers. The degree of correlation and (asymmetric) uncertainty 
depends on the proportion of shared and unique resources of acquirers. When the initial 
bidder controls more unique, potentially valuable resources (rather than shared resources) its 
expected target value is likely to be higher and correlation lower. Part of the value creation in 
the acquisition cannot be replicated by rivals. In many cases unique resources increase 
uncertainty about target value (e.g., the acquirer possesses a unique technology with an 
uncertain match with the target). It is hard for outsiders to make inferences on the value of 
these unique resources in relation to the target. Likewise, the holder of unique resources has a 
more complicated task to assess the use and value of its unique resources within the target. Of 
course, there are situations in which the addition of unique resources to a player’s bundle of 
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Figure 3.3. 
First Bidder’s (Player A) Expected Value Appropriation of a Bidding Contest with Opportunity  
to Pre-empt or Accommodate Rival Bidder (Player B) at Time 1 
Expected acquirer return is certain if the pre-emptive bid is quoted (represented by the dotted line), and uncertain when competition 
is accommodated. In the latter case, it is equal to the expected value of the real option to accommodate competition (represented by 
the continuous line). The pre-emptive bid is given by the intersection of the dotted line with the X-axis. Panel A shows the standard 
case where both players’ expected value equals 100 and uncertainty is 30%. In Panel B, only uncertainty for Player A has risen to 
40%, while in Panel C only uncertainty for Player B has increased to 40%. In Panel D both players’ uncertainty has increased to 
40%. In Panel E Player A’s expected target value rises to 110, while in Panel F Player B’s expected target value is 110. In all panels, 
the reservation price equals 80. 
Panel A. Base Case      Panel B. Larger Uncertainty to Player A: 
        Value appropriation increases  
 
Panel C. Larger Uncertainty to Player B:   Panel D. Larger Uncertainty to Both Players: 
Value appropriation increases and decreases    Value appropriation increases and decreases  
 
Panel E. Larger Expected Value to Player A:   Panel F. Larger Expected Value to Player B: 
Value appropriation increases     Value appropriation decreases 
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resources may reduce the uncertainty about its target value. For instance, a high quality 
(unique) distribution channel that can be used for the target’s products may decrease 
uncertainty. 
From finance and strategy literature, it is known that firms need unique, idiosyncratic 
skills to generate abnormal returns in acquisitions, since for common resources competition 
drives up the takeover price and, as a consequence, value appropriation is low or non-existent. 
Imperfect and costly information might change this result. In order to compete for the target, a 
rival must incur due diligence costs that it expects to recover. The initial bidder, who is 
informed about its target value, therefore has a strategic competitive advantage, as it can 
affect the rival’s beliefs about expected gains from the acquisition. A key feature of our model 
lies in the opening bid, which contains a signal on both the initial bidder’s and the rival’s 
target value. The ability of the first bidder to influence the later entrant’s behavior by setting 
the appropriate opening bid depends on the degree of relatedness between bidders and the 
bidders’ uncertainty.  
The extent to which value-creating capabilities in the acquisition are shared or, on the 
contrary unique, has a sophisticated effect on value appropriation. When the first bidder offers 
the opening bid, the second bidder updates its own expected value of the acquisition in a 
potential bidding contest. The impact of this update depends on correlation between the 
bidders. On one hand, the rival’s expected target value increases in the level of correlation and 
on the other hand, the acquisition price in the contest will also be closer to its target value. A 
certain tradeoff in both effects exists, in which bidding contests are most likely when there is 
an intermediate level of correlation. For low correlation, the opening bid reveals only a high 
acquisition price, not a higher target value to the rival. High correlation implies that both 
players’ target values are closer to each other and that value creation will be bid away in a 
contest. For intermediate correlation, the opening bid provides an upwards update on target 
value, while leaving room for favorable due diligence outcome on the acquisition price and 
for value appropriation. 
Larger asymmetries in uncertainty between players can strengthen or weaken the 
signal of the opening bid. Increased asymmetric uncertainty can therefore offset the increase 
in option value as caused in general by higher uncertainty. When a player’s target value is 
surrounded by larger uncertainty, this player has more power in the first stage of the bidding 
game in which players decide on investing in due diligence. 
Our model provides a number of interesting new implications. The likelihood of 
bidding contests to occur depends on correlation. A bidding contest between players operating 
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in different industries is not very likely as correlation is low. Similarly, we do not expect 
bidding contests between rivals who possess different experience/skills, when one bidder is a 
strategic buyer and the other a financial investor, or when one bidder is aiming for a vertical 
acquisition while the other is pursuing a horizontal acquisition. Likewise, a bidding contest is 
not likely to take place between similar firms within an industry, as the due diligence costs are 
too high as compared with the potential gains. The highest probability of a bidding contest 
occurs when rivals are characterized by intermediate correlation (e.g., financial bidders who 
pursue different strategies for the target, strategic bidders in the same sector that differ in their 
resource base, a high cost-high quality vs. low cost player). Thus, we expect bidding contests 
to unfold when the target is under scrutiny of several players that differ in some aspects but 
are not completely different. 
The likelihood of bidding contests depends also on the uncertainty both players face. 
When the second bidder is more uncertain about its target value, the option to perform due 
diligence is more valuable, lowering value appropriation for the initial bidder. On the other 
hand, if the second bidder has higher uncertainty about the acquisition price (=initial bidder’s 
target value) and observes a high opening bid as well, he is less induced to retrieve 
information, resulting in higher value appropriation for the initial bidder. We expect that a 
bidding contest is less likely to unfold and that the initial bidder captures the highest amount 
of value appropriation when the initial bidder is a young firm58 or operates in a different sector 
than the target (high uncertainty about its target value). Bidding contests are also less likely 
when potential rival bidders are larger, mature firms (low uncertainty due to experience in 
matching resources) or when information costs are high (e.g., the target is a complex firm to 
value). 
A typical young firm is less likely to experience a rival bidder but is more likely to 
join a bidding contest as a second player, as the first bidder’s offer triggers his interest. As a 
consequence, outsiders are the main opponents within bidding contests. An outsider, more 
uncertain about its value and to a lesser extent correlated with the first bidder, may show up in 
the takeover battle. Within bidding contests, we expect that initial bidders will be those with 
high expected value and considerable uncertainty, while we expect rival bidders also to be 
faced with high uncertainty and to be related to some extent with the first (not too little, but 
neither too much). 
                                                 
58 Bernardo & Chowdhry (2002) suggest, for example, that younger and smaller firms still have a lot to learn 
about (the value of) their resources and therefore face higher uncertainty than more mature and larger firms. 
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The timing of the rival bidder’s decision to invest in due diligence is exogenous in our 
model. However, our results do not change when we consider endogenous timing, because 
firms are inclined to invest sequentially in order to optimally use the revelation of 
information. To show this, we consider the possible timing game presented in a matrix in 
Figure 3.4.. (i, ii) When firms invest sequentially the value of the first entrant is given by Fi, 
and the value of the second to enter the bidding contest by Si. (iii) When both players decide 
to invest simultaneously in due diligence, there is no information revelation and the payoff is 
given by the value of the Margrabe exchange option Ni minus the due diligence costs. (iv) 
When both rivals defer, the game is repeated in the next period (Di). 
 
Figure 3.4. 
Timing of the Due Diligence Investment Game 
A player can either wait or invest in due diligence. When both 
players invest they receive the option value of a bidding contest 
reduced with the due diligence costs. The value of entering first is 
given by the expected value of either a deterrence or an 
accommodating strategy reduced by the due diligence costs. The 
value of entering second is given by the value of entering the 
bidding contest when it is optimal to invest in due diligence. The 
deferral value is the present value of the next period’s game. 
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Simultaneous investment in due diligence (NA, NB) is not a Nash equilibrium. In order 
to benefit from the information revealed by a bid it is always preferred that the rivals invest 
sequentially and thereby potentially avoid unnecessary due diligence investment of the second 
player in the game (Si > Ni). Dependent on the actual payoffs, the three other cells constitute 
an equilibrium. Firms will invest sequentially when Fi > Di.. A coordination problem arises in 
a symmetrical game when there are two equilibria, in which one player invests and the other 
player waits. However, asymmetry in the payoffs might facilitate solving the coordination 
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game by finding a unique Nash equilibrium or at least a focal point. We note that due to the 
opportunity to offer a pre-emptive bid Fi is larger than Ni. 
The value of waiting, Di, depends on additional uncertainty besides the incomplete 
information in our model. The actual target value may change as developments in the 
economy or business environment create new opportunities for the employment of the 
combined target’s and acquirer’s resources. Over time not only the target’s reservation price, 
and potential rival bidders’ expected value, but also uncertainty itself and correlation may 
evolve. When the game is repeated in the next period the firms may defer until a sequential 
revelation equilibrium results. Endogenous timing will therefore result in sequential 
investment and will not affect the main results of our model. 
 
3.6. Conclusions 
 
In this chapter we use a real options-game model that examines the bidding process, 
the likelihood of a bidding contest and the expected value appropriation for the acquirer. We 
focus on the role of information asymmetry and on heterogeneity in the rival bidders’ 
resource base. A firm’s capabilities and resources, combined with those of the target, 
determine its expected target value, uncertainty around it, and the correlation with rivals’ 
target values. In our model, an uninformed bidder may acquire the option to bid on the target 
by performing due diligence. A potentially interested buyer will only become an informed 
bidder when its option value exceeds the due diligence costs. The initial bidder can affect the 
rival’s option value since the opening bid provides a signal on its own and on the rival’s target 
value. The first bidder may therefore choose a strategy to bid high and pre-empt rivals, or to 
bid low and accommodate competition, when pre-emption is too costly. 
By considering a bidding contest as a sequential option game within a resource-based 
perspective of bidders, our model introduces the roles of uncertainty and correlation for the 
likelihood of a bidding contest and value appropriation. The extent to which value-creating 
capabilities in the takeover are shared between rival bidders (correlation) has a U-shaped 
effect on value appropriation. Very high levels and very low levels of correlation lead to a rise 
in value appropriation due to pre-emption, under imperfect information. At intermediate 
levels of correlation a bidding contest may occur and value appropriation is lower. The 
magnitude and sign of the bidding signal further depends on the uncertainty both players face. 
Our model could be further expanded by including bidding costs, examining the 
endogenous timing of making a bid and determining endogenously which player offers the 
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opening bid. Under uncertainty, rivals may defer investment until major macroeconomic 
uncertainties are resolved. 
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Appendix to Chapter 3 
 
A. Derivation of Player B’s option to bid 
 
Before any due diligence Players A and B share common beliefs on the target value 
for each of them, both given by a lognormal distribution or the solution of a geometric 
Brownian motion from Equation 3.1. at t = 1. 
 
( )iiiii ZVEV σσ +−= 221exp)(   for i = A or B              (A.1.) 
 
We assume that the drift is absent, or the discount rate is equal to zero. The normally 
distributed variables AZ  and BZ  are correlated by a factor ρ . 
After due diligence, Player A offers a bid Ab  and truncates the distribution on its target 
value by the value AV ′  (with AV ′> Ab ), which is implied by this bid as we will show later. AZ  
cannot take values below ( ) AAAA VEVk σσ /))(ln()ln( 221+−′= . The expected value is now 
given by 
 
( ) ( ) ( )kNkNVEdxkNxfxVEVVE AA
k
AAiAA −−=−+−=′ ∫∞ σσσ )()(/)(exp)()|( 221  
(A.2.) 
where f(x) is the probability density function of the normal distribution and 
)(/)( kNxf −  gives the pdf. of the truncated distribution. The updated expected value of 
Player B’s target value also depends on the truncation of AZ by k: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )kNkNVEdydxkNyxgyVEVVE BB
k
BBBAB −−=−+−=′ ∫ ∫∞
∞−
∞
ρσσσ )()(/),(exp)()|( 221
      (A.3.) 
where g(x,y) is the pdf. of the bivariate normal distribution. 
The value of the option under the risk neutral measure Q conditional on the implied 
bid AV ′  is given by 
 
( )AABQ VVVEC ′−= |)0),1()2(max()1(                            (A.4.) 
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We can rewrite this to 
 
( )VVVEC
AAABAAAB VVVVAVVVVBQ
′−= ′>>′>> |1)2(1)2()1( })2()|2()2({})2()|2()2({                         (A.5.) 
  
which in turn can be rewritten by changing the numeraire:59 
 
( ) ( )AAABVAAAABVB VVVVQVVVVVQVC AB ′>>×−′>>×= )2(|)2()2()1()2(|)2()2()1()1(
  (A.6.) 
 
The conditional probabilities can be calculated by adjusting the drift of the geometric 
Brownian motions describing )(tVA  and )(tVB in accordance to the right probability measure 
AV
Q  or 
BV
Q . The solution is given by Equation 3.5. or 
 
)(/),,()|)1(()(/),,()|)1(( 2121121211 eNeeMVVEdNddMVVE AAAB ρρ ′−′               (A.7.) 
 
where the parameters of the standard bivariate and univariate normal distribution function M 
and N are given by 
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ABAB VEVEd
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σ+−=            
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ABAAA VVEd σ
σσρσ 221
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)ln())(ln( −+′−=  
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ABAB VEVEe
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2
/2
1
1
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σ
σ−−=             
A
AAA VVEe σ
σ 221
2
)ln())(ln( +′−=  
 
The variance of the ratio )1(/)1( AB VV  is given by BABAAB σρσσσσ 2222 / −+= , while the 
correlation between the ratio )1(/)1( AB VV  and the variable )1(AV  is given by 
                                                 
59 See Geman, El Karoui, & Rochet (1995). 
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AB
AB
/
1 σ
σρσρ −= . 
 
B. Derivation of Player A’s option under an accommodating strategy 
 
After due diligence, Player A knows the realization of 
( ) AAAAA VEVlZ σσ /))(ln()ln()2( 221** +−==  and can therefore infer a more precise expected 
value of Player B’s target value, which is given by the conditional expectation 
 
( ) )(/)()0(),(exp))0(()|)2(( 221*1 llVdyylgyVEVVE BBAABAB ϕρσϕσσ −=+−= ∫∞
∞−
   (A.8.) 
 
Also, the conditional uncertainty on the value )2(BV  is smaller and the standard deviation is 
given by Bσρ )1( 2− . The value of the option is now 
 
))0),),2(max((max()1( * ABAQ bVVED −=                    
 (A.9.) 
 
This can be rewritten by changing the numeraire as 
 
))2(())2(),2()2(()1())2()2(()1( * ABAABABVBABA bVQbbVVVQVVVQVD B <−><−<=
                               (A.10.) 
By changing the drift under the right probability measure we arrive at 
 
( ) )()()()|)2(()()1( 121*11* fNbeNeNVVEdNVD AABA −−−=            (A.11.) 
 
where the parameters are given by 
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2
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2
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1
*
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The option value decreases in the level of the opening bid bA. For a higher opening bid, the 
expected acquisition price increases, while the probability of a successful acquisition is not 
altered. To maximize the value of the bidding contest, Player A will therefore offer a bid as 
low as possible, i.e. equal to the RES.  
 
C. Derivation of Player B’s option to bid when Player A accommodates 
 
When Player A does not offer a pre-emptive bid, it signals to Player B that its value is 
lower than the threshold, impAb , above which pre-emption is preferred. In addition to the 
minimal price (value for Player A) truncating the value distribution from below, the 
distribution is now also truncated from above, enabling a more accurate valuation of the 
option to bid on the target. The normally distributed variable, AZ , cannot take values below 
( ) AAAVERESk σσ /))(ln()ln( 2211 +−=  or above ( ) AAAimpA VEbk σσ /))(ln()ln( 2212 +−= . In this 
case, the conditional expected value is given by: 
 
( ) ( )
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12
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2
1
2
1
kNkNkNkNVE
dxkNkNxfxVERESbVE
AAA
k
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σσ
σσ
          (A.12.)              
 
The conditional expected value for player B is given by 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ))()()(
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1212
12
2
2
1
2
1
kNkNkNkNVE
dydxkNkNyxgyVERESbVE
BBB
k
k
BBBAB
−−−−
=−+−== ∫ ∫∞
∞−
ρσρσ
σσ
  (A.13.) 
 
The value of the option for Player B conditional on the bid RES  and the pre-emption 
threshold AV
~ is given by 
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( )impAAABQ bVRESVVEC <<−= )2(|)0),2()2(max()1(                        (A.14.) 
 
We can rewrite this to: 
 ( )impAAbVRESVVAbVRESVVBQ bVRESVVEC impAAABimpAAAB <<−= <<><<> )2(|1)2(1)2()1( })2()|2()2({})2()|2()2({
                               (A.15.) 
  
which in turn can be rewritten by changing the numeraire: 
 
( )
( )impAAABVA
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AAABVB
bVRESVVQV
bVRESVVQVE
A
B
<<>×−
−<<>×=
)2(|)2()2()1(
)2(|)2()2()1()1(
                       (A.16.)
  
The conditional probabilities can be calculated by adjusting the drift of the geometric 
Brownian motions describing )(tVA  and )(tVB in accordance to the right probability measure 
AV
Q  or 
BV
Q . The solution is given by  
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          (A.17.) 
 
where the parameters of the standard, bivariate and univariate normal distribution function M 
and N are given by 
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D. Proof that Player B’s option value increases in value when acknowledging that Player A 
accommodates  
 
The option value E(1) can be written as a function of C(1|bA) with an offer bA equal to 
the reservation price, RES, or the threshold, impAb : 
 
( ) ( )
)()(
)|1()(1()|1()(1)1(
12
21
kNkN
bCkNRESCkNE
imp
A
−
−−−=                        (A.18.) 
 
The value of the option E(1) can only become lower than C(1|RES) when C(1| impAb ) is higher 
than C(1|RES). This cannot happen, as the value of the option C(1|RES) is always larger than 
I, otherwise the RES acts as the pre-emptive bid and C(1|RES) = C(1| impAb ) = I. Hence E(1) > 
C(1|RES). When AB σρσ >  Player B’s option value strictly increases in Player A’s bid, but 
then a pre-emptive bid cannot be made and impAb  does not exist. When the reservation price is 
already deterrent, E(1) equals zero. 
 
E. Proof of the existence of a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium 
 
We assume that Player A has invested in due diligence and is informed about its actual 
target value, *AV  > RES. This player can offer any bid bA higher than or equal to the 
reservation price, RES. In a possible bid contest it will raise its bid until its target value has 
been reached. Player B can decide to invest an amount I in due diligence, observes then its 
actual target value *BV  and joins the bidding contest if 
*
BV  is higher than the opening bid of 
Player A. If Player B decides not to invest, it will not be informed and cannot enter the 
bidding contest. 
There are multiple equilibria. They are of the form that Player A offers a high bid, Ab′ , 
when its valuation exceeds a certain threshold, AV ′ , and offers the reservation price in the 
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other case. The high pre-emptive bid is given by ),1( AAA VDVb ′−′=′ . Player B will invest in 
due diligence when Player A’s opening bid equals the reservation price and will enter the 
bidding contest if its actual target value exceeds the reservation price. Player B does not 
invest in due diligence when it observes the high pre-emptive bid. 
Player B is deterred by the bid Ab′  since Player A will only offer this bid when its 
valuation exceeds the threshold AV ′ . At any actual target value higher than this threshold, 
Player B’s option value is lower than its cost. The minimal value of this threshold AV ′  to be 
deterrent is given by impAb , which is defined by the following condition: 
 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ <∂
∂≤= 0)(),1(,),1(|min impA
A
A
AA
imp
A bb
bCIbCbb                         (A.19.)
  
The accompanying pre-emptive bid is given by )~,1(~~ AAA VDVb −= . For any value impAA bV >* , 
Player B is deterred by the pre-emptive bid, as  0)(),1( * <∂
∂
A
A
A V
b
bC holds for all impAA bV >* . 
When, on the other hand, the second part of the condition in Equation A.19. does not 
hold, the knowledge that AA VV ′>*  could invite Player B to enter the bidding contest rather 
than deter him. In this case a maximum level of the threshold exists and is given by the 
conditions: 
 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ >∂
∂≤= 0)(),1(,),1(|max maxmax A
A
A
AAA bb
bCIbCbb                         (A.20.) 
 
The optimal Bayesian-Nash equilibrium is given by the following set of strategies. 
Player A’s strategy: offer an accommodating bid, RES, when the actual target value, *AV , is 
less than the threshold impAb  and offer a pre-emptive bid, Ab
~ , when the actual target value, *AV , 
exceeds the threshold, impAb . 
Player B’s strategy: when observing an accommodating bid, RES, invest in due diligence and 
join a bidding contest and when observing a pre-emptive bid, Ab
~ , do not invest in due 
diligence and do not join a bidding contest. 
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Proof 
Suppose that impAA bV >*  and Player A still offers an accommodating bid. Player B will then 
enter the bidding contest and Player A’s payoff is the lower option value D(1), instead of the 
higher pre-emption value, AA bV
~* − . Pre-emption would be preferred. Suppose that impAA bV <*  
and Player A offers the pre-emptive bid. Player B will not enter the bidding contest and 
Player A’s payoff will be AA bV
~* − , while the value of accommodating D(1) is higher. As a 
consequence, Player A’s strategy is optimal. 
Suppose that Player B does not invest in due diligence and observes an 
accommodating bid. Its payoff will be zero, while if it had entered, it would have received the 
positive amount of E(1) – I. Investing in due diligence is preferred. Suppose that Player B 
does invest in due diligence and observes a pre-emptive bid.  Its payoff will be the negative 
amount of IbC A −)~|1( , while not investing would have yielded a payoff of zero. As a 
consequence, Player B’s strategy is optimal. Note that in case of positive correlation 
)1(~* DbV AA >−  for all impAA bV >*  and that )1(~* DbV AA <−  for all impAA bV <* . 
This forms the optimal set of strategies, as the payoff to the first player is maximized 
by choosing the pre-emptive bid Ab
~  and threshold impAb . By choosing a higher threshold AV ′  
the value of either entering a bid contest or pre-emption is reduced for any actual target value 
imp
AA bV >* . If Player A would still choose to pre-empt, its payoff is reduced, as the pre-emptive 
bid has increased. If Player A does not pre-empt anymore, but accommodates, its payoff is 
reduced as well. The value of accommodation is less than the value of pre-emption with the 
lowest pre-emptive bid Ab
~ , as 1)()1(* <∂
∂ imp
A
A
b
V
D . This condition might not hold in case of 
negative correlation and high implied pre-emptive bids. We will address this issue in the next 
subsection of this appendix.  
Summarizing, Player A will not offer a bid other than RES or the pre-emptive bid Ab
~ . 
A bid higher than Ab
~  would yield a lower payoff for Player A. Player B will still not join the 
bidding contest, and Player A has only raised its acquisition price. A bid between RES and Ab
~  
would also yield a lower payoff. Player B will enter the bidding contest and only the expected 
price is raised, but the probability of a successful takeover is not altered. Finally, a bid lower 
than RES is not feasible, as the present owners will only sell at a bid of at least size RES. We 
refer to Fishman (1988) for an in-depth analysis of the equilibrium concept. 
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F. Additional remarks for the case with negative correlation 
 
In the case of negative correlation, Player A’s value of the option to accommodate can 
become so large at high actual target values that it exceeds the payoff of the pre-emptive bid. 
The likely outcome of Player B’s due diligence is a target value smaller than the reservation 
price, as the players are negatively correlated. Hence, for low and high actual target values an 
accommodating bid is offered, while for intermediate actual target values the pre-emptive bid 
is offered. The pre-emptive bid, Ab
~ , and the high threshold above which accommodation is 
preferred again, AV
~ , are given by 
 
{ }IbEbb AAA <= ),0(:inf~ , { }AAAA bVDVV ~)1(:inf~ −>=                        (A.21.) 
 
When Player A has offered the accommodating bid, Player B knows that Player A’s 
actual target value is between the reservation price RES and the threshold impAb  or above the 
higher threshold AV
~ . Player B’s option value can now be written as 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
)(1)()(
)~|1()(1()|1()(1()|1()(1)1(
312
321
kNkNkN
VCkNbCkNRESCkNE A
imp
A
−+−
−+−−−=           (A.22.) 
 
The probability that Player A’s value is above the threshold AV
~  and offers the accommodating 
bid is given by N(k3), where ( ) AAAA VEVk σσ /))(ln()~ln( 2213 +−= . As the option value of 
Player B C(1|bA) is strictly decreasing in the bid bA when correlation is negative, it is clear that 
C(1|RES) > C(1| impAb ) > C(1| AV
~ ) and therefore E(1) is always larger than C(1|RES). Player B 
will therefore always invest in due diligence when Player A offers an accommodating bid. 
The following set of strategies forms a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in the case of negative 
correlation. 
Player A’s strategy: offer an accommodating bid, RES, when the actual target value, *AV , is 
less than the threshold Ab
~  or above the threshold AV
~  and offer a pre-emptive bid, Ab
~ , when 
the actual target value, *AV , lies between  the thresholds 
imp
Ab  and AV
~ . 
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Player B’s strategy: when observing an accommodating bid, RES, invest in due diligence and 
join a bidding contest and when observing a pre-emptive bid, Ab
~ , do not invest in due 
diligence and do not join a bidding contest. The proof is analogous to the case of positive 
correlation. 
It could occur that A
imp
A Vb
~≥  and the pre-emptive bid will never be offered. This is the case 
when 1)()1(* >∂
∂ imp
A
A
b
V
D . 
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Summary and conclusion  
 
Sophisticated valuation techniques such as adjusted present value (APV) and real 
options (RO), attract ever-increasing attention from theory and practice. A huge number of 
papers provide various applications of these advanced tools, for instance valuing R&D, 
strategic alliances and real estate. Real options have also been used for valuing acquisitions. 
However, notwithstanding the rich knowledge about valuation models applicable for valuing 
takeovers, there remains a need to further develop theories about the distribution of the value 
creation between the target’s and acquirer’s shareholders. Strategic management literature 
underlines the impact of possessing unique capabilities, and both the strategic and financial 
literature emphasize the role of information asymmetry in explaining value appropriation in 
acquisitions.   
In this dissertation both simple and more complex valuation models are discussed, and 
we propose a real option-game model that analyzes the acquirer’s value appropriation. In our 
valuation and value appropriation models, the specific resources and capabilities of the 
evaluator are considered. By taking the acquirer resources into account and by developing a 
new application of a combined option-game model, this PhD thesis is taking a step in further 
bridging the gap between finance theory and strategic management. 
The thesis consists of the collection of three chapters: ‘The Valuation of IPOs by 
Underwriting Investment Banks and the Stock Market’, ‘The Role of Investor Capabilities in 
Public-to-Private Transactions’, and ‘Acquisitions as a Real Options Bidding Game’. The 
first chapter is empirical work, the second is a conceptual synthesis and the third one is based 
on theoretical modeling. The common topic in these pieces is valuation (all three chapters) 
and value appropriation (second and third chapter). This dissertation discusses the real option 
framework in addition to the traditional valuation frameworks. 
The first chapter ‘The Valuation of IPOs by Underwriting Investment Banks and the 
Stock Market’ examines the accuracy of the valuation models used by the underwriting 
investment banks for 49 IPOs listed on Euronext Brussels between 1993-2001. Many papers 
have been published about the accuracy of valuation methods and about IPOs. However, the 
literature about IPO valuation and IPO valuation accuracy is limited. In Belgium, pre-IPO 
valuation estimates by the underwriting investment bank are available in the IPO prospectus. 
This permits us to investigate the accuracy of the ex-ante valuation models as used by the 
126
Summary and conclusion 
 
110  
underwriting investment bank, while related papers analyze the ex-post value estimates of 
academics. 
We find that for each IPO several valuation methods are used, of which the discounted 
free cash flow (DFCF) method is the most popular. However, the valuation result provided by 
the dividend discount model (DDM) is closest to the offer price, suggesting that investment 
banks use the DDM to set the offer price. When comparing the DDM valuation results with 
the price on the stock market after listing, we find that DDM tends to underestimate the value, 
while DFCF results in a pretty accurate predictor of the stock price. Interviews with 
investment bankers indicate that underwriters consciously underprice IPOs, by applying a 
discount to DFCF value estimates. DFCF is considered to be the most reliable method. DDM 
estimates are on average closer to the preliminary offer price than other value estimates, 
because DDM tends to underestimate value. When multiples valuation is used, investment 
banks rely mostly on future earnings and cash flows. Moreover, multiples valuation based on 
post-IPO forecasted earnings and cash flows leads to more accurate valuations than multiples 
valuation based on earnings and cash flows in the IPO-year. Consistent with the hypothesis 
that lead underwriters use other valuable information (such as investors’ demand for the IPO) 
besides value estimates to set the final offer price, our results indicate that the final offer price 
is closer to the post-IPO stock market price than the individual value estimates provided by 
the various methods. Real option techniques currently have not been used or even discussed 
for any of the IPOs in our sample.   
The second chapter ‘The Role of Investor Capabilities in Public-to-Private 
Transactions’, examines the value of a public-to-private leveraged management buyout (PTP) 
from the perspective of a private investor. It provides an overview of the sources of value 
creation and destruction in PTPs. We discuss all potential sources of value, hence we take into 
account the real options generated by a PTP. Next to the traditional value components 
(reducing agency problems and information-asymmetry, tax shields) we discuss the 
importance of levering the private investor’s core competencies. These allow benefiting from 
the synergetic benefits that might exist between the target and the current portfolio 
companies, and the intertemporal synergies, i.e., the opportunity to generate synergetic effects 
in the future by making follow-on investments which build on the initial PTP platform. An 
additional value component is provided by the information learned by making the buyout: the 
transaction allows the investor to become better informed about its resources and skills, 
thereby allowing him to make better investment decisions in the future. All the sources of 
value are integrated within an expanded adjusted present value criterion, which incorporates 
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the operational, financial value and real option value of a public-to-private. We provide an 
integration of finance and strategic management, and use that combined view to value public-
to-privates, as well as to explain the developments observed within this type of acquisitions. 
The chapter explores the evolution in the market of public-to-privates: due to the ever 
increasing levels of competition, the value generated by traditional sources of value is largely 
bid away. As a result, private equity investors aim for extracting value via exploiting non-
traditional value sources like levering their core competencies. This leads for instance to a 
further specialisation as to build unique resources that allow private equity players to 
appropriate part of the value creation in the buyout. It also gives an explanation for the so-
called path dependency of their investments: the previous investments in other portfolio 
companies determine the current resources and capabilities and therefore indicate which 
current and future investment opportunities are valuable. Furthermore, it provides an impulse 
to pursue innovative investment strategies such as buy-and-build: the public-to-private target 
is considered as a platform investment which provides the opportunity of making a number of 
follow-on investments. Within this strategy, the private investor tries to lever its own or the 
platform company’s core competences onto the follow-on acquisitions. The valuation of such 
a strategy requires a real option model that incorporates potential competitor bidders’ 
reactions.  
The third chapter ‘Acquisitions as a Real Options Bidding Game’ investigates the 
acquirer value appropriation in takeover contests. Empirical research indicates that 
acquisitions create value but most of this added value is reflected in the takeover premium. 
However, the resulting low acquirer returns show substantial variation. In bidding contests in 
particular, heterogeneity between rival bidders and information asymmetry affect the 
acquisition price. The real options-game model presented here examines the bidding process, 
the likelihood of a bidding contest and the expected acquirer value appropriation.  
Bidders often perform due diligence before making acquisitions. This investment in 
due diligence investment can be considered as the purchase of a real option on the target’s 
value. The due diligence costs (option premium) a potential buyer needs to incur reveals the 
target value (underlying value) and are thus a prerequisite before making a bid (exercise 
price). A potentially interested bidder will only perform due diligence if this real option value 
is higher than the cost. However, the opportunity to bid on a target is a shared option, where 
the acquisition price is determined by competing bidders. A public opening bid might reveal 
an attractive takeover target for rivals and induce a close scrutiny of the target by other 
bidders. The extent to which an opening bid affects an uninformed rival’s beliefs concerning 
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its target value and its expected gains from the acquisition depends on the bidders’ resources. 
For example, a high bid indicates a high value for the initial bidder and a similar rival is likely 
to have a high target value as well. 
The implications of our model build on signaling by heterogeneous bidders. The 
bidding strategy, the likelihood of a bidding contest and the expected acquisition price are 
determined by new and less obvious parameters such as volatility and correlation between 
bidders’ resources. In contrast to common wisdom, value appropriation does not strictly 
decrease with the level of relatedness between bidders but has a U-shaped form. Both very 
high and very low levels of correlation result in a higher value appropriation due to pre-
emption of rival bidders, whereas at intermediate levels of correlation a bidding contest may 
occur and value appropriation is likely to be lower. Furthermore, value appropriation 
increases in case of higher uncertainty and higher expected value for the initial bidder. Greater 
uncertainty to the second bidder increases the likeliness of a bidding contest and reduces the 
value appropriation.  
  This dissertation aims to contribute to our knowledge about company valuation and 
about the value appropriation of acquirers. We have illustrated the importance of 
incorporating the real option perspective for both valuation and value appropriation. In 
addition, at the end of each chapter we have identified a number of potential directions for 
future research. These include examining what valuation methods are used by practitioners, 
such as financial analysts and investment bankers, how they actually deploy those models in 
practice and whether the use of real options is on the rise. It would also be worthwhile 
investigating why discounted dividend and discounted cash flow models that should produce 
identical results in theory provide different outcomes in reality. Another valuable suggestion 
for future work can be derived from acknowledging that the strategic intuition behind the 
evaluation and the decision making process of economic agents can benefit from the 
discipline of a more rigorous analytical process that draws from concepts of finance theory. 
For instance, there is a need to incorporate the insights and consequences of real options 
thinking to a wider range of applications and to make the so-called strategic value of any 
transaction or investment project more explicit. Research that combines insights from finance 
and strategic management to evaluate transactions and to analyze the potential value 
appropriation would also be helpful in contributing to the current state of scientific knowledge 
regarding valuation and value appropriation.  
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Samenvatting 
 
Geavanceerde waarderingstechnieken zoals de aangepaste contante waarde methode 
en reële opties maken een opmars, zowel in theorie als in de praktijk. Een groot aantal 
wetenschappelijke publicaties gaat in op de verschillende mogelijke toepassingen voor deze 
complexe technieken, bijvoorbeeld in het kader van de waardering van onderzoek en 
ontwikkeling, strategische allianties en vastgoed. Reële optietechnieken worden ook gebruikt 
om overnames te waarderen. In tegenstelling tot de uitgebreide kennis omtrent 
waarderingsmethoden voor acquisities bestaat in de academische financiële literatuur echter 
een onvolledig begrip van de factoren die de verdeling van de waardecreatie bij overnames 
tussen overnemer en doelwit verklaren. De strategische literatuur wijst hieromtrent op het 
belang van unieke capaciteiten, en zowel de financiële als de strategische literatuur 
beklemtonen de rol die informatie-asymmetrie hierbij speelt. 
  Deze dissertatie gaat in op de traditionele en op de meer recente, complexere 
waarderingsmodellen, en we stellen tevens een speltheoretisch reëel optiemodel voor dat de 
waardetoe-eigening van de investeerder bij een overname analyseert. De modellen voor 
waardering en waardetoe-eigening houden expliciet rekening met de identiteit en de 
specifieke capaciteiten van de investeerder. Door strategische aspecten zoals inzichten uit de 
resource-based view en speltheorie op te nemen in een model voor het bieden op acquisities, 
tracht deze promotie een bijdrage te leveren aan het overbruggen van de kloof die bestaat 
tussen strategische inzichten en de waarderingsmethodieken in financieel management.  
Dit proefschrift wordt gevormd door een bundeling van artikelen en bestaat uit de 
volgende 3 hoofdstukken: ‘The Valuation of IPOs by Underwriting Investment Banks and the 
Stock Market’, ‘The Role of Investor Capabilities in Public-to-Private Transactions’, en 
‘Acquisitions as a Real Options Bidding Game’. Het eerste hoofdstuk betreft een empirisch 
onderzoek, het tweede is een conceptuele synthese en het derde is gebaseerd op een 
wiskundig model. De rode draad van deze hoofdstukken is waardering (alle hoofdstukken) en 
waardetoe-eigening (tweede en derde hoofdstuk). Hierbij komen de traditionele 
waarderingsmethoden aan bod, aangevuld met het reële optie-perspectief. 
Het eerste hoofdstuk is getiteld ‘The Valuation of IPOs by Underwriting Investment 
Banks and the Stock Market’ (co-auteurs: Marc Deloof en Koen Inghelbrecht). In dit stuk 
wordt de accuraatheid van de verschillende waarderingsmethoden, zoals gebruikt door 
investment banks, onderzocht voor een steekproef van 49 Belgische IPOs. In België worden 
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de resultaten van de pre-IPO waardering door de underwriting investment bank in de 
prospectus gepubliceerd, wat ons toelaat om ex-ante waarderingen door de lead underwriter te 
gebruiken, terwijl andere papers in dit domein de ex-post waardeschattingen door de 
onderzoekers zelf evalueren.  
Voor de IPO’s werden verschillende waarderingsmethoden gebruikt. De DCF 
(discounted cash flow) methode is de meest populaire, maar de DDM (dividend discount 
model) methode produceert een waarde die het dichtst bij de intekenprijs ligt. Dit zou 
suggereren dat de banken de intekenprijs baseren op de resultaten van DDM. Als we de 
verkregen waardeschattingen via DDM echter vergelijken met de aandelenprijs na de 
introductie, stellen we vast dat DDM de waarde onderschat, terwijl de DCF methode een vrij 
accurate predictie geeft van de aandelenkoers. Interviews met investment bankers wijzen erop 
dat de intekenprijs bewust vrij laag wordt gezet, door een discount toe te passen op de DCF 
waarde, welke beschouwd wordt als de meest betrouwbare methode. De via DDM verkregen 
schattingen liggen dichter tegen de intekenprijs omdat deze methode de waarde van de IPO 
eerder lijkt te onderschatten. Bij een waardering aan de hand van multiples maken 
underwriters voornamelijk gebruik van toekomstige winsten en cash flows. Deze resulteren in 
meer accurate waarderingen dan multiples gebaseerd op historische boekhoudkundige cijfers. 
In lijn met de hypothese dat underwriters andere waardevolle informatie (zoals de marktvraag 
naar de IPO) gebruiken bij de bepaling van de intekenprijs, stellen we vast dat de finale 
intekenprijs een betere voorspelling geeft van de aandelenkoers dan de schattingen volgens de 
verschillende waarderingsmethodes.  
Het tweede hoofdstuk is getiteld ‘The Role of Investor Capabilities in Public-to-
Private Transactions’. In dit hoofdstuk wordt een uitgebreid overzicht gegeven van de 
verschillende bronnen van waardecreatie en waardevernietiging. Naast de traditionele 
factoren (de reductie van vertegenwoordigingsproblemen en informatie-asymmetrie, en 
belastingsoptimalisatie) worden een aantal nieuwe elementen naar voor gebracht, het 
‘leveren’ van de unieke capaciteiten van de investeerder. Deze kunnen de synergie die 
gerealiseerd kan worden met de bestaande portefeuille-ondernemingen en de intertemporele 
synergie omvatten. Laatstgenoemde betreft de opties om later synergieën te creëren door 
middel van vervolgovernames na de aankoop van een platform onderneming. Een bijkomende 
waardecomponent ligt verscholen in de informatiewaarde van de buyout: door de transactie 
leert de investeerder nieuwe zaken over zijn capaciteiten, wat toelaat om in de toekomst 
betere investeringsbeslissingen te nemen. Deze waardecomponenten worden geïntegreerd in 
een uitgebreid waarderingscriterium, dat zowel de operationele, financiële en reële 
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optiewaarde van een public-to-private transactie omvat. De voornaamste bijdrage van dit 
onderdeel ligt in het feit dat het een integratie biedt van ondernemingsfinanciering en 
strategisch management, en hiervan gebruik maakt om public-to-privates transacties te 
waarderen en de waardetoe-eigening door de private investeerder te verklaren. 
Dit hoofdstuk geeft tevens een beschrijving van de evolutie in de markt van public-to-
privates. Door de immer scherper wordende concurrentie wordt waarde behaald uit de 
traditionele componenten grotendeels weggeboden en trachten private equity spelers 
maximaal nieuwe componenten te benutten. Dit resulteert in een steeds verdere specialisatie 
en verklaart ook de zogenaamde padafhankelijkheid van investeringen (de vroegere 
investeringen bepalen de huidige capaciteiten en dus de huidige en toekomstige 
investeringen). Dit heeft geleid tot nieuwe strategieën zoals buy-and-build waarbij de eerste 
acquisitie gezien wordt als een platform overname, waarna meerdere vervolginvesteringen 
kunnen plaatsvinden. Getracht wordt om kerncompetenties van de private equity speler of van 
de platformonderneming te implementeren in deze latere acquisities.  
Het derde hoofdstuk is getiteld ‘Acquisitions as a Real Options Bidding Game’ (co-
auteurs: Han Smit en Ward van den Berg) en onderzoekt de waardecreatie voor de overnemer 
in biedstrijden. Een overvloed aan empirisch materiaal wijst er op dat overnames waarde 
creëren maar dat het voornaamste deel hiervan weerspiegeld wordt in de betaalde 
overnamepremies. Er valt echter een grote variatie waar te nemen in de rendementen voor de 
overnemer, waarbij sommige overnemers er wel in slagen een deel van de waardecreatie toe 
te eigenen. Bij biedstrijden in het bijzonder, hebben de heterogeniteit tussen de verschillende 
bieders en informatie-asymmetrie een belangrijke invloed op de overnameprijs. Wij 
onderzoeken het biedproces, de kans op een biedstrijd en de verwachte winst voor de 
overnemer aan de hand van een reëel optiemodel, dat rekening houdt met de reacties van 
concurrerende bieders (speltheorie).   
Potentiële bieders voeren vaak een due diligence uit alvorens overnames te doen. Deze 
investering in due diligence kan beschouwd worden als de aanschaf van een reële optie op de 
waarde van het doelwit. De due diligence is kostbaar (optiepremie) maar informeert een 
mogelijke overnemer over de waarde van het doelwit (onderliggende waarde) en is dus een 
noodzakelijke investering alvorens de overnemer een bod (uitoefenprijs) kan uitbrengen. Een 
potentieel geïnteresseerde bieder zal enkel due diligence doen als de reële optiewaarde 
voldoende hoog is. De mogelijkheid om te bieden op een overnamedoelwit is echter een 
gedeelde optie, waarbij de overnameprijs wordt beïnvloed door concurrerende bieders. Een 
publiek overnamebod wijst op een interessant overnamedoelwit en kan aldus de interesse van 
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concurrenten opwekken. Dit bod heeft ook een impact op de waarschijnlijkheidsverdeling van 
de doelwitwaarde en dus op de mogelijke overnamewinsten van niet-geïnformeerde bieders. 
Deze impact hangt af van de heterogeniteit tussen bieders: een hoog bod signaleert een hoge 
waarde voor de initiële bieder en dus een hoge waarde voor gelijkaardige bieders.  
De implicaties van ons model steunen op informatievrijgave in het bod (signaling) 
door heterogene bieders. De biedstrategie, de kans op een biedstrijd en de verwachte 
overnameprijs worden binnen ons model bepaald door nieuwe en minder voor de hand 
liggende parameters zoals onzekerheid en correlatie tussen bieders. De waardetoe-eigening is 
niet strikt dalend in de mate van heterogeniteit tussen bieders maar vertoont een U-vorm. 
Zowel een zeer hoge als zeer lage correlatie leidt tot waardetoe-eigening omdat het toelaat 
concurrentie te vermijden, terwijl een middelmatige correlatie kan resulteren in een biedstrijd 
en aldus tot een lagere waardetoe-eigening. Daarnaast leiden ook een hogere onzekerheid en 
een hogere verwachte doelwitwaarde voor de initiële bieder tot hogere overnamewinsten. Een 
hogere onzekerheid voor de rivaliserende bieder vergroot de kans op een biedstrijd en 
vermindert de waardetoe-eigening.  
Dit proefschrift tracht een bijdrage te leveren aan de wetenschappelijke kennis over 
waardering en waardetoe-eigening door investeerders. We hebben het belang geïllustreerd van 
het reële optieperspectief voor zowel waardering als waardetoe-eigening. Daarnaast werden er 
aan het einde van elk hoofdstuk ook verschillende aanwijzingen gegeven omtrent uitbreiding 
van de voorgestelde ideeën. Enkele suggesties voor vervolgonderzoek betreffen het in kaart 
brengen van de waarderingsmodellen die in de praktijk door zakenbankiers gebruikt worden 
en op welke manier deze toegepast worden. Hierbij is het interessant om na te gaan waarom 
discounted cash flow en discounted dividend modellen in de praktijk verschillende resultaten 
opleveren, terwijl deze in theorie nochtans identiek zijn en dus gelijkaardige uitkomsten 
zouden moeten voortbrengen. Ander nuttig vervolgonderzoek betreft het formaliseren van de 
strategische intuïtie die schuilgaat achter de evaluatie en besluitvorming van economische 
agenten met een degelijk analytisch model gebaseerd op concepten uit financieel 
management. Door het incorporeren van de inzichten en de consequenties van het reële 
optiedenken kan men de strategische aspecten expliciet tot uiting brengen en een meer 
volledig beeld krijgen van de waardecomponenten van een transactie. 
 
153
 
 
 
154
 
  
155
 
139 
Curriculum vitae 
 
Wouter De Maeseneire (1977) obtained his Master’s degree in Applied Economics magna 
cum laude from Ghent University, Belgium, in 1999. He joined the Department of Corporate 
Finance at Ghent University and the Competence Centre Accounting and Finance at the 
Vlerick Leuven Gent Management School in September 1999. In September 2001, Wouter 
was awarded with a scholarship from the Fund for Scientific Research-Flanders (Aspirant). In 
September 2002 he also joined ERIM as a PhD candidate to carry out his doctoral research. 
His work has been presented at several international conferences e.g., at the conferences of 
the European Financial Management Association and of the Strategic Management Society. 
His current research interests include valuation, real options and private equity. 
 
 
 
156
 
  
157
 
  
ERASMUS  RESEARCH  INSTITUTE  OF  MANAGEMENT  (ERIM) 
 
ERIM PH.D. SERIES 
RESEARCH IN MANAGEMENT 
 
ERIM Electronic Series Portal: http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1 
 
 
Appelman, J.H., Governance of Global Interorganizational Tourism 
Networks; Changing Forms of Co-ordination between the Travel Agency 
and Aviation Sector, Promotors: Prof. dr. F.M. Go & Prof. dr. B. 
Nooteboom, EPS-2004-036-MKT, ISBN 90-5892-060-7, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1199 
Berens, G., Corporate Branding: The Development of Corporate 
Associations and their Influence on Stakeholder Reactions, Promotor: 
Prof. dr. C. B. M. van Riel, EPS-2004-039-ORG, ISBN 90 –5892–065–
8, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1273 
Berghe, D.A.F., Working Across Borders: Multinational Enterprises and 
the Internationalization of Employment, Promotors: Prof. dr. R.J.M. van 
Tulder & Prof. dr. E.J.J. Schenk, EPS-2003-029-ORG, ISBN 90-5892-
05-34, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1041 
Bijman, W.J.J., Essays on Agricultural Co-operatives; Governance 
Structure in Fruit and Vegetable Chains, Promotor: Prof. dr. G.W.J. 
Hendrikse, EPS-2002-015-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-024-0, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/867 
Brito, M.P. de, Managing Reverse Logistics or Reversing Logistics 
Management? Promotors: Prof. dr. ir. R. Dekker & Prof. dr. M. B. M. de 
Koster, EPS-2004-035-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-058-5, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1132 
Campbell, R.A.J., Rethinking Risk in International Financial Markets, 
Promotor: Prof. dr. C.G. Koedijk, EPS-2001-005-F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-
008-9, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/306 
Chen, Y., Labour Flexibility in China’s Companies: An Empirical 
Study, Promotors: Prof. dr. A. Buitendam & Prof. dr. B. Krug, EPS-
2001-006-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-012-7, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/307  
Daniševská, P., Empirical Studies on Financial Intermediation and 
Corporate Policies, Promotor: Prof. dr. C.G. Koedijk, EPS-2004-044-
F&A, ISBN 90–5892–070–4, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1518 
158
 
  
Delporte-Vermeiren, D.J.E., Improving the Flexibility and Profitability 
of ICT-enabled Business Networks: An Assessment Method and Tool, 
Promotors: Prof.mr. dr. P.H.M. Vervest & Prof. dr. ir. H.W.G.M. van 
Heck, EPS-2003-020-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-040-2, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/359 
Dijksterhuis, M., Organizational Dynamics of Cognition and Action in 
the Changing Dutch and US Banking Industries, Promotors: Prof. dr. 
ing. F.A.J. van den Bosch & Prof. dr. H.W. Volberda, EPS-2003-026-
STR, ISBN: 90-5892-048-8, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1037 
Fenema, P.C. van, Coordination and Control of Globally Distributed 
Software Projects, Promotor: Prof. dr. K. Kumar, EPS-2002-019-LIS, 
ISBN: 90-5892-030-5, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/360 
Fleischmann, M., Quantitative Models for Reverse Logistics, Promoters: 
Prof. dr. ir. J.A.E.E. van Nunen & Prof. dr. ir. R. Dekker, EPS-2000-
002-LIS, ISBN: 3540 417 117, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1044 
Flier, B., Strategic Renewal of European Financial Incumbents: 
Coevolution of Environmental Selection, Institutional Effects, and 
Managerial Intentionality, Promotors: Prof. dr. ing. F.A.J. van den 
Bosch & Prof. dr. H.W. Volberda, 
EPS-2003-033-STR, ISBN: 90–5892–055–0, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1071 
Fok, D., Advanced Econometric Marketing Models, Promotor: Prof. dr. 
P.H.B.F. Franses, EPS-2003-027-MKT, ISBN: 90-5892-049-6, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1035 
Ganzaroli , A., Creating Trust between Local and Global Systems, 
Promotors: Prof. dr. K. Kumar & Prof. dr. R.M. Lee, EPS-2002-018-
LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-031-3, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/361 
Gilsing, V.A., Exploration, Exploitation and Co-evolution in Innovation 
Networks, Promotors: Prof. dr. B. Nooteboom & Prof. dr. J.P.M. 
Groenewegen, EPS-2003-032-ORG, ISBN 90-5892-05-42, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1040 
Graaf, G. de, Tractable Morality: Customer Discourses of Bankers, 
Veterinarians and Charity Workers, Promotors: Prof. dr. F. Leijnse & 
Prof. dr. T. van Willigenburg, EPS-2003-031-ORG, ISBN: 90–5892–
051–8,  http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1038 
Hermans. J.M., ICT in Information Services, Use and deployment of the 
Dutch securities trade, 1860-1970. Promotor: Prof. dr. drs. F.H.A. 
Janszen, EPS-2004-046-ORG, ISBN 90-5892-072-0, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1793 
159
 
  
Heugens, P.M.A.R., Strategic Issues Management: Implications for 
Corporate Performance, Promotors: Prof. dr. ing. F.A.J. van den Bosch 
& Prof. dr. C.B.M. van Riel, EPS-2001-007-STR, ISBN: 90-5892-009-
7, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/358 
Hooghiemstra, R., The Construction of Reality, Promotors: Prof. dr. 
L.G. van der Tas RA & Prof. dr. A.Th.H. Pruyn, EPS-2003-025-F&A, 
ISBN: 90-5892-047-X, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/871 
Jansen, J.J.P., Ambidextrous Organizations, Promotors: Prof.dr.ing. 
F.A.J. Van den Bosch & Prof.dr. H.W. Volberda, EPS-2005-055-STR, 
ISBN 90-5892-081-X 
Jong, C. de, Dealing with Derivatives: Studies on the Role, 
Informational Content and Pricing of Financial Derivatives, Promotor: 
Prof. dr. C.G. Koedijk, EPS-2003-023-F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-043-7, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1043 
Kippers, J., Empirical Studies on Cash Payments, Promotor: Prof.dr. 
Ph.H.B.F. Franses, EPS-2004-043-F&A. ISBN 90-5892-069-0, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1520 
Koppius, O.R., Information Architecture and Electronic Market 
Performance, Promotors: Prof. dr. P.H.M. Vervest & Prof. dr. ir. 
H.W.G.M. van Heck, EPS-2002-013-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-023-2, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/921 
Langen, P.W. de, The Performance of Seaport Clusters; A Framework 
to Analyze Cluster Performance and an Application to the Seaport 
Clusters of Durban, Rotterdam and the Lower Mississippi, Promotors: 
Prof. dr. B. Nooteboom & Prof. drs. H.W.H. Welters, EPS-2004-034-
LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-056-9, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1133 
Le Anh, T., Intelligent Control of Vehicle-Based Internal Transport 
Systems, Promotors: Prof.dr. M.B.M. de Koster & Prof.dr.ir. R. Dekker, 
EPS-2005-051-LIS, ISBN 90-5892-079-8 
Liang, G., New Competition; Foreign Direct Investment And Industrial 
Development In China, Promotor: Prof.dr. R.J.M. van Tulder, EPS-
2004-047-ORG, ISBN 90–5892–073–9, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1795. 
Loef, J., Incongruity between Ads and Consumer Expectations of 
Advertising, Promotors: Prof. dr. W.F. van Raaij & Prof. dr. G. 
Antonides, EPS-2002-017-MKT, ISBN: 90-5892-028-3, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/869 
Mandele, L.M., van der, Leadership and the Inflection Point: A 
Longitudinal Perspective, Promotors: Prof. dr. H.W. Volberda, Prof. dr. 
H.R. Commandeur, EPS-2004-042-STR, ISBN 90–5892–067–4, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1302 
160
 
  
Meer, J.R. van der, Operational Control of Internal Transport, 
Promotors: Prof. dr. M.B.M. de Koster & Prof. dr. ir. R. Dekker, EPS-
2000-001-LIS, ISBN:90-5892-004-6, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/859 
Miltenburg, P.R., Effects of Modular Sourcing on Manufacturing 
Flexibility in the Automotive Industry: A Study among German OEMs, 
Promotors: Prof. dr. J. Paauwe & Prof. dr. H.R. Commandeur, EPS-
2003-030-ORG, ISBN 90-5892-052-6, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1039 
Mol, M.M., Outsourcing, Supplier-relations and Internationalisation: 
Global Source Strategy as a Chinese Puzzle, Promotor: Prof. dr. R.J.M. 
van Tulder, EPS-2001-010-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892- 014-3, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/355 
Mulder, A., Government Dilemmas in the Private Provision of Public 
Goods, Promotor: Prof. dr. R.J.M. van Tulder, EPS-2004-045-ORG, 
ISBN: 90-5892- 071-2, http://hdl.handle.net/1765 
Muller, A.R., The Rise of Regionalism: Core Company Strategies Under 
The Second Wave of Integration, Promotor: Prof. dr. R.J.M. van Tulder, 
EPS-2004-038-ORG, ISBN 90–5892–062–3, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1272 
Oosterhout, J. van, The Quest for Legitimacy: On Authority and 
Responsibility in Governance, Promotors: Prof. dr. T. van Willigenburg 
& Prof.mr. H.R. van Gunsteren, EPS-2002-012-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-
022-4, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/362 
Peeters, L.W.P., Cyclic Railway Timetable Optimization, Promotors: 
Prof. dr. L.G. Kroon & Prof. dr. ir. J.A.E.E. van Nunen, EPS-2003-022-
LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-042-9, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/429 
Popova. V., Knowledge Discovery and Monotonicity, Promotor: Prof. dr. 
A. de Bruin, EPS-2004-037-LIS, ISBN 90-5892-061-5, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1201 
Puvanasvari Ratnasingam, P., Interorganizational Trust in Business to 
Business E-Commerce, Promotors: Prof. dr. K. Kumar & Prof. dr. H.G. 
van Dissel, EPS-2001-009-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-017-8, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/356 
Romero Morales, D., Optimization Problems in Supply Chain 
Management, Promotors: Prof. dr. ir. J.A.E.E. van Nunen & Dr. H.E. 
Romeijn, EPS-2000-003-LIS, ISBN: 90-9014078-6, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/865 
Roodbergen , K.J., Layout and Routing Methods for Warehouses, 
Promotors: Prof. dr. M.B.M. de Koster & Prof. dr. ir. J.A.E.E. van 
Nunen, EPS-2001-004-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-005-4, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/861 
161
 
  
Schweizer, T.S., An Individual Psychology of Novelty-Seeking, 
Creativity and Innovation, Promotor: Prof.dr. R.J.M. van Tulder. EPS-
2004-048-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-07-71, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1818 
Six, F.E., Trust and Trouble: Building Interpersonal Trust Within 
Organizations, Promotors: Prof. dr. B. Nooteboom & Prof. dr. A.M. 
Sorge, EPS-2004-040-ORG, ISBN 90–5892–064–X, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1271 
Slager, A.M.H., Banking across Borders, Promotors: Prof. dr. D.M.N. 
van Wensveen & Prof. dr. R.J.M. van Tulder, EPS-2004-041-ORG, 
ISBN 90-5892-066–6, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1301 
Speklé, R.F., Beyond Generics: A closer look at Hybrid and 
Hierarchical Governance, Promotor: Prof. dr. M.A. van Hoepen RA, 
EPS-2001-008-F&A, ISBN: 90-5892-011-9, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/357 
Teunter, L.H., Analysis of Sales Promotion Effects on Household 
Purchase Behavior, Promotors: Prof. dr. ir. B. Wierenga & Prof. dr. T. 
Kloek, EPS-2002-016-ORG, ISBN: 90-5892-029-1, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/868 
Valck, K. de, Virtual Communities of Consumption: Networks of 
Consumer Knowledge and Companionship, Promotors: Prof.dr.ir. G.H. 
van Bruggen, & Prof.dr.ir. B. Wierenga, EPS-2005-050-MKT, ISBN 90-
5892-078-X 
Verheul, I., Is there a (fe)male approach? Understanding gender 
differences  
in entrepreneurship, Prof.dr. A.R. Thurik, EPS-2005-054-ORG, ISBN 
90-5892-080-1 
Vis, I.F.A., Planning and Control Concepts for Material Handling 
Systems, Promotors: Prof. dr. M.B.M. de Koster & Prof. dr. ir. R. 
Dekker, EPS-2002-014-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-021-6, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/866 
Vliet, P. van, Downside Risk and Empirical Asset Pricing, Promotor: 
Prof. dr. G.T. Post, EPS-2004-049-F&A ISBN 90-5892-07-55, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1819 
Waal, T. de, Processing of Erroneous and Unsafe Data, Promotor: Prof. 
dr. ir. R. Dekker, EPS-2003-024-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-045-3, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/870 
Wielemaker, M.W., Managing Initiatives: A Synthesis of the 
Conditioning and Knowledge-Creating View, Promotors: Prof. dr. H.W. 
Volberda & Prof. dr. C.W.F. Baden-Fuller, EPS-2003-28-STR, ISBN 
90-5892-050-X, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/1036 
162
 
  
Wijk, R.A.J.L. van, Organizing Knowledge in Internal Networks: A 
Multilevel Study, Promotor: Prof. dr. ing. F.A.J. van den Bosch, EPS-
2003-021-STR, ISBN: 90-5892-039-9, http://hdl.handle.net/1765/347 
Wolters, M.J.J., The Business of Modularity and the Modularity of 
Business, Promotors: Prof. mr. dr. P.H.M. Vervest & Prof. dr. ir. 
H.W.G.M. van Heck, EPS-2002-011-LIS, ISBN: 90-5892-020-8, 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/920 
 
 
 
 
Essays on Firm Valuation and Value Appropriation
Sophisticated valuation techniques such as adjusted present value
and real options, attract ever-increasing attention from theory and
practice. A huge number of papers in the academic field provide
various applications of these advanced tools, for instance valuing
research and development, strategic alliances and real estate. Real
options have also been used for valuing mergers and acquisitions.
However, notwithstanding the rich knowledge about valuation
models applicable for valuing takeovers, there remains a need to
further develop theories about the distribution of the value creation
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emphasize the role of information asymmetry in explaining value
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more complex valuation models are discussed, and we propose a real
option-game model that analyzes the acquirer’s value appropriation.
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